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Theoretical Models of Decision-Making in the Ultimatum Game: Fairness vs. Reason

  • Tatiana V. Guy
  • Miroslav Kárný
  • Alessandra Lintas
  • Alessandro E.P. Villa
Conference paper
Part of the Advances in Cognitive Neurodynamics book series (ICCN)

Abstract

According to game theory, a human subject playing the ultimatum game should choose more for oneself and offer the least amount possible for co-players (assumption of selfish rationality) (Rubinstein in J Econ Behav Organ 3(4):367–388, [1]). However, economy, sociology and neurology communities repeatedly claim non-rationality of the human behaviour (Werner et al. in Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton University Press, Princeton, [2]), following the observation that responders reject offers they find too low and proposers often offer more than the smallest amount, thus suggesting that humans’ behaviour is significantly influenced by social norms. We also assume human rationality, but our model describes a human responder via decision process with a reward function respecting fairness as much as the economic profit. This model is positively tested against a set of original experimental data, thus providing an insight into human’s motivation as a social being.

Keywords

Ultimatum game Decision making Fairness 

Notes

Acknowledgments

The work was supported by the project GA\(\check{C}\)R 13-13502S of the Czech Science Foundation and by the Swiss National Science Foundation grant CR13I1-138032.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Singapore 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Tatiana V. Guy
    • 1
  • Miroslav Kárný
    • 1
  • Alessandra Lintas
    • 2
  • Alessandro E.P. Villa
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Adaptive SystemsInstitute of Information Theory and Automation Czech Academy of SciencesPragueCzech Republic
  2. 2.Neuroheuristic Research Group & LABEX, HEC LausanneUniversity of LausanneLausanneSwitzerland

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