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No-Key Protocol for Deniable Encryption

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Information Systems Design and Intelligent Applications

Abstract

There is proposed a new method for deniable encryption based on commutative transformations. The method has been used to design the deniable encryption protocol resistant to the passive coercive attacks, which uses no pre-shared secret keys and no pre-exchanged public keys. The protocol begins with the stage at which the sender and receiver exchange their single-use public keys and compute the single-use shared secret key. Then, it is performed pseudo-probabilistic three-pass protocol with simultaneous commutative encryption of the fake and secret messages. Resistance of the proposed protocol to coercive attacks is provided by its computational indistinguishability from probabilistic no-key three-pass protocol used to send securely the fake message. To perform commutative encryption, it used exponentiation cipher. To provide security against active coercer, the protocol is to be complemented with procedure for authenticating the sent messages.

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Correspondence to Hieu Minh Nguyen .

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Nguyen, N.H., Moldovyan, N.A., Shcherbacov, A.V., Nguyen, H.M., Nguyen, D.T. (2018). No-Key Protocol for Deniable Encryption. In: Bhateja, V., Nguyen, B., Nguyen, N., Satapathy, S., Le, DN. (eds) Information Systems Design and Intelligent Applications. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 672. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7512-4_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7512-4_10

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore

  • Print ISBN: 978-981-10-7511-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-981-10-7512-4

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