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Abstract

We have seen that a State enjoys territorial jurisdiction over all persons and things which find themselves, in fact, within that territory; that this jurisdiction is, in principle, exclusive with regard to other States but that its exercise, within territorial limits, is not always exclusive with regard to international law owing to general rules of international law, which may limit that exercise in favour of foreign state jurisdictions. It follows that, apart from territorial jurisdiction, some other state jurisdiction must exist, which may be exercised outside territorial limits.

Keywords

International Tribunal Arbitral Tribunal Territorial Water Territorial Jurisdiction Draft Convention 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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    Moore 4–4377, 4378. Cf. American Institute of International Law, Project No. 12, article 7: “The law of each nation applies to its merchant vessels on the high seas, including passengers and crew, and the property of the nation and of its nationals found thereon.”, A.J.I.L. Off, Doc. Special Number October 1926, p. 324.Google Scholar
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    Moore 5–4952.Google Scholar
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    See, inter alia: G. Canonne: Essai de droit pénal international. L’affaire du Lotus, Paris 1929; H. Hayri: L’abordage en haute mer en droit international public maritime, Paris 1939; R. Portail: L’affaire du Lotus devant la Cour permanente de justice internationale et devant l’opinion publique, Paris 1928; H. Walther: L’affaire du Lotus, Paris 1928; further, articles in: A.J.I.L. 22 (1928) — 8/14, idem 29(1935)-495/9; British Yearbook 1927 p. 108/28; Law Quarterly Review 44 (1928) — 154/63; Michigan Law Review 26 (1928) — 361/82; R.D.DL 19 1927) — 521/49; R.D.L 1928–65/134, 135/65; R.D.I.L.C. 55 (1928) — 1/32, 124/56, 400/21; R.G.D.I P. 35 (1928) — 361/76; Weekblad van het Recht 1927 Nos. 11716/7; Yale Law Journal 37 (1928) — 484/90, etaGoogle Scholar
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    Loc. cit. p. 5.Google Scholar
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    My italics.Google Scholar
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    Loc. cit. p. 9.Google Scholar
  125. 91).
    “Nous sommes devant vous en vertu d’un compromis; d’après ce compromis, M. l’agent français doit apporter la preuve que la Turquie a enfreint un principe existant de droit international. La preuve de l’existence de ce principe ne nous incombe pas. L’article 15 de la Convention de Lausanne et le texte du compromis ne nous attribuent pas ce rôle; c’est M. l’agent français qui doit prouver l’existence d’une disposition prohibitive. L’agent turc n’a pas à apporter la preuve d’une disposition permissive. Le compromis et l’article 15 précité ne permettent pas cette interversion des rôles, et nous nous excusons.”, Speech of the Turkish Agent, Series C p. 115.Google Scholar
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    “Selon la conception de M. l’agent du Gouvernement turc, il faudrait au contraire prendre ici pour point de départ la souveraineté de la Turquie et se borner à rechercher s’il existe des règles prohibitives du droit international qui limitent le libre exercice, par la Turquie, de sa souveraineté. Cette façon de poser la question me paraît tout à fait défectueuse. L’article 15, je ne saurais trop le répéter, prescrit que la compétence soit réglée conformément aux principes du droit international, il parle des principes du droit international, il ne fait aucune allusion aux solutions particulières que pourrait édicter la loi turque. Encore bien moins fait-il intervenir en première ligne, comme le veut la thèse du Gouvernement turc, la loi turque. Cet article 15, dis-je, prescrit de régler la compétence pénale des tribunaux turcs selon les principes du droit international; dans le droit international, nous trouvons ce principe incontestable de la compétence de l’Etat du pavillon pour crimes commis en haute mer: voilà un de ces principes de droit international. Il s’agit ici de savoir s’il y aura une dérogation à ce principe, dérogation qui consisterait en une compétence concurrente des tribunaux turcs pour le cas du Lotus. Cette dérogation à un principe de droit international ne peut être consacrée que par une règle de droit international; je ne comprends pas une dérogation à un principe de droit international résultant d’une règle de droit national: il faut donc que nous avons ici une règle permissive du droit international pour fonder cette dérogation. Cette façon de poser la question, qui consiste à rechercher ce que dit le droit international et si un principe de droit international comporte une dérogation, est seule conforme à l’article 15 de la Convention de Lausanne.”, Speech of the French Agent, Series C p. 151/2.Google Scholar
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  129. 95).
    Prof. Max Huber.Google Scholar
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    Loc. cit. p. 32.Google Scholar
  131. 97).
    Lord Finlay, in his dissenting opinion, said that this view of the Court appeared “to be based on a misconception of the proposition that a ship on the high seas may be regarded as part of the territory of the country whose flag she flies, Turkey’s case is that the crime was committed in Turkish territory, namely, on a Turkish ship on the high seas, and that the Turkish Courts therefore have a territorial jurisdiction. A ship is a movable chattel, it is not a place; when on a voyage it shifts its place from day to day and from hour to hour, and when in dock it is a chattel which happens at the time to be in a particular place. The jurisdiction over crimes committed on a ship at sea is not of a territorial nature at all. It depends upon the law which for convenience and by common consent is applied to the case of chattels of such a very special nature as ships. It appears to me to be impossible with any reason to apply the principle of locality to the case of ships coming into collision for the purpose of ascertaining what court has jurisdiction; that depends on the principles of maritime law. Criminal jurisdiction for negligence causing a collision is in the courts of the country of the flag, provided that if the offender is of a nationality different from that of his ship, the prosecution may alternatively be in the courts of his own country.”, loc. cit. p. 53.Google Scholar
  132. 98).
