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Could Kant Have Been a Utilitarian?

  • R. M. Hare
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 227)

Abstract

My aim in this paper is to ask a question, not to answer it. To answer it with confidence would require more concentrated study of Kant’s text than I have yet had time for. I have read his main ethical works, and formed some tentative conclusions which I shall diffidently state. I have also read some of his Englishspeaking disciples and would-be disciples, but not, I must admit, any of his German expositors except Leonard Nelson. My purpose in raising the question is to enlist the help of others in answering it.

Keywords

Moral Judgment Moral Reasoning Moral Philosophy Categorical Imperative Moral Thinking 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References and Bibliography

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • R. M. Hare
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Oxford UniversityUK
  2. 2.The University of FloridaUSA

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