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Vulnerabilities in UMTS Location Update Procedure and Its Countermeasures

  • Zengshan Tian
  • Weiguang Li
  • Yujia Yao
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering book series (LNEE, volume 463)

Abstract

Mobile communication systems have been developing for decades. Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) is a third-generation mobile cellular system for networks based on the GSM standard. As an evolved technology of GSM, UMTS has adopted a more reliable security mechanism. Integrity protection and mutual authentication were added in UMTS. However we carefully analyzed UMTS location update procedure specifications and uncover several vulnerabilities in UMTS. By sending specific types of LOCATION UPDATING REJECT messages during location update procedure, the rogue base station can deny all services to a target UMTS device. We also present several countermeasures including increasing the rate of TMSI reallocation, rebooting or re-inserting the SIM/USIM card and installing the protection application on UE to resist these vulnerabilities.

Keywords

UMTS security DOS attacks Location updating procedure Counter-measures 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Chongqing Key Lab of Mobile Communications TechnologyChongqing University of Posts and TelecommunicationsChongqingPeople’s Republic of China

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