    It should be noted that the Lotus case had no precedent in international decisions.Google Scholar
  133. 99).
    Wrongfully the Court said that “the contention of the French Governement to the effect that Turkey must in each case be able to cite a rule of international law authorizing her to exercise (my italics) jurisdiction, is opposed to the generally accepted international law.” (loc. cit. p. 19). The French Government did not make such a contention, as has been observed above, unless the Court assimilated also the question of attribution of jurisdiction to that of exercise of jurisdiction, which assimilation is fundamentally erroneous. Cf. also the considerations of the Court on pp. 18 and 19.Google Scholar
  134. 100).
    Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung I, Z. f. a. ö. R. u. V. I (1929)-1–56.Google Scholar
  135. 101).
    Series C. p. 40.Google Scholar
  136. 102).
    Ibidem p. 38/9.Google Scholar
  137. 103).
    “Das Piraterierecht als völkerrechtliches Rechtsinstitut in dem heutigen Sinne ist eine Erscheinung jungen Datums. Der Gedankenkreis der Meeresfreiheit, in den es sich einfügt (s. o. 1), ist noch im 18., in einzelnen Beziehungen selbst noch im Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts nicht mehr als ein von einer—freilich stets wachsenden—Anzahl von Staaten verfochtenes politisches Prinzip. Mag auch die Piraterie zu allen Zeiten bekämpft worden sein, so sind doch die rechtlichen Grundlagen des Einschreitens in alter und neuer Zeit durchaus verschieden. Einen der Gründe der Unsicherheit ihres völkerrechtlichen Tatbestandes darf man darin sehen, dass sie ihre heutige Stellung im System des Völkerrechts erst erlangte, als ihr tatsächliches Vorkommen schon selten geworden war.”, Paul Stiel: Der Tatbestand der Piraterie nach geltendem Völkerrecht unter vergleichender Berücksichtigung der Landesgesetzgebungen, Leipzig 1905, p. 30.Google Scholar
  138. 104).
    A. J.I.L. Off. Doc. 1932, p. 749.Google Scholar
  139. 105).
    Ibidem p. 756.Google Scholar
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  141. 107).
    Ibidem p. 759/60.Google Scholar
  142. 108).
    Series A. No. 10, p. 70.Google Scholar
  143. 109).
    In re a reference under the Judicial Committee Act, 1833. The Committee added that “actual robbery is not an essential element in the crime of piracy iure gentium. A frustrated attempt to commit a piratical robbery is equally piracy iure gentium” (July 26, 1934, A.J.I.L. 29 (1935) — 141).Google Scholar
  144. 110).
    Article 2 of an amended draft convention of Mr. Matsuda, reporter on piracy for the League of Nations Committee of Experts for the progressive codification of international law, 1926, provided that “... in committing an act of piracy the pirate loses the protection of the State whose flag the ship flies.”, League of Nations, Document No. C. 196. M. 70, 1937, V, p. 119. See also W. E. Hall: A treatise on international law, Oxford 1924, § 81 (“A pirate either belongs to no State or organized political society, or by the nature of his act he has shown his intention and his power to reject the authority of that to which he is properly subject.” “Absence of competent authority is the test of piracy”.)Google Scholar
  145. 111).
    In international law, it is irrelevant whether a vessel retains its national character although it has become a pirate ship. Such a question is a matter of municipal law. Article 5 of the Harvard draft convention holds: “A ship may retain its national character although it has become a pirate ship. The retention or loss of national character is determined by the law of the State from which it was derived.” (loc. cit. p. 825). The draft convention of Mr. Matsuda holds in article 2: “It is not involved in the notion of piracy that the ship should not have the right to fly a recognized flag, but in committing an act of piracy the pirate loses the protection of the State whose flag the ship flies.” (loc. cit. p. 119).Google Scholar
  146. 112).
    Loc. cit. p. 768. Cf. article 5 of the draft convention of Mr. Matsuda loc. cit. p. 119.Google Scholar
  147. 113).
    Loc. cit. p. 768/9.Google Scholar
  148. 114).
    Loc. cit. p. 822. Following the draft convention of Mr. Matsuda, “piracy occurs only on the high sea and consists in the commission for private ends of depredations upon property or acts of violence against persons...” (article 1, loc. cit. p. 119).Google Scholar
  149. 115).
    Loc. cit. p. 119.Google Scholar
  150. 116).
    Loc. cit. p. 846. The comment on that article held: “Warships have been the traditional means of capturing pirates on the sea; but today police boats and other means are useful. Indeed there seems no good reason why a State may not choose, through its law or government, its own agencies for seizure, subject to the check that it is responsible for its seizures. ... only States should exercise the special authority under international law to seize for piracy, so that clear state responsibility will accompany each exercise of this special authority.”, loc. cit. p. 846/7.Google Scholar
  151. 117).
