Coordination Effects of Market Power and Fairness Preference on Supply Chain

  • Ju-ning SuEmail author
  • Xiao-yu Yang
  • Jun-feng Jiang
  • Li-yao Tan
Conference paper


As the core of supply chain management, supply chain coordination is influenced by several factors. The theory of behavioral supply chain management holds that in addition to economic factors, supply chain coordination is also impacted by behavioral factors. Fairness preference is a common behavioral factor. This paper examined the effect of the external factor, i.e. market power, and internal factor, i.e. fairness preference, on supply chain coordination. First, a benchmark for supply chain coordination effects was established. Next, the influences of two factors, i.e. market power and fairness preference, on supply chain coordination were separately analyzed. It was indicated that both producing negative effects on supply chain coordination. Lastly, the coordination effects of the two factors were compared, the former’s influence was larger.


Coordination effects Fairness preference Market power Nash game 



This research is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71672143), the Project of Humanities and Social Science Research of Education Ministry of China (13YJA630077), Shaanxi Province Natural Science Foundation Research Project (2017JM7013).


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ju-ning Su
    • 1
    Email author
  • Xiao-yu Yang
    • 1
  • Jun-feng Jiang
    • 1
  • Li-yao Tan
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Economics and ManagementXi’an University of TechnologyXi’anChina

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