The Theory of Public Goods

Part of the Springer Texts in Business and Economics book series (STBE)


In Chap.  8, we investigated taxation from the viewpoint of efficiency. In this chapter, we investigate government spending from the viewpoint of efficiency. Here, the notion of public goods is important. As explained in Chap.  1, public goods have properties of non-rivalness and non-excludability. Non-rivalness in consumption means that an increase in someone’s consumption does not reduce the availability of consumption for others. Non-excludability means that someone cannot be excluded from consuming a good because of technical or other reasons simply because she or he does not pay the price.


Public goods Non-rivalness Non-excludability Pure public goods Impure public goods Club goods, commons Samuelson rule Nash equilibrium approach Private provision of public goods Lindahl equilibrium Person-specific burden ratio Free rider problem Clarke tax Neutrality theorem of public goods 


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© Springer Science+Business Media Singapore 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.National Gradual Institute for Policy StudiesMinato-kuJapan

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