    Op. cit. p. 49.Google Scholar
  152. 118).
    Following article 3 of the draft convention of Mr. Matsuda “only private ships can commit acts of piracy...” (loc. cit. p. 119).Google Scholar
  153. 119).
    The Pelletier case between Haiti and U.S.A. clearly shows that, in the 19th century, the exact meaning of piracy under international law was not well established. The award of the sole arbitrator, William Strong, who had to decide the claim “according to the rules of international law existing at the time of the transactions complained of”, was not performed (award June 13, 1885, Moore 2–1757 (especially p. 1773/4), Survey No. 131; cf. Moore 5–4629/36).Google Scholar
  154. 120).
    It is obvious that States can limit freedom of navigation, freedom of fishing, freedom of immersion of submarine cables on the high seas by treaty. As to navigation, see e.g. Convention pour l’unification de certaines règles en matière d’abordage, Brussels September 23, 1910, de Martens N.R.G. 3–7-711; Convention pour l’unification de certaines règles en matière d’assistance et de sauvetage maritimes, Brussels September 23, 1910, de Martens N.R.G. 3–7-728; International convention for the safety of life at sea, London May 31, 1929, A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. 1937–105; Agreement concerning manned lightships not on their stations, Lisbon October 23, 1930, L.N.T.S. vol. 112 p. 22; Agreement concerning maritime signals, Lisbon October 23, 1920, L.N.T.S. vol. 125 p. 96; see also Institut de Droit international concerning the “création d’un Office international des eaux”, Annuaire 1929–1-155/228, 1931–1-6/24, 1932–65/6, 1934–545/71, 711/3. As to fisheries, the Permanent Court of Arbitration observed in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries arbitration that “though a State cannot grant rights on the high seas it certainly can abandon the exercise of its right to fish on the high seas within certain definite limits” (Great Britain-U.S.A., 7–9-1910, A.J.I.L. 4 (1910) — 978, Survey No. 291); see also Survey Nos. 49, 96, 166, 170, 195, etc.; Convention internationale pour régler la police de la pêche dans la mer du Nord en dehors des eaux territoriales, The Hague, May 6, 1882, de Martens N.R.G. 2–9-556; Convention for the regulation of whaling, Geneva, September 24, 1931, A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. 1936–167; Agreement for the regulation of whaling, London, June 8, 1937, A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. 1940–106. Cf. the Resolution of the Institut de Droit international concerning „les fondements juridiques de la conservation des richesses de la mer”, Annuaire 1936–1-329/96, 1937–35/7, 93/131, 268/71. As to submarine cables, see e.g. Convention concernant la protection des câbles sousmarins, Paris, March 14, 1884, de Martens N.R.G. 2–11-281; Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit international 1879/80–1-351/94, 1902–12/8, 301/32, 1927–1-171/90, 1927–3-296/9, 343/4; Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 1921–70/6. About the high seas in general, see e.g. Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit international 1927–1-103/46, 1927–3-257/67, 339; E. W. Crecraft: Freedom of the seas, New York 1935; Th. M. Fulton: The sovereignty of the sea, London 1911; G. Gidel: Le droit international public de la mer, vol. 1, La haute mer, Chateauroux 1932; P. B. Potter: The freedom of the seas in history, law, and politics, New York 1924, etc.Google Scholar
  155. 121).
    A.J.I.L. Off. Doc., Special Number April 1929, p. 250.Google Scholar
  156. 122).
    A.J.I.L. 4 (1910)-231, Survey No. 288. Cf. the Hague Codification Conference 1930, Report on Territorial Waters, Annex I concerning the legal status of the territorial sea, article 1: “The territory of a State includes a belt of sea described in this Convention as the territorial sea.”, A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. 1930 p. 239.Google Scholar
  157. 123).
    “It is a universally recognized principle of international law that a State has jurisdiction over sea-fishing within its territorial waters, and to apply thereto its municipal law, and to impose in respect thereof such prohibitions as it may think fit.”, Great Britain-U.S.A., arb., C. 18–8-1910, Report Nielsen p. 512, Survey No. 303.Google Scholar
  158. 124).
    Cf. Ph. C. Jessup: L’exploitation des richesses de la mer, Recueil des Cours 29 (1929) — 405/508, etc.Google Scholar
  159. 125).
    See § 1, p. 10.Google Scholar
  160. 126).
    “E impossibile che la potestà d’impero di uno Stato cessi del tutto dove finisce la terra ferma. Troppi e troppo gravi interessi dello Stato potrebbero essere sacrificati, se esso fosse nell’impossibilità di far sentire la sua autorità immediatamente al di là del limite delia superficie solida. La difesa dello Stato si trove-rebbe presso che paralizzata, tutte le sue funzioni amministrative inceppate o ostacolate se l’azione si arestasse necessariamente dove la terra confina col mare. Occorre anche non dimenticare che in questo tratto di mare si esercitano attività industriali che presentano spesso importanza rilevantissima per intere popolazioni: le popolazioni costiere, in molti luoghi, traggono dall’attività che esplicano su questa zona di mare i mezzi di sussistenza, e uno Stato non potrebbe rinunziare a regolarla e proteggerla senza danni gravi.”, D. Anzilotti: Corso di diritto internazionale, vol. I, Rome 1912, p. 176.Google Scholar
  161. 127).
