The Judge and the Application of Law

  • Jerzy Wróblewski
Chapter
Part of the Law and Philosophy Library book series (LAPS, volume 15)

Abstract

Concluding the present work I outline the problem of the place and role of the judge in the application of law. I have tried to demonstrate that the judge has a fundamental role in the application of law: “There is no need of a judge where the rules lead everyone, provided no errors are committed, to the same solution, and where correct rules of reasoning from indisputable premisses exist. We need judges when these rules are equivocal, when reasoning does not end in a conclusion, but justifies a decision” (Ch Perelman, Justice, Law and Argument, Dordrecht 1980, pp. 143–144). It is the character of the judge that determines whether and what decision is made, and this cannot be negated by any ideology or theory of judicial activity.

Keywords

Legal System Legal Rule Legal Reasoning Judicial Decision Judicial Practice 
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Notes

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    Cf., the opposition of “axiomatic” and “code-thinking” with “topic” and “problemthinking”, J. Esser, 1964, pp. 44, 80ff, and Ch XI.Google Scholar
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    A plea for a position between the Scylla of formalism and Charybdis of scepticism, cf., H. L. A. Hart, 1961, p. 144.Google Scholar
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    C. Cossio, 1964, pp. 125ff; 167, Ch I.2; the role of judicial decision in legal experience is confirmed also outside Egology, cf., F. Carnelutti, 1953, vol. II, p. 159ff; G. Dioguardi, 1959, p. 230; L. Recasens Siches, 1959, p. 319.Google Scholar
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    The judge is “substantively immanent in law”, but normativism treats him as only “formally immanent”, C. Cossio, 1967, p. 61ff.Google Scholar
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    Montesquieu, 1969, p. 127.Google Scholar
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    M. G. Losano, 1969, Ch IV; C. Ciampi, 1982; A. A. Martino, 1982; A. Martino and F. Socii Natali 1986. Cf., in general R. Kowalski, 1979; R. Susskind, 1987, Ch 1, 2, 5, 7; cf., note (XII) 35.Google Scholar
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    W. Friedmann, 1961, pp. 823, 825, 836ff; E. Huber, 1925, p. 387.Google Scholar
  45. 45.
    O. Schweitzer, 1959, pp. 100ff, 117ff.Google Scholar
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    Cf., the contemporary archetype of judge K. Zweigert, 1966, p. 301.Google Scholar
  47. 47.
    On the role of the highest judicial court, E. Garcia Maynez, 1960, p. 115; J. Wróblewski, 1985a, pp. 28–30 treats the Supreme Court as a co-creator of the axiology of law, and this demands a proper compromise between dependence on social consciousness and shaping it (J. Wróblewski, 1981a). Cf., for USA I. Jenkins, 1978, p. 178.Google Scholar
  48. 48.
    It is the unique source of rightness in the free law school, cf., E. Ehrlich, 1987, p. 188; M. Rumpf, 1913, p. 12.Google Scholar
  49. 49.
    R. Marcic, 1967, vol. II, pp. 103, 114.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jerzy Wróblewski
    • 1
  1. 1.Faculty of LawUniversity of ŁódzPoland

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