MobiSec 2016: Mobile Internet Security pp 154-163 | Cite as

Security Analysis Oriented Physical Components Modeling in Quantum Key Distribution

Conference paper
First Online:
Part of the Communications in Computer and Information Science book series (CCIS, volume 797)

Abstract

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), based on fundamental principles of quantum mechanics, plays an irreplaceable role in national defense, financial and government affairs. Security analysis of QKD system is of great importance. However, existing studies on modeling QKD system are theory analysis based. In this paper, we propose a Simulation System of Physical Components (SSPC) in QKD system which modeling the three key modules: single photon source, quantum channel and single photon detector, it could generate the simulated key resemble to real QKD physical system and its parameters of the physical components are configurable. Therefore, solution can be deployed in different QKD physical systems.

Keywords

QKD Security analysis Physical components Modeling 
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

Notes

Acknowledgments

This work was supported in part by National Science Foundation of China under grant No. 61202488, Guangxi Cooperative Innovation Center of cloud computing and Big Data (No. YD16801,YD16505.), and the outstanding young scholar funding of NUDT.

References

  1. 1.
    Bennett, C.H., Brassard, G.: Quantum cryptography: public key distribution and coin tossing. In: Proceedings of the Conference on Computers, Systems and Signal Processing, Bangalore, India, December 1984 (1984)Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Chen, C., Anada, H., et al.: A hybrid encryption scheme with key-cloning protection: user/terminal double authentication via attributes and fingerprints. J. Internet Serv. Inf. Secur. 6(2), 23–36 (2016)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Kurokawa, T., Nojima, R., Moriai, S.: On the security of CBC mode in SSL3.0 and TLS1.0. J. Internet Serv. Inf. Secur. 6(1), 2–19 (2016)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Peng, Y., Wu, C., Zhao, B., Yu, W., Liu, B., Qiao, S.: QKDFlow: QKD based secure communication towards the openflow interface in SDN. In: Yuan, H., Geng, J., Bian, F. (eds.) GRMSE 2016. CCIS, vol. 699, pp. 410–415. Springer, Singapore (2017).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3969-0_45 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Elliott, C., Colvin, A., Pearson, D., et al.: Current status of the DARPA quantum network. In: Proceedings of the Defense and Security. International Society for Optics and Photonics (2005)Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Peev, M., Pacher, C., Alléaume, R., et al.: The SECOQC quantum key distribution network in Vienna. New J. Phys. 11(7), 075001 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    Chen, T.-Y., Liang, H., Liu, Y., et al.: Field test of a practical secure communication network with decoy-state quantum cryptography. Opt. Express 17(8), 6540–6549 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. 8.
    Chen, T.-Y., Wang, J., Liang, H., et al.: Metropolitan all-pass and inter-city quantum communication network. Opt. Express 18(26), 27217–27225 (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Wang, S., Chen, W., Yin, Z.-Q., et al.: Field test of wavelength-saving quantum key distribution network. Opt. Lett. 35(14), 2454–2456 (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    Sasaki, M., Fujiwara, M., Ishizuka, H., et al.: Field test of quantum key distribution in the Tokyo QKD network. Opt. Express 19(11), 10387–10409 (2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. 11.
    Stucki, D., Legre, M., Buntschu, F., et al.: Long-term performance of the SwissQuantum quantum key distribution network in a field environment. New J. Phys. 13(12), 123001 (2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. 12.
    Fröhlich, B., Dynes, J.F., Lucamarini, M., et al.: A quantum access network. Nature 501(7465), 69–72 (2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. 13.
    Zhao, B., Liu, B., Wu, C., et al.: A novel NTT-based authentication scheme for 10-GHz quantum key distribution systems. IEEE Trans. Ind. Electron. 63(8), 5101–5108 (2016)MathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  14. 14.
    Liu, B., Zhao, B., Wei, Z., et al.: Qphone: a quantum security VoIP phone. In: Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review. ACM (2013)Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Djellab, R., Benmohammed, M.: Securing encryption key distribution in WLAN via QKD. In: 2012 International Conference on Proceedings of the Cyber-Enabled Distributed Computing and Knowledge Discovery (CyberC). IEEE (2012)Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    Toyoshima, M., Schaefer, C., Shoji, Y., et al.: Mobile quantum cryptography enhances secure communicationsGoogle Scholar
  17. 17.