    “L’Etat a un droit de souveraineté sur une zone de la mer qui baigne la côte, sauf le droit de passage inoffensif réservé à l’article 5. Cette zone porte le nom de mer territoriale.”, Règles sur la définition et le régime de la mer territoriale, Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit international 1894/5, article 1, p. 329. “Les Etats ont la souveraineté sur une zone de la mer qui baigne leurs côtes dans l’étendue et sous les restrictions déterminées ci-après. Cette zone porte le nom de Mer Territoriale.”, Projet de règlement relatif à la mer territoriale en temps de paix, idem Annuaire 1928, article 1 p. 755. “The sovereignty of a State extends to the outer limit of its marginal seas.”, Harvard Research article 13, loc. cit. p. 288. Cf. article 1 of the Convention relating to the regulation of aerial navigation, Paris October 13, 1919: “... for the purpose of the present Convention, the territory of a State shall be understood as including the national territory, both that of the mother country and of the colonies, and the territorial waters adjacent thereto.”, L.N.T.S. 11–190.Google Scholar
  162. 128).
    “The territory of a coastal State includes also the air space above the territorial sea, as well as the bed of the sea, and the subsoil.”, Hague Codification Conference 1930, article 2 of Annex I to the Report, loc. cit. p. 240.Google Scholar
  163. 129).
    G.P.O. 1927, p. 250, Survey No. 354.Google Scholar
  164. 130).
    G P.O. 1929 p. 176/7.Google Scholar
  165. 131).
    “The technical study by the engeneers Barberena and Alcaine declares the existence of two zones in which, according to the law of nations and the internal laws of the riparian States, they may exercise their jurisdiction, to wit, the zone of one marine league contiguous to the coasts, wherein the jurisdiction is absolute and exclusive (my italics), and the further zone of three marine leagues, wherein they may exercise the right of imperium for defensive and fiscal purposes.”, Salvador-Nicaragua, C.A.C.J., 9–3-1917, A.J.I.L. 11 (1917) — 706, Survey Appendix No. III.Google Scholar
  166. 132).
    See § 2, B, p. 22.Google Scholar
  167. 133).
    Hot pursuit is an exception to this principle; vide infra. Google Scholar
  168. 134).
    Cf., in other sense, the systems of P. Fauchille (“droit de conservation”, in his Traité de droit international public, Paris 1925, I, 2–147), and of A. de Lapradelle (“servitudes côtières”, R.G.D.I.P. 5 (1898) — 264, 309). It may be observed that the Agent of the U.S. in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration (Survey No. 291) did not invoke this latter system, though it was favourable in his thesis.Google Scholar
  169. 135).
    See e.g. A. Raestad: Kongens Strömme, Kristiania 1912, and: La mer territoriale, Paris 1913; P. Th. Fenn: Origins of the theory of territorial waters, A.J.I.L. 20 (1926) — 465/82; G. Gidel: Le droit international public de la mer, vol. III, La mer territoriale et la zone contiguë, p. 23/61, etc. In a recent study, entitled “Des graven stroom” (Communications of the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences, vol. 3 no. 4, Amsterdam 1940), Prof. E. M. Meyers of Leiden University concluded that he had established positive evidence as to the Dutch origin of the territorial sea; he gathered valuable data concerning the “Flemish Stream”. Mr. Raestad published also many documents of ancient authors (Bartolus, Baldus, etc.), and of various state-practice (e.g. Norman influence in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies at the end of the 14th century, see La mer territoriale p. 18/9, 54/5), which seem to indicate that the origin of the marginal sea cannot be based on the state-practice of one coastal State only.Google Scholar
  170. 136).
    Moore 1–937/8, Survey No. 170.Google Scholar
  171. 137).
    Moore 5–4952, Survey No. 188. Cf. Louisiana-Mississippi, U.S.S.C., 23–4-1906, 202 U.S. 52 (A.J.I.L. 1 (1907) — 207).Google Scholar
  172. 138).
    Article 6, no. 5, Survey No. 170.Google Scholar
  173. 139).
    “Nous, ... la majorité des Arbitres, décidons et prononçons que les Etats-Unis n’ont aucun droit de protection ou de propriété sur les phoques à fourrure qui fréquentent les îles appartenant aux Etats-Unis dans la mer de Behring, quand ces phoques se trouvent en dehors de la limite ordinaire de trois milles.”, Moore 1–938/9.Google Scholar
  174. 140).
