‘… destroy all sense of dependence’: On the Selection and Independence of the Judiciary in Norway

  • Eivind SmithEmail author
Part of the European Yearbook of Constitutional Law book series (EYCL, volume 1)


Notwithstanding its bicentennial system of judicial review, the constitutional system of Norway does not seem to justify a shift from a triangular to a bipolar perspective. In the single-tiered judicial system, the courts have competence in any legal matter, including administrative and constitutional law. Some lacunae in the constitutional protection have not given rise to serious concerns about its independence. However, judicial appointments by the executive give rise to some particular questions. The author argues that appointment completely isolated from the political branches of government, as sometimes advocated, undermines the legitimacy of judges with a permanent status to undertake constitutional and other norm-setting functions.


bipolarity career systems judges as norm-setters judicial development of the law judicial review Norwegian Constitution of 1814 political appointments precedent social trust Supreme Court of Norway the constitution as positive law 


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Copyright information

© T.M.C. Asser Press and the authors 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of OsloOsloNorway

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