New Opportunities of Portal Monitors with Plastic Scintillation Detectors (Asia-New. New Advanced Source Identification Algorithm)

Conference paper
Part of the NATO Science for Peace and Security Series B: Physics and Biophysics book series (NAPSB)

Abstract

Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM) with plastic detectors represent the main instruments used for primary border (customs) radiation control. RPM are widely used because they are simple, reliable, relatively inexpensive and have a high sensitivity. However, experience using the RPM in various countries has revealed the systems have some grave shortcomings. There is a dramatic decrease of the probability of detection of radioactive sources under high suppression of the natural gamma background (radiation control of heavy cargoes, containers and, especially, trains). NORM (Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material) existing in objects under control trigger the so-called “nuisance alarms,” requiring a secondary inspection for source verification. At a number of sites, the rate of such alarms is so high it significantly complicates the work of customs and border officers.

This paper presents a brief description of new variant of algorithm ASIA-New (New Advanced Source Identification Algorithm), which was developed by the author and based on some experimental test results. It also demonstrates the capability of a new system to overcome the shortcomings stated above. New electronics and ASIA-New enables RPM to detect radioactive sources under a high background suppression (tested at 15–30 %) and to verify the detected NORM (KCl) and the artificial isotopes (Co-57, Ba-133). New variant of ASIA is based on physical principles and does not require a lot of special tests to attain statistical data for its parameters. That is why this system can be easily installed into any RPM with plastic detectors.

This algorithm was tested for 1,395 passages of different transports (cars, trucks and trailers) without radioactive sources. Only one false alarm has been detected. It also was tested for 4,015 passages of these transports with radioactive sources of different activity (Co-57, Ba-133, Cs-137, Co-60, Ra-226, Th-232) and NORM (K-40).

Keywords

False Alarm Rate Radioactive Source Shipping Container Minimum Detectable Activity Background Suppression 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

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    Kagan L, Stavrov A (2010) New opportunities of radiation portal monitors with plastic detectors. Third European IRPA Congress, Helsinki, Finland, 14–18 June 2010Google Scholar
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    Kagan L, Stavrov A (2010) Border radiation control: integral system or simple combination of instruments and rules? In: 6th symposium hazards – detection and management (Final programme), Dresden, 20–24 September 2010Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Rapiscan Systems, Inc.TorranceUSA

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