    “La Commission aura pour objet d’examiner et de décider la question de savoir si le vapeur norvégien Tiger’ a été poursuivi, arrêté et coulé par un sous-marin allemand en dedans ou en dehors de la zone de trois milles marins de la côte espagnole.”, Survey Appendix No. V.Google Scholar
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    The ‘David’ was arrested “within the three-mile limit according to the ordinary rules for measuring territorial waters.”, Report Hunt p. 814, Survey No. 375. Cf. also the Turner case, Lapradelle-P. 1–494. Article 2 of the Règles sur la définition et le régime de la mer territoriale, adopted by the Institut de Droit international on March 31, 1894, provided: “La mer territoriale s’étend à six milles marins (60 au degré de latitude) de la laisse de basse marée sur toute l’étendue des côtes.”, Annuaire de l’Institut 1894/5 p. 329; article 2 of the Projet de règlement relatif à la mer territoriale en temps de paix, 1928, provided: “L’étendue de la mer territoriale est de trois milles marins. Un usage international peut justifier la reconnaissance d’une étendue plus grande ou moins grande que trois milles.”, Annuaire 1928 p. 755.Google Scholar
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    In his Report on Territorial Waters, Prof. François observed: “With regard, however, to the breadth of the belt over which the sovereignty of the State should be recognised, it soon became evident that opinion was much divided. These differences of opinion were to a great extent the result of the varying geographical and economic conditions in different States and parts of the world. Certain delegations were also anxious about the consequences which, in their opinion, any rules adopted for time of peace might indirectly have on questions of neutrality in time of war. The Committee refrained from taking a decision on the question whether existing international law recognises any fixed breadth of the belt of territorial sea. Faced with differences of opinion on this subject, the Committee preferred, in conformity with the instructions it received from the Conference, not to express an opinion on what ought to be regarded as the existing law, but to concentrate its efforts on reaching an agreement which would fix the breadth of the territorial sea for the future. It regrets to confess that its efforts in this direction met with no success.”, A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. 1930 p. 234/5.Google Scholar
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    A.J.I.L. 34 (1940) — 151, in re The People v. Stralla and Adams (98 California Decisions, 440).Google Scholar
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    See § 2 B, p. 22.Google Scholar
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    G. Gidel: op. cit. p. 361/78; Ph. Marshall Brown: Protective jurisdiction over marginal waters, Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 1923–15/31; H. W. Briggs: Les Etats-Unis et la loi de 1935 sur la contrebande. Etude de la zone contiguë et des critères de ‘raisonnabilité’, R.D.I.L.C. 66 (1939) — 217/55.Google Scholar
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    Loc. cit. p. 333/4. Project No. 12, article 12, of the American Institute of International Law provides: “The American Republics may extend their jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea, parallel with such sea, for an additional distance of ... marine miles, for reasons of safety and in order to assure the observance of sanitary and customs regulations.”, A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. Special Number October 1926 p. 324; and article 12 of the Projet de règlement relatif à la mer territoriale en temps de paix, elaborated by the Institut de Droit international, 1928: “Dans une zone supplémentaire contiguë à la mer territoriale, l’Etat côtier peut prendre les mesures nécessaires à sa sécurité, au respect de sa neutralité, à la police sanitaire, douanière, et de la pêche. Il est compétent pour connaître, dans cette zone supplémentaire, des infractions aux lois et règlements concernant ces matières. L’étendue de la zone supplémentaire ne peut dépasser neuf milles marins.”, Annuaire de l’Institut 1928 p. 758.Google Scholar
  181. 147).
    Loc. cit. p. 334; see also p.251.Google Scholar
  182. 148).
    Sec p. 126. In the same sense: P. Fedozzi: La condition juridique des navires de commerce, Recueil des Cours 10 (1925) — 79/81. Cf. the case of the “Itata”, award under Convention of August 7, 1892, between Chile and U.S.A., Moore 3–3067, Survey No. 173. Prof. Gidel denies that it is a case of hot pursuit (“Il est difficile de penser que le cas de l’Itata, bien qu’il soit mentionné par la réponse officielle des Etats-Unis (Bases, II, 94) et par les auteurs américains (par exemple Jessup, op. cit. p. 110) à l’occasion de la hot pursuit, rentre véritablement dans cette catégorie.”, La mer territoriale et la zone contiguë, p. 354). He quotes Moore’s Digest of International Law, vol. 2, p. 986, where it is said: “When information was received of the escape of the Itata, orders were given to the U.S.S. Charleston and the U.S.S. Omaha to go in search of her, and if she was found at sea to seize her and bring her into port. If she was convoyed by a Chilean war vessel, the circumstances of the escape were to be explained and a demand made for her restauration to the possession of the United States; if this demand was refused, it was to be enforced if practicable.” The Commission held however: “Assuming it to be true that after the departure of the Itata from the port of San Diego she was pursued (my italics) by the naval authorities of the United States upon the high seas into Chilean waters, induced to surrender by a display of superior force, and brought back under duress, the question arises whether or not such action on the part of the United States was allowed by the laws of nations. After an examination of many authorities on international law and numerous decisions of courts, we are of opinion that the United States committed an act for which they are liable in damages and for which they should be held to answer.”, Moore 3–3070.Google Scholar
  183. 149).
