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An Optimal Investment Strategy Against Information Security Risks

  • Bing-ning Pan
  • Jing Xie
Conference paper

Abstract

Information risks generally become a great challenge for individuals and organizations around the world. Managing information risks has involved various tools and approaches, among which self-protection and cyber insurance are two important methods to control the residual risk and improve security level. This paper analyzes these companies’ investment strategies on self-protection and insurance respectively, and presents a company’s best choice in both the weakest-link case and the partial-correlation case. The result shows that for most parameter settings Nash equilibrium could be reached and that the companies’ strategies have an obvious impact on each other.

Keywords

Information security Insurance Interdependent risks Self-protection 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.College of Management and EconomicsTianjin UniversityTianjinChina

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