Sensitive Perception, Stable Disposition and Deliberation: Starting from “Virtue Is Knowledge”

  • Cheng Yuan


Moral deliberation is usually characterized as one kind of mental process which provides us convincing reason to make morally right choice by clear reasoning, forming judgments, or explicit self-reflection guided by moral principles. However, this kind of understanding renders an intellectualist illusion: one can acquire moral quality only by reasoning skillfully. In this chapter, by re-reading Socrates’ thesis and following suggestions of philosophers such as B. Williams and John McDowell, the author explores the intrinsic connection between deliberation with perception, as well as connection between deliberation with disposition: one can make deliberations morally, which can be regarded as the natural result produced and released by the person who has been already morally cultivated and therefore is equipped with such moral perception. Similarly, a good performance of deliberation tightly relies on or even is rooted in a well-formed disposition which prevents deliberator from being distracted by disturbing “deliberation.”


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© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Cheng Yuan
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyCapital Normal UniversityBeijingChina

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