    “La juridiction sur la mer territoriale était, à l’origine, réduite à la seule compétence d’y protéger la navigation pacifique contre les entreprises des pirates.”, A. Raestad: La mer territoriale, Paris 1913, p. 52; cf. E. M. Meyers, op. cit. p. 35.Google Scholar
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    Recent questions and negociations, A.J.I.L. 18 (1924) — 231/2.Google Scholar
  185. 151).
    A treatise on international law, 8th edition, Oxford 1924 p. 309. Cf. also the comment of the Harvard Research 1929 on the quoted article 21: “There is considerable authority for the proposition that a State may continue on the high sea a pursuit begun in territorial waters. If a vessel is found within territorial waters under circumstances justifying its arrest for an offense committed there or elsewhere over which the State pursuing has jurisdiction and if the vessel attempts to escape and is pursued, there seems to be no sound basis for asserting that it obtains sanctuary by crossing the three-mile limit. The situation is unlike that upon land where the offender by crossing the boundary line passes from one jurisdiction to another. The continuation of the pursuit on the high sea does not infringe upon the territorial sovereignty of any other State.”, loc. cit. p. 358.Google Scholar
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    See the ‘I’m alone’ case between Canada and U.S.A., Survey No. 357. In the Joint Interim Report, dated June 30, 1933, the Commissioners held: “On the assumptions stated in the question, the United States might, consistently with the Convention (of January 23, 1924, between U.S.A. and Great Britain to prevent the smuggling of intoxicating liquors into the U.S.), use necessary and reasonable force for the purpose of effecting the objects of boarding, searching, seizing and bringing into port the suspected vessel; and if sinking should occur incidentally, as a result of the exercise of necessary and reasonable force for such purpose, the pursuing vessel might be entirely blameless. But the Commissioners think that, in the circumstances stated in § 8 of the Answer, the admittedly intentional sinking of the suspected vessel was not justified by anything in the Convention.”, A.J.LL. 29 (1935) — 328; in the Joint Final Report it was said: “It will be recalled that the ‘I’m alone’ was sunk on the 22nd of March, 1929, on the high seas, in the Gulf of Mexico, by the U.S. revenue cutter ‘Dexter’. By their interim report the Commissioners found that the sinking of the vessel was not justified by anything in the Convention. The Commissioners now add that it could not be justified by any principle of international law. ... The Commissioners consider that, in view of the facts, no compensation ought to be paid in respect of the loss of the ship or the cargo. The act of sinking the ship, however, by officers of the U.S. Coast Guard, was, as we have already indicated, an unlawful act; and the Commissioners consider that the U.S. ought formally to acknowledge its illegality, and to apologize to His Majesty’s Canadian Government therefor; and, further, that as a material amend in respect of the wrong the U.S. should pay the sum of $ 25,000 to His Majesty’s Canadian Government.”, ibidem p. 330/1. See also W. C. Dennis: The sinking of the ‘I’m alone’, A.J.I.L. 23 (1929) — 351/62.Google Scholar
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    G. Gidel: op. cit. p. 339/60, 490/92; A. S. Hershey: Incursions into Mexico and the doctrine of hot pursuit, A.J.I.L. 13 (1919) — 557/69; Ph. C. Jessup: The law of territorial waters and maritime jurisdiction, New York 1927 p. 106/12;Google Scholar
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  192. 155).
    If the coastal State exercises this jurisdiction, which prevails over the personal jurisdiction of the foreign State of the flag, contrary to the established prescriptions of international law, it engages its international responsibility. See G. Gidel op. cit. p. 359/60.Google Scholar
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    Cf. the following draft conventions reflecting the viewpoint of many authors on international law: „Tous les navires sans distinction on le droit de passage inoffensif par la mer territoriale, sauf le droit des belligérants de réglementer et, dans un but de défense, de barrer le passage dans ladite mer pour tout navire, et sauf le droit des neutres de réglementer le passage dans ladite mer pour les navires de guerre de toutes nationalités.”, article 5 of the Règles sur la définition et le régime de la mer territoriale, Institut de Droit international, Annuaire 1894/5 p. 329; “Les navires de commerce ont le droit de passage inoffensif par la mer territoriale. Ils sont, toutefois, soumis aux lois et règlements de police et de navigation édictés par l’Etat côtier. Les navires marchands qui enfreignent ces lois et règlements sont justiciables de la juridiction de cet Etat.”, article 6 of the Projet de règlement relatif à la mer territoriale en temps de paix, idem Annuaire 1928 p. 757; “Merchant vessels of all countries may pass freely through the territorial sea, subject to the laws and regulations of the Republic to which the said sea belongs/’, article 9 of Project no. 12 of the American Institute of International Law, A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. Special Number October 1926 p. 324; “A State must permit innocent passage through its marginal sea by the vessels of other States, but it may prescribe reasonable regulations for such passage.”, article 14 Harvard Research 1929, A.J.LL. Off. Doc. Special Number April 1929 p. 295; “ ‘Passage’ means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose either of traversing that sea without entering inland waters, or of proceeding to inland waters, or of making for the high sea from inland waters. Passage is not innocent when a vessel makes use of the territorial sea of a coastal State for the purpose of doing any act prejudicial to the security, to the public policy or to the fiscal interests of that State. Passage includes stopping and anchoring, but in so far only as the same are incidental to ordinary navigation or are rendered necessary by force majeure or by distress.”, article 3 of Annex I to the Report on Territorial Waters, Hague Codification Conference 1930, A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. 1930 p. 240/1. In that Report, Prof. François observed that “it is precisely because the freedom of navigation is of such great importance to all States that the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea has been generally recognized.”, loc. cit. p. 234. See also G. Gidel, op. cit. vol. III p. 193/273; E. Pagliano: Mare territoriale e transito inoffensivo, R.D.D.I. 5 (1910) — 551/66; J. S. Reeves: Submarines and innocent passage, A.J.LL. 11 (1917) — 147/53.Google Scholar
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  201. 164).
