Historical Injustice and Human Insecurity: Conflict and Peacemaking in Muslim Mindanao

  • Rommel A. Curaming
Part of the Asia in Transition book series (AT, volume 5)


This chapter addresses the question of why conflicts that are deeply rooted in historical injustice tend to defy straightforward resolution. It traces the historical roots of the conflict in Mindanao and the various efforts of the government in the Philippines to reach a political settlement. In particular, it examines the peacemaking efforts by the Macapagal-Arroyo and Aquino administrations, the contexts in which they made progress but also stalled and the ways in which the general public reacted to these efforts. It argues that it takes more than political will and historical sensitivity on the part of the government to address the problem. If a broader segment of the public, especially in political elite circles, do not share the need to recognize historical injustice and address restorative justice then obstacles to resolution remain.


Conflict Historical injustice, marginalization Mindanao Moro Islamic Liberation Front Peacemaking efforts Political settlement Restorative justice 


  1. ABS-CBN News. (2015). “How Mamasapano Tragedy Affected BBL.” ABS-CBN May 15.
  2. Amnesty International. (2008). “Shattered Peace in Mindanao: The Human Cost of Conflict in the Philippines.” London: Amnesty International.Google Scholar
  3. Arcilla, A. (2016). “Revisiting Mamasapano: A Disaster for the BBL.” Business World Online, January 24.Google Scholar
  4. Arguillas, C. (2008a). “Real ‘Breakthrough’ in GRP-MILF Pact Is Correcting Historical Injustices vs Bangsamoro.” Mindanews, July 21. (accessed on 28 December 2015).
  5. Arguillas, C. (2008b). “Dureza Says GMA Wants to Leave ‘Lasting Legacy’: Opposition Says It’s a Ploy for Charter Change.” Mindanews, July 24. (accessed on 28 December 2015).
  6. Arguillas, C. (2008c). “The Government Peace Panel Had No Authority to Sign?” MindaNews, August 31. (accessed on 28 December 2015).
  7. Azurin, A. 1996. “The Jabidah Massacre Myth.” In Beyond the Cult of Dissidence in Southern Philippines and War torn Zones in the Global Village. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies, pp. 93-103.Google Scholar
  8. Batistiana, B. (ed.)(2009). Land Tenure Stories in Central Mindanao. Davao City, Philippines: Local Governance Support Program in ARMM.Google Scholar
  9. Brown, G. (2011). “The Long and Winding Road: The Peace Process in Mindanao, Philippines.” 6. IBIS Discussion Series: Patterns of Conflict Resolution. Dublin: Institute of British-Irish Studies, University College of Dublin.Google Scholar
  10. Cayabyab, J. (2016). “House Leader Gives up Hope on BBL Passage: We Failed Next Generation.” Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 27. (accesed on 25 March 2016).
  11. Diaz, P. (2011). “MNLF: When? Who?” MindaNews, February 7. (accessed on 24 March 2016).
  12. Diaz, P.. (2016). “Biased Media, Too.” MindaNews, February 11.
  13. Genilo, E. (2014). “The Catholic Church and the Reproductive Health Bill Debate: The Philippine Experience: The Catholic Church and the Reproductive Health Bill Debate.” The Heythrop Journal, 1044–1055. doi: 10.1111/heyj.12203.
  14. George, T. J. S. (1980). Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine Politics. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  15. GMA News.TV. (2009). “Palace Part of MOA-AD Deal, Says Former Government Negotiator.” GMA News Online. January 27. (accessed on 24 March 2016)
  16. Gordon, A. (ed.) (2001). The Propagation of Islam in the Indonesian-Malay Archipelago. Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute.Google Scholar
  17. Gorit, G. and J., Clapano (2016). “Lack of House Quorum Still Delaying BBL Passage.” Philippine Star, January 20. (accessed on 24 March).
  18. Gowing, P. G. (1983). Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos, 1899-1920. Quezon City: New Day Publishers.Google Scholar
  19. Gutierrez, E. (2000). “The Reimagination of the Bangsamoro.” In KritinaGaerlan and Mara Stankovitch (eds.) Rebels, Warlords and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines, edited by,. Quezon City: Institute of Popular Democracy, pp. 305–48.Google Scholar
  20. Human Development Network (HDN). (2005). “Philippine Human Development Report 2005: Peace, Human Security and Human Development in the Philippines.” Human Development Report. HDN, UNDP and NZAID.Google Scholar
  21. IDMC. (2013). “Philippines: Internal Displacement in Brief.” Geneva: Internal Diplacement Monitoring Center.Google Scholar
  22. Ivison, D. (2006). “Historical Injustice.” In Jon Dryzek, Bonnie Honnig, and Anne Philipps. The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory, edited by, 507–27. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  23. Janoff-Bulman, R. (1992). Shattered Assumptions: Towards a New Psychology of Trauma. New York: Free Press.Google Scholar