    Marhoefer, M., Wimberger, I., Poppe, A.: Applicability of quantum cryptography for securing Mobile communication networks (2009)Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    Cui, K., Wang, J., Zhang, H.-F., et al.: A real-time design based on FPGA for expeditious error reconciliation in QKD system. Inf. Forensics Secur. IEEE Trans. 8(1), 184–190 (2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. 19.
    Rivest, R.L., Shamir, A., Adleman, L.: A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Commun. ACM 21(2), 120–126 (1978)MathSciNetCrossRefMATHGoogle Scholar
  20. 20.
    Bennett, C.H., Bessette, F., Brassard, G., et al.: Experimental quantum cryptography. J. Cryptol. 5(1), 3–28 (1992)CrossRefMATHGoogle Scholar
  21. 21.
    Brassard, G., Salvail, L.: Secret-Key reconciliation by public discussion. In: Helleseth, T. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1993. LNCS, vol. 765, pp. 410–423. Springer, Heidelberg (1994).  https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48285-7_35 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. 22.
    Buttler, W., Lamoreaux, S., Torgerson, J., et al.: Fast, efficient error reconciliation for quantum (2002). 03.67: 2. http://lib-www.lanl.gov/cgi-bin/getfile?00796756.pdf
  23. 23.
    Gallager, R.G.: Low-density parity-check codes. Inf. Theor. IRE Trans. 8(1), 21–28 (1962)MathSciNetCrossRefMATHGoogle Scholar
  24. 24.
    Walenta, N., Burg, A., Caselunghe, D., et al.: A Fast and versatile QKD system with hardware key distillation and wavelength multiplexing (2013). arXiv preprint arXiv:13092583
  25. 25.
    Vernam, G.S.: Cipher printing telegraph systems for secret wire and radio telegraphic communications. Trans. Am. Inst. Electr. Eng. XLV(2), 295–301 (1926)Google Scholar
  26. 26.
    Shannon, C.E.: Communication theory of secrecy systems. Bell Syst. Technical J. 28(4), 656–715 (1949)MathSciNetCrossRefMATHGoogle Scholar
  27. 27.
    Koashi, M., Preskill, J.: Secure quantum key distribution with an uncharacterized source. Phys. Rev. Lett. 90(5), 057902 (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. 28.
    Shor, P.W., Preskill, J.: Simple proof of security of the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol. Phys. Rev. Lett. 85(2), 441 (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. 29.
    Baiardi, F., Tonelli, F., Isoni, L.: Application vulnerabilities in risk assessment and management. J. Wirel. Mob. Netw. Ubiquit. Comput. Dependable Appl. (JoWUA) 7(2), 41–59 (2016)Google Scholar
  30. 30.
    Lim, K., Jeong, Y., Cho, S.-J., et al.: An android application protection scheme against dynamic reverse engineering attacks. J. Wirel. Mob. Netw. Ubiquit. Comput. Dependable Appl. (JoWUA) 7(3), 40–52 (2016)Google Scholar
  31. 31.
    Engle, R.D., Hodson, D.D., Grimaila, M.R., et al.: Modeling quantum optical components, pulses and fiber channels using OMNeT++. arXiv preprint arXiv:150903091 (2015)
  32. 32.
    Mailloux, L., Engle, R., Grimaila, M., et al.: Modeling decoy state quantum key distribution systems. J. Defense Model. Simul. Appl. Methodol. Technol. 12(4), 489–506 (2015)Google Scholar
  33. 33.
    Mailloux, L., Grimaila, M., Hodson, D., et al.: A model and simulation framework for studying implementation non-idealities in quantum key distribution systems. IEEE Access 3, 110–130 (2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. 34.
    Mailloux, L.O., Grimaila, M.R., Hodson, D.D., et al.: Modeling continuous time optical pulses in a quantum key distribution discrete event simulation. In: Proceedings of the International Conference on Security and Management (SAM). The Steering Committee of The World Congress in Computer Science, Computer Engineering and Applied Computing (WorldComp) (2014)Google Scholar
  35. 35.
    Mailloux, L.O., Morris, J.D., Grimaila, M.R., et al.: A modeling framework for studying quantum key distribution system implementation nonidealities. Access 3, 110–130 (2015). IEEECrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. 36.
    Morris, J.D.: Conceptual modeling of a quantum key distribution simulation framework using the discrete event system specification. Air Force Institute of Technology (2014)Google Scholar
  37. 37.
    Morris, J.D., Grimaila, M.R., Hodson, D.D., et al.: Using the discrete event system specification to model quantum key distribution system components. J. Defense Model. Simul. Appl. Methodol. Technol. 12(4), 457–480 (2015)Google Scholar
  38. 38.
    Xu, B.: The Practical Security of Quantum Key Distribution System. Peking University (2012)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.College of ComputerNational University of Defense TechnologyChangshaChina
  2. 2.Guangxi Colleges and Universities Key Laboratory of Cloud Computing and Complex SystemsGuilin University of Electronic TechnologyGuilinChina
  3. 3.Guangxi Cooperative Innovation Center of Cloud Computing and Big DataGuilin University of Electronic TechnologyGuilinChina

Personalised recommendations