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The Economic Reforms’ Agenda and Bottlenecks

  • Mahmoud Sami Nabi
Chapter

Abstract

Since January 2011, the ninth successive Tunisian government dedicated specific social programs and mechanisms in the objective to send short-term positive signals while trying to undertake critical structural reforms. Despite several positive measures and governmental actions, the economy is still suffering from slow progress in implementing the economic reforms, overwhelming corruption and weak business environment. This chapter begins by exploring the current economic reforms’ agenda and presents the ongoing comprehensive macroeconomic reform program which is supported by the International Monetary Fund. Then, it delves into the factors explaining the resistance to change and questions the ability of the state’s institutions to conduct effective and fair integrated reforms. It finally analyzes the structural factors that are preventing the transformation of the Tunisian economy: (1) lack of an integrated development strategy, (2) lack of consensus and weak institutional capacities and (3) extractive political institutions.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mahmoud Sami Nabi
    • 1
  1. 1.LEGI-Tunisia Polytechnic School and FSEG NabeulUniversity of CarthageTunisTunisia

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