Kinds of Legal Judgments and Legal Situations

See also the supplement.Google Scholar

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Hart (1994), 19 and 82.Google Scholar

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The distinction between weak and strong permissions is treated in von Wright(1963), 85–89; C.E. Alchourón and E. Bulygin, Normative Systems (Vienna: Springer Verlag, 1971), 119–125; Ross (1968), 120–124; Raz(1975), 83–102;CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.1.Google Scholar

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In 2.06 of the Tractates, Wittgenstein circumscribes ‘reality’ as the existence and nonexistence of states of affairs. In the same vein, the legal system can be circumscribed as the validity and invalidity of legal situations as projected by perfect legal judgments. Google Scholar

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Searle and Vanderveken (1985), 44, 58, and 211–216.Google Scholar