    As to the exercise of general jurisdiction: Kent, Wheaton, Savador v. Nicaragua (C A.C.J. 1917, vide supra), Jessup, Hall, Oppenheim, Pitt Cobbett, Baty and a decision of the Court of Middelburg in the case of the Government of the Netherlands v. Neptune Steamship Co., September 20, 1914, Journal Clunet 43 (1916) — 657, Weekblad van het Recht no. 9266 (see about this decision Gidel loc. cit. p. 265 note 1). As to the right of innocent passage: Lawrence, Hyde, Hall, Woolsey, Ferguson.Google Scholar
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    Report p. 797/8.Google Scholar
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    “A coastal State may not arrest nor divert a foreign vessel passing through the territorial sea, for the purpose of exercising civil jurisdiction in relation to a person on board the vessel. A coastal State may not levy execution against or arrest the vessel for the purpose of any civil proceedings save only in respect of obligations or liabilities incurred by the vessel itself in the course of or for the purpose of its voyage through the waters of the coastal State. The above provisions are without prejudice to the right of the coastal State in accordance with its laws to levy execution against, or to arrest, a foreign vessel in the inland waters of the State or lying in the territorial sea, or passing through the territorial sea after leaving the inland waters of the State, for the purpose of any civil proceedings.”, A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. 1930 p. 244/5.Google Scholar
  207. 170).
    “A State may not exercise civil jurisdiction over a vessel of another State while it is in course of innocent passage through the marginal sea, except in respect of an act committed by the vessel during the course of that innocent passage and not relating solely to the internal economy of the vessel.”, A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. Special Number April 1929 p. 297.Google Scholar
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    “When a foreign merchant ship is passing through territorial waters but is neither coming from nor bound for a port of the coastal State, the authorities of that State may not, in the exercise of the civil jurisdiction of the State, divert the ship from its course for the purpose of levying an execution or taking measures to preserve the rights of parties to any legal proceedings, except where such action is taken in consequence of events occurring in the waters of the State the effects of which extend beyond the ship itself.”, Bases of Discussion, vol. II Territorial Waters. League of Nations, No. C. 74. M. 39. 1929. V. p. 86.Google Scholar
  209. 172).
    “The sovereignty of a State extends to all persons and to all things within its territory; and the rights which a State enjoys over its territorial waters are rights of sovereignty. It follows that foreign vessels and the persons and things on board, when passing through or anchored in the territorial waters of the State, are subjected to the sovereignty of the State unless by the accepted rules of international law they are entitled to immunity from the local jurisdiction (foreign vessels of war, diplomatic agents, etc.). States do not in practice exercise jurisdictional rights over foreign vessels which are merely passing through their territorial waters. There would be no advantage to themselves in doing so, and the exercise of such jurisdiction would be burdensome to the foreign vessels. Rights of jurisdiction are, in practice, only exercised where it is necessary to do so in the interests of good government, but the State itself must be the judge whether or not the interests of good government require it. The good sense of Governments has rendered unnecessary any attempt to conclude agreements as to the occasions on which jurisdiction shall or shall not be exercised. States are deterred from attempts to enforce their jurisdiction unreasonably over vessels passing through their territorial waters by the consideration that, if they did so, they could not complain if their own merchant vessels when passing through the territorial waters of foreign States were subjected to similar treatment. The State is not precluded from exercising jurisdiction (a) in civil or (b) in criminal cases over foreign merchant vessels or persons or property on board when passing through its territorial waters. Jurisdiction is not limited to occurrences happening during the passage. It may be exercised to the same extent and subject to the same limitations as on the national territory. No distinction as to the exercise of jurisdiction is to be made in law according to whether the vessel is passing through the territorial waters on its way to or from a port of the coast State or not, but, in practice, a State would be much less disposed to exercise jurisdiction because of something which happened within its territorial waters if the vessel were not coming to or going from one of its ports than if it were doing so. Nor should any distinction be made in law according to whether the effect of the occurrence does or does not extend beyond the ship itself or the persons on board, but, in fact and in practice, the distinction is of the first importance. The question whether or not the State feels called upon to exercise jurisdiction depends upon whether or not the exigencies of good government require that such jurisdiction should be exercised. If the effect of the occurrences on board the foreign vessel extends beyond the vessel herself and those on board, the exigencies of good government are more likely to require that jurisdiction should be exercised. A State is entitled to arrest a person on board a vessel passing through its territorial waters.”Google Scholar
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    La mer territoriale et la zone contiguë, p. 266 note.Google Scholar
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    Actes de la Conférence, League of Nations, vol. III, no. C. 351 (b). M. 145 (b). 1930. V. p. 62.Google Scholar
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    Annuaire de L’Institut, 1894/5 p, 152, note 1. Cf. A. Raestad in the Actes of the Hague Codification Conference 1930: “Là, où le passage est inoffensif, il est toujours permis.” (vol. III, p. 70).Google Scholar
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    Article 3 of Annex I to the Report, Actes de la Conférence p. 213.Google Scholar
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    A.J.I.L. 27 (1933) — 749. The replies of the Governments, for the Hague Codification Conference, to Point IX concerning innocent passage of foreign ships through territorial waters are very divergent; see Bases of discussion p. 65 et seq. A good terminology was used in the Convention relating to the regulation of aerial navigation, signed at Paris, October 13, 1919, article 2: “Each contracting State undertakes in time of peace to accord freedom of innocent passage above its territory to the aircraft of the other contracting States, provided that the conditions laid down in the present Convention are observed...” (L.N.T.S. vol. 11 p. 190), and in the Statute of freedom of transit, signed at Barcelona, April 20, 1921, article 2; “... In order to ensure the application of the provisions of this article (viz relative to free transit), contracting States will allow transit in accordance with the customary conditions and reserves across their territorial waters.” (L.N.T.S. vol. 7 p. 27).Google Scholar
  226. 189).
