Groundedness, Truth and Dependence
Leitgeb (2005) proposes a new approach to semantic paradoxes, based upon a direct definition of the set of grounded sentences in terms of dependence upon non-semantic state of affairs. In the present paper, we account for the extensional disagreement between this dependence approach and more familiar alethic approaches. In order to do so, we study the behavior of dependence jumps and alethic jumps, and provide an equivalence result for the two approaches.
KeywordsDependence Supervaluations Groundedness Jump.
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