Advertisement

The Behavioral Logic and Institutional Basis of Chinese Local Developmental Government

  • Jianxing Yu
  • Xiang GaoEmail author
Chapter

Abstract

In China, local government is characterized as developmental government as they consider promoting regional economic growth as their main target after 1978. Such behavioral patterns cannot be adequately explained by theories of “Fiscal Federalism with Chinese Characteristics” and “Decentralized Authoritarianism.” The dominance of fiscal revenue maximization on the behaviors of local governments does not suggest that a decentralized financial system is a necessary condition for the formation of a local developmental government. After decentralization in the 1980s, the horizontal accountability system did not have effective control over the behaviors of local governments, whereas the vertical accountability system with the core of personnel power also has obvious limitations. Due to information asymmetry and other reasons, the central government hardly had the infrastructure power of shaping the behavioral pattern of the local government. Both the defects of the horizontal accountability system and the limitation of the vertical accountability system have propelled the maximization of fiscal revenue to become the dominant logic guiding the behaviors of local government, and have led to their selective fulfillment of their functions.

References

  1. Blecher, M. 1991. Development state, entrepreneurial state: The political economy of socialist reform in Xinju municipality and Guanghan county. In: The Chinese State in the Era of Economic Reform. United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Cai, Y. 2007. Civil resistance and rule of law in China: The case of defending home owners’ rights. In: Grassroots Political Reform in Contemporary China, pp. 174–195.Google Scholar
  3. Cao, Z., and J. Shi. 2009. The strategy of coping with marketization reform of China’s local government: Seize the initiative of economic development: Theoretical hypotheses and empirical verification (Zhongguo Difang Zhengfu Yingdui Shichanghua Gaige de Celue: Zhuazhu Jingji fazhan de Zhudong Quan, Lilun Jiashuo yu Anli Yanzheng). Sociological Research (4): 1–27.Google Scholar
  4. Cho, Y. 2009. Local People’s Congresses in China: Development and Transition. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  5. He, X. 2007. The role of local government in the process of marketization and its behavior logic: From the perspective of local government autonomy (Shichanghua JInchengzhong de Difang Zhengfu Juese jiqi Xingwei Luoji: Jiyu Difang Zhengfu Zizhuxing de Shijiao). Journal of Zhejiang University (Humanities and Social Sciences Edition) (6): 25–35.Google Scholar
  6. He, X. 2010. The path selection of building the post-crisis era service-oriented government (Hou Weiji Shiqi de Fuwuxing Zhengfu Jianshe de Lujing Xuanze: Yi Zhejiang Weili). Journal of Party School of CPC Ningbo Municipal Committee 32(5): 29–37.Google Scholar
  7. Horsley, J. 2010. The rule of law, pushing the limits of Party rule. In: China Today, China Tomorrow: Domestic Politics, Economy and Society. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 51–68.Google Scholar
  8. Huang, Z., and C. Liu. 2011. The exploration of the Chongqing model of household registration system reform (Huji Zhidu Gaige de Chongqing Moshi Tansuo). Journal of China National School of Administration (2): 90–94.Google Scholar
  9. Landry, P.F. 2008. Decentralized Authoritarianism in China: The Communist Party’s Control of Local Elites in the Post-Mao Era. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  10. Lin, J., and Z. Liu. 2000. Fiscal decentralization and economic growth in China. Economic Development and Cultural Change 49: 1–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Li, L. 2002. The politics of introducing direct township elections in China. China Quarterly 171(171): 704–723.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Li, S., and B. Luo. 2010. The estimate of China’s land finance scale (Woguo Tudi Caizheng Guimo Gusuan). Journal of the Central University of Finance and Economics (5): 12–17.Google Scholar
  13. Li, X. 2011. Household registration system and social differences of contemporary China: A quantitative research based on China’s comprehensive social survey data (Huji Zhidu yu Dangdai Zhongguo Shehui Chabie Guanxi de Shizheng Fenxi). Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology (Social Science Edition) (3): 98–105.Google Scholar
