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Properties

  • Bo R. MeinertsenEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 136)

Abstract

This chapter is concerned with issues that I find particularly relevant to understanding the relationship between properties and states of affairs. It is not concerned with the problem of universals, which, as I have made clear, falls outside the scope of this book.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTongji UniversityShanghaiChina

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