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Laboratory Experiments in Game Theory

  • Takizawa HirokazuEmail author
Chapter

Abstract

This chapter discusses several issues in experimental game theory. Since its inception in the 1950s, experimental game theory has now grown into a field with large literature, still attracting many young researchers (Kagel and Roth in The handbook of experimental economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995; Camerer in Behavioral game theory: experiments in strategic interaction. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2003).

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of EconomicsChuo UniversityHachiojiJapan

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