  14. Manion, M. 2015. Information for Autocrats: Authoritarian Parochialism. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  15. Mann, M. 1984. The autonomous power of the state: Its origins, mechanisms and results. Archives Européennes De Sociologie 25(2): 185–213.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Montinola, G., Y. Qian, and B.R. Weingast. 1995. Federalism, Chinese style: The political basis for economic success in china. World Politics 48(1): 50–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Naughton, B. 2008. Analysis of the political economy of China’s economic transition. In: China’s Great Economic Transformation. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  18. O’Brien, K.J. 1994. Chinese people’s congresses and legislative embeddedness: Understanding early organizational development. Social Science Electronic Publishing 27(1): 80–107.Google Scholar
  19. Oi, J.C. 1992. Fiscal reform and the economic foundations of local state corporatism in China. World Politics 45(1): 99–126.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Oi, J.C. 1995. The role of the local state in China’s transitional economy. China Quarterly 144(144): 1132–1149.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Ostrom, V. 1974. The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.Google Scholar
  22. Perry, E., and M. Goldman. 2007 Introduction: Historical reflections on grassroots political reform in China. In: Grassroots Political Reform in Contemporary China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  23. Qu, J. 2012. The project system: A new state governance system (Xiangmu Zhi: Yizhong Xin de GUojia Zhili Tizhi). Chinese Social Science (5): 113–130.Google Scholar
  24. Riskin, C. 2010. Inequality: Overcoming the great divided. In: China Today, China Tomorrow: Domestic Politics, Economy and Society. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.Google Scholar
  25. Shen, R. 2009. The vertical management of government under the background of decentralization: Patterns and ideas (Fenquan Beijignxia de Zhengfu Chuizhi Guanli: Moshi yu Silu). China Administration (9): 38–43.Google Scholar
  26. Shi, Y., and I. Zhou. 2007. Regional decentralization and economic efficiency: A case study on specially designated in the state plan (Diqu Fangquan yu Jingji Xiaolv: Yi Jihua Danlie Weili). Economic Research 1: 17–28.Google Scholar
  27. Tiebout, C.M. 1956. A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of Political Economy 64(5): 416–424.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Tsai, L.L. 2007. Accountability without Democracy: Solidary Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural China. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  29. Wang, S., and A. Hu. 1994. The decline of the Chinese government’s extractive capacity and its consequences (Zhongguo Zhengfu Jiqu Nengli de Xiajiang jiqi Houguo). Twenty-first Century 1: 5–14.Google Scholar
  30. White, G. 1991. The Road to Crisis: The Chinese State in the Era of Economic Reform. The Chinese State in the Era of Economic Reform. United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan UK.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. Wong, C. 1992. Fiscal reform and local industrialization: The problematic sequencing of reform in post-Mao China. Modern China 18: 197–227.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Ye, L. 1995. The plight of state-owned silk enterprises in Huzhou City and thoughts on deepening the reform (Huzhoushi Guoyou Sichou Qiye de Kunjing yu Shenhua Gaige de Sikao). China Textile (9): 42–44.Google Scholar
  33. Yu, J., and Y. Xu. 2004. From development-type government to public service-type government: A case study of Zhejiang Province (Cong Fazhanxing Zhengfu dao Fuwuxing Zhengfu: Yi Zhejiang Sheng Wei Ge’an). Marxism and Reality (5): 65–74.Google Scholar
  34. Zhang, T., and H. Zou. 1998. Fiscal decentralization, public spending and economic growth in China. Journal of Public Economics: 221–240.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. Zhao, P., and P. Howden-Chapman. 2010. Social inequalities in mobility: The impact of the hukou system on migrants’ job accessibility and commuting costs in Beijing. International Development Planning Review 32(3): 363–384.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Zhao, S. 2013. The crisis and change of the governance of county and township governments: The structural adjustment of power distribution and interactive mode (Xianxiang ZHengfu ZHili de Weiji yu Biange: Shiquan Fenpei he Hudong Moshi de Jiegouxing Tiaozheng). People’s Forum (21): 14–30.Google Scholar
  37. Zheng, Y. 2007. De Facto Federalism in China: Reforms and Dynamics of Central-Local Relations. Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific.Google Scholar
  38. Zhou, F. 2006. Ten years of tax distribution system: Institution and its influence (Fenshuizhi Shinian: Zhidu ji Yingxiang). Chinese Social Science (6): 100–115.Google Scholar
  39. Zhou, F. 2010. Building boom: Land finance and local government behavior (Daxing Tumu: tudi Caizheng yu Difang Zhengfu Xingwei). Economic and Social System Comparison (3): 77–89.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Public AffairsZhejiang UniversityHangzhouChina

Personalised recommendations