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From Guardians of the State to Guardians of Democracy? Institutional Change and Military Democratization in Insecure States

  • Cornelia-Adriana BaciuEmail author
Chapter

Abstract

This chapter studies military transformation and civil–military relations in insecure states, applying Pakistan as a case study. It aims at (1) assessing the institutional change and transformation of armed forces and (2) conceptualizing the role which civil society organizations (CSOs)–military interaction can have on processes of institutional change of security and defence. The following research questions are examined: (1) “How is the role of the military in insecure and transitional states changing?” and (2) “What are the effects of CSOs on the transformation of the defence and security sector?”. A diachronic, case-oriented methodology is applied, using Pakistan as a “telling” case. The timeframe studied is 1999–2017, encompassing the military rule of Pervez Musharraf (t1) and the post-Musharraf transition period (t2). In total, 88 data points (48 expert interviews and 40 surveys), collected by the author during field research in four sample regions in Pakistan, are used for the empirical analysis. The findings of this chapter advance our conceptual understanding of mechanisms of hybrid security and democratic civilian control as well as the impact of CSOs on the democratic transformation of security and defence institutions. At policy level, the results of this study provide insights for international organizations and donors sustaining the democratization of armed forces in insecure, fragile or otherwise transitional states.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Dublin City UniversityDublinIreland

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