    In his Report, the American Agent, Bert L. Hunt, observed: “This is doubtless a sound decision on a question which has been the subject of much academic discussion. It is perfectly sound logic and at the same time a correct statement of law to say that, although sovereignty over the marginal seas is restricted by the accepted rule of innocent passage which prevents the State from closing such seas to the innocent transit of foreign vessels, sovereignty, in this respect, as in every other respect, is deemed to be exclusive except when clearly shown to have been restricted. Restrictions of sovereignty generally proceed from the express or implied consent of the sovereign. There is no accepted principle of international law by the adoption of which the nations may be said to have so restricted their sovereignty in favor of others in the marginal seas. The question, therefore, as to whether nations will exercise civil or criminal jurisdiction over such vessels while traversing the marginal seas is one entirely within the discretion of the sovereign will.”, p. 819/20. Prof. Jessup was of opinion that “since the principle of the littoral State’s sovereignty over its territorial waters is clear, and since the immunities of a ship in innocent passage are by no means clearly established, the decision is undoubtedly sound in law.”, loc. cit. p. 750.Google Scholar
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    “Moreover, I believe that the right of passage which pursuant to international law exists in favor of all nations should be applied a fortiori when treating of the nation which made the grant in terms which implied a conveyance of relative sovereingty, not absolute, and in circumstances in which the right invoked is vital to the State making the grant, as it cut in two its own territory and left itself obliged to cross territorial waters of the State receiving the grant in order to carry on its coastwise trade.”, Report p. 819. Cf. now the General Treaty of friendship and co-operation between Panama and the United States of America, signed at Washington on March 2, 1936 (A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. 1940 p. 139).Google Scholar
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    Article 3 of Annex I to the Report.Google Scholar
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    Cf. the quoted article 16 of the Harvard Research 1929 (p. 168). Following Prof. Borchard, the question was “whether the arrest of a passing ship, not for an offense it has then committed, but as a means of obtaining forcible jurisdiction in a pending litigation between the owner and a private plaintiff, is a proper or improper impairment of the right of innocent passage.”, loc. cit. p. 104.Google Scholar
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    The marginal sea, A.J.I.L. 17 (1923) — 94/5.Google Scholar
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    “The inland waters of a State are the waters inside its marginal sea, as well as the waters within its land territory.”, Draft Convention of the Harvard Research Committee on Territorial Waters, 1929, article 3, A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. Special Number April 1929 p. 262.Google Scholar
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    Cf. Cade Civil Français article 1349.Google Scholar
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    A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. 1928 p. 69. See also L.N.O.J. 1927 p. 1514/6. Prof. Gidel wrote about the Statute: “Le Statut de Genève n’a pas établi le principe d’ouverture des ports; tout au moins ne l’a-t-il établi que dans des limites très étroites, à savoir: a) entre les Etats contractants; b) sous condition de réciprocité; c) sous réserve de la liberté des Etats contractants d’exclure tel ou tel port de ce régime/’, Les eaux intérieures, p. 49.Google Scholar
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    A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. Special Number October 1926 p. 323 *) My italics.Google Scholar
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    Ibidem p. 736/7. If this article is compared with article 3 of the Règlement of 1898, it appears, inter alia, that the words “pour des raisons dont il est seul juge”, and “justes” (représailles) were omitted in the new article of 1928.Google Scholar
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    “... Quant à la traite de la gomme, les Anglois auront la liberté de la faire, depuis l’embouchure de la rivière de St. Jean, jusqu’à la baye et fort de Portendic inclusivement. Bien entendu, qu’ils ne pourront faire, dans la dite rivière St. Jean, sur la côte, ainsi que dans la baye de Portendic, aucun établissement permanent de quelque nature qu’il puisse être