Conclusion: Governance and Manufacturing Towns in Continuous Reforms
Gong concludes that the governance of migrants in different non-factory areas involves inclusion-and-exclusion mechanisms, acting like multiple “invisible filters” which screen migrants and reinforce the labor supply and factory management of migrant workers. While a small portion of migrants with skills or higher education have become local residents, the majority maintain the status quo as a source of cheap labor and may encounter an uncertain fate. Even though the forms of governance and manufacturing towns may vary from one region to another, and all are in flux, rural migrants’ conditions in these towns have stabilized and will be a constant challenge to governance.
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