  24. Johns, A.H. (1993). “Islamization in Southeast Asia: Reflections and Reconsiderations with the Special Reference to the Role of Sufism.” Southeast Asian Studies 31 (1): 43–61.Google Scholar
  25. Jubair, S. (1999). Bangsamoro, a Nation Under Endless Tyranny. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: IQ Marin.Google Scholar
  26. Lacson, N. (2015). “Features of MOA-AD Are in the BBL.” Manila Bulletin, March 10. (accessed on 28 December 2015).
  27. Majul, C. A. (1973). Muslims in the Philippines. 2d ed. Quezon City: Published for the Asian Center by the University of the Philippines Press.Google Scholar
  28. McKenna, T.M. (1998). Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines. Comparative Studies on Muslim Societies 26. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
  29. McKenna, T.M. (2007). “Governing Muslims in the Philippines.” Harvard Asia Pacific Review 9 (1): pp. 3–9.Google Scholar
  30. Mendoza, M . (2010). “Humanitarianism in Complex Areas.” In M. Mendoza and V.Taylor (eds.) Challenges to Human Security in Complex Situations. Kuala Lumpur: Asian Disaster Reduction and Response Network (ADRRN), pp. 78-90.Google Scholar
  31. Mendoza, M. and V. Taylor, (eds.) (2010). Challenges to Human Security in Complex Situations: The Case of Conflict in the Southern Philippines. Kuala Lumpur: Asian Disaster Reduction and Response Network (ADRRN).Google Scholar
  32. Meyers, B. (1991). “Disaster Study of War.” Disasters 15 (4): 318–30.Google Scholar
  33. Mindanao Development Authority. (2012). “Mindanao 2020: Peace and Development Framework Plan 2011-2030.” Mindanao Development Authority. (accessed 20 November 2015)
  34. Muslim, M. (1994). The Moro Armed Struggle in the Philippines: The Nonviolent Autonomy Alternative. Marawi City, Philippines: College of Public Affairs, Mindanao State University.Google Scholar
  35. Muslim, M. and R. Cagoco-Guiam (1999). “Mindanao: Land of Promise.” Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives 6: pp. 10–19.Google Scholar
  36. Norwegian Refugee Council. (2009). “Cycle of Conflict and Neglect: Mindanao’s Displacement and Protection Crisis.” Geneva Switzerland: Norwegian Refugee Council.Google Scholar
  37. Oquist, P. (2000). Options for a Win-Win Solution in Mindanao. Multi-Donor Group Support for Peace and Development in Mindanao: Third Assessment Mission Report. Manila: UNDP.Google Scholar
  38. Ordinario, C. (2013). “MAP: The Poorest Provinces in the Philippines.” Rappler. April 27. 20 November 2015).
  39. Phelan, J. L. (1959). The Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish Aims and Filipino Responses 1565-1700. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.Google Scholar
  40. Placido, D. (2014). “Ferrer Says Lessons Learned from MOA-AD.” ABS-CBN News, August 13. (accessed on 28 December 2015).
  41. Rodil, R. (1994). The Minoritization of the Indigenous Communities of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. Davao City: Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao, Inc.Google Scholar
  42. Sabillo, K. (2014). “What Is the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro?” Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 26. (accessed on 5 March 2016).
  43. Santos, S. (2005). “Evolution of the Armed Conflict on the Moro Front.” Philippine Human Development Report. Human Development Network Foundation.Google Scholar
  44. Schiavo-Campo, S., and M. Judd. (2005). “The Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines: Roots, Costs, and Potential Peace Dividend.” 24. Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction. Washington DC: World Bank. (accessed on 20 November 2016).
  45. The Daily Tribune. (2013). “Noynoy Insists Jabidah Massacre True, Wants It in History Books.” The Daily Tribune, March 19.Google Scholar
  46. Tiglao, R. (2015). “Jabidah Was a Big Hoax.” March 22. (accessed on 28 December 2015).
  47. Vitug, M. D., and G. M. Gloria. (2000). Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao. Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs.Google Scholar
  48. Williams, T. (2010). “The MoA-AD Debacle – An Analysis of Individuals’ Voices, Provincial Propaganda and National Disinterest.” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 29 (1): 121–44.Google Scholar
  49. Yamsuan, C. (2012). “Enrile Memoir: Tripoli Agreement Was a Sellout.” Philipine Daily Inquirer, October 12. (accessed 20 November 2015).
  50. Yap, D. J. (2015). “Quorum Lack on BBL Bill Bothers Belmonte.” Philipine Daily Inquirer, August 17. (accessed on 25 March 2016).

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Singapore 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Universiti Brunei DarussalamBandar Seri BegawanBrunei Darussalam

Personalised recommendations