Norms for Theories of Reflexive Truth

Chapter
First Online:
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 36)

Abstract

In the past two decades we have witnessed a shift to axiomatic theories of truth. But in this tradition there has been a proliferation of truth theories. In this article we carry out a meta-theoretical reflection on the conditions that we should want axiomatic truth theories to satisfy.

Keywords

Norms Axiomatic theory Reflexive truth Disquotation Compositionality 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.New College, University of OxfordOxfordUK
  2. 2.University of BristolBristolUK

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