An Integrated Modal Approach to Rational Agents

  • Wiebe van der Hoek
  • Bernd van Linder
  • John-Jules Ch. Meyer
Chapter
Part of the Applied Logic Series book series (APLS, volume 14)

Abstract

In this paper we give an overview of work we have done to provide a framework in which many aspects of rational agency are integrated. The various attitudes of a rational agent, viz. the informational as well as the motivational ones, are modelled in the framework by means of a variety of modal operators that are interpreted by means of possible worlds, as usual in modal logic. A main point here is that we incorporate all these modal operators into one model, so that in principle the various modal operators can be mixed to describe an agent’s complex attitudes.

Keywords

Rational Agent Belief Revision Atomic Action Kripke Model Epistemic Logic 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wiebe van der Hoek
    • 1
  • Bernd van Linder
    • 2
  • John-Jules Ch. Meyer
    • 1
  1. 1.Universiteit UtrechtThe Netherlands
  2. 2.ABN-AMRO BankThe Netherlands

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