Solidarity, Justice, Reflexivity and Participatory Citizenship

Abstract

As indicated in the introduction to this part of the volume, we have asked the authors of this philosophical part to reflect upon the concept of solidarity from the vantage point of their specific country and philosophical tradition. This did not forestall more general conceptual analysis in our project, which has first and foremost been delivered by the German chapter from Rahel Jaeggi. Applying ordinary language analysis, she concludes that solidarity is distinguished from friendship (too strong), interest coalitions (too weak), loyalty (too particularistic), compassion or humanitarian aid (too private, noncommittal and a-symmetrical). Solidarity appears to imply a sense of ‘non-instrumental cooperation based on identification with a common cause’. Jaeggi traces this notion to Hegel’s concept of ‘Sittlichkeit’ (‘ethical life’, as distinguished from morality) as a constitutive sense of commonality and a cooperative relationship that transcends altruism or self-interest. According to this model, certain social conditions are inherent to self-understanding and constitutive for self-realisation, enabling an ‘enlargement of self’. Not every form of commonality leads to solidarity, however, partly because of overlapping or mutually exclusive commonalties, partly because commonality may stem from and result in morally indefensible practices. Commonality is not a natural phenomenon, but a social construction, constituted in action that is perceived to be beneficial and rightful.