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Remuneration Rule for Employee Inventions, Moral Hazard, and the Hold-Up Problem

  • Keiki Kumagae
Chapter

Abstract

Under the patent Law of Japan, an inventor has a right to demand the remuneration as monetary compensation for the employee invention (Article 35). If the inventor is dissatisfied with the amount of compensation they have paid, the inventor can file a lawsuit. When the inventor wins the lawsuit, the court can intervene in the level of the remuneration which has been agreed in advance and orders the employer to pay extra profit as a reasonable remuneration. In order to calculate this extra payment, the court takes the amount of profits that the employer will make from the successful invention and the contribution made by the employer and inventor into consideration.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Kyushu UniversityFukuokaJapan

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