Meaningful Care pp 167-181 | Cite as
Experience of Meaning in Daily Care for People with Mental Retardation
Chapter
Abstract
When things go well, one doesn’t usually wonder whether one’s life, work, marriage, or parenting is meaningful. Questions about meaning usually come about when one experiences a fundamental deficiency. In their work, pedagogic counsellors1 can get confronted with extreme situations, in which parents and children get completely stuck. Feelings of disappointment, sadness, and powerlessness predominate. People wonder if life this way holds any meaning. What value is there in continuing with each other under such circumstances?
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- 1.In the Netherlands, pedagogic counsellors play a central role in the care for people with mental retardation. Their most important task is developing, carrying out, and evaluating the individual care plans of their clients. In doing this, they work hand in hand with a.o. group leaders, who provide the daily care in group homes or day-care centers. It is the pedagogic counsellor’s job to provide guidance to the group leaders in their tasks. In the Netherlands, pedagogic counsellors receive a university education, and usually receive additional schooling beyond their degree.Google Scholar
- 2.See a.o. P.A. de Ruyter, “Pedagogische hulpverleningsvisies” (Concepts of Pedagogic Care), in R. de Groot, K. Doornbos, J.D. van der Ploeg, and P.A. De Ruyter (eds.), Handboek Orthopedagogiek (The Pedagogic Counsellor’s Manual). Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, rubriek 3104, (1993), pp. 1–31;Google Scholar
- 2a.P.A. de Ruyter and J. Stolk, “Wanneer is het hulpverlenend handelen goed genoeg?” (When Is Assistance Good Enough?), in H. Kars (ed.), Ernstig probleemgedrag bij zwakzinnige mensen (Severely Problematic Behavior of People with Mental Retardation). Houten: Bohn Stafleu Van Loghum, 1995, pp. 35–54.Google Scholar
- 3.The concept of a norm for defining meaning is developed in the Introduction.Google Scholar
- 4.R. van Woudenberg, Gelovend denken. Inleiding tot een christelijke filosofie (Faith and Reason: An Introduction to a Christian Philosophy). Amsterdam: Buijten en Schipperheijn, 1992, pp. 193ff.Google Scholar
- 5.The contributions of Young and De Ruyter (chapters 1 and 11) illustrate this in more detail.Google Scholar
- 6.See J. Stolk, “Die Frage nach dem Wert des Lebens geistig behinderter Kinder” (On the Value of Life of Children with Mental Retardation), in W. Thimm et al. (eds.), Ethische Aspekte der Hilfen für Behinderte (Ethical Aspects of Caring for People with a Handicap). Marburg, Germany: Lebenshilfe Deutschland, 1989, pp. 184–213;Google Scholar
- 6a.J. Stolk, “Geistig behindert mit dem Verlangen auch jemand zu sein” (People with Mental Retardation Longing for ldentity), in J. Stolk and M.J.A. Egberts (eds.), Über die Würde geistig behinderter Menschen, Zwischen Verlangen und Wirklichkeit (The Dignity of People with Mental Retardation: Between Dream and Reality). Marburg, Germany: Lebenshilfe Deutschland, 1990, pp. 5–34.Google Scholar
- 7.The concept of personhood as described here, can be typified as ‘static.’ Personhood is considered an ontological quality. One can also view the personhood of humans in a dynamic way: personhood is the product of human development. This conception is bound to certain conditions. A child becomes a person only once it has met a certain developmental level. The choice for using a static or dynamic concept for personhood has important moral implications for the care of people with mental retardation. This comes to light in the discussion regarding the right to protection of the life of seriously handicapped newborns, in which the concept of personhood plays a crucial role. See G. Antor and U. Bleidick, Recht auf Leben, Recht auf Bildung. Aktuelle Fragen der Behindertenpäidagogik (Right to Life, Right to Education: On Educating People with Handicaps). Heidelberg, Germany: Schindele Publishers, 1995. My choice to use the static concept of personhood must be seen in light of this discussion.Google Scholar
- 7a.Cf. J. Stolk, “The concept of the person: valuing the life of severely handicapped babies,” in J.M. Berg et al., Report on the European workshop “Bio-ethics and Mental Handicap”. Utrecht: Bishop Bekkers Foundation, 1992, pp. 117–28.Google Scholar
- 8.See Th. Jak, Huizen van Barmhartigheid. Zorg voor zwakzinnigen in Nederland in de tweede helft van de negentiende eeuw, met bijzondere aandacht voor’s Heeren Loo (Homes of Mercy: Care of People with Mental Retardation in the Second Half of the 19th Century). Amersfoort: Vereniging’s Heeren Loo, 1993.Google Scholar
- 9.Henri Nouwen interviewed by Wolterink in Contactblad Philadelphia, Vol. 177, (1994), pp. 6–8.Google Scholar
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