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Analysis on the Strategy of Promoting the Quality of Shared Bicycle Service Based on Evolutionary Game

  • Yan-liang Zhang
  • Liu-yu Wen
Conference paper

Abstract

In order to enhance the service quality of shared bicycles under the background of popular bicycle market, the evolution path and evolutionary equilibrium of government and enterprise choice game strategy is analyzed by constructing the evolutionary game model of government and enterprise strategy from the perspective of management under the attention of sharing the bike in this paper. Then the evolution strategy of government and enterprise is analyzed by using the evolutionary game theory and the government and enterprise as the main body of the game. Moreover, the stable conditions that can promote the government and enterprise decision-making are discussed. The results show that strengthening the cooperation between government and enterprises, increasing the sharing of bicycle propaganda, strengthening government management awareness, promote the development of consumer standards, and standardize user behavior will help to enhance the quality of shared bicycles.

Keywords

Evolutionary game Service quality Shared cycling Strategy selection 

Notes

Acknowledgements

This research is supported by Humanity and Social Science Youth foundation of Ministry of Education of China under Grant #11YJC630291 to Yanliang Zhang.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Management EngineeringZhengzhou UniversityZhengzhouChina

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