Analysis of the Frameworks for Foreign Presence from an International Operational Perspective

  • Joop VoetelinkEmail author


In general, sending States can exercise criminal jurisdiction over their deployed forces for offences committed either on- or off-duty, to the exclusion of, or priority over, the host State. Viewed from an operational law perspective, this practice can be explained by a general desire of the host States to protect their armed forces’ members against a foreign legal system. Moreover, the operational tasks of the deployed forces may entail the functional necessity of subjecting them to the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the sending States.


Armed Force Military Personnel Armed Conflict Sexual Exploitation International Criminal 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© T.M.C. Asser Press and the author 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of Military ScienceNetherlands Defence AcademyBredaThe Netherlands

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