The International Criminal Court and the Sovereign State

  • Diane Marie Amann
Chapter
Part of the Nova et Vetera Iuris Gentium book series (NVIG, volume 23)

Abstract

Terrorism, drug trafficking, and internecine conflict spurred revival in 1989 of a decades-old proposal for an international court to judge persons accused of the world’s worst crimes. Within years the Security Council of the United Nations established ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, amid negotiations for a permanent tribunal with broader jurisdiction. Diplomats produced a statute for the International Criminal Court at a conference in Rome in 1998.2 A majority of the world’s states welcomed the institution the statute envisioned, so much so that the treaty bearing the statute took effect a scant four years later. A few states nonetheless voiced opposition. Unremitting resistance has come from the United States. US critics variously have said that the ICC Statute: contains a provision “contrary to the most fundamental principles of treaty law”;3 suffers from a “deep democratic defect”;4 and is “a fundamental threat to American sovereignty”.5 Examination of such complaints, cloaked as they are in certain notions of sovereignty and the role of the nation-state, may contribute to a larger understanding of the contemporary challenges of global governance.

Keywords

Supra Note Security Council International Criminal Court International Criminal Rome Statute 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Diane Marie Amann
    • 1
  1. 1.School of LawUniversity of California, DavisUSA

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