Disarmament, Arms Control and Arms Race

  • Ajey LeleEmail author
Part of the Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies book series (SIST, volume 132)


In coming years, various emerging and/or disruptive technologies and various other technological innovations happening from time to time are expected to get refined, adapted and used at a remarkable rate by military establishments globally. The rapidity in innovation and development is also expected to bring in the ethos of scientific uncertainty. Owing to the dynamic developments taking place in the fields of modelling and simulation and virtual reality technologies, the need for testing of weapons could reduce. This could lead faster induction of certain technologies in the armed forces and leave very little time with the mankind to first understand and then improve upon the limitations of rapidly developing technologies. All this could pose significant challenges to the systems of governance both at regional and global levels.


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© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute for Defence Studies and AnalysesNew DelhiIndia

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