A quick review of the theories of action we have seen in Chapters III and IV, advocated by philosophers and by criminal lawyers, respectively, will reveal parallels between them. Here, instead of explaining more about them in so many words, I will simply present them in the following table (where in the right-hand column, corresponding to criminal law, I will additionally indicate in brackets the equivalent approaches in Anglo-Saxon law):
Bodily Movement Social Criterion Criminal Lawyer Human Mental State Voluntary Bodily Movement
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Feinberg 1968, pp. 111 ff. As we have seen in Chapter III, Sect. 3, Feinberg adds that the ascription of an action is performed in order to attribute responsibility (in the widest sense, including merely causal responsibility which does not necessarily imply blame); but we do not need to include this feature here, because he stretches the meaning of ‘responsibility’ too far. For the present context, it is enough to say that when an action is ascribed to someone, this is normally done with some purpose (which must not necessarily be that of blaming or praising).Google Scholar
11.
In the sense spelled out in Chapter I, sect. 4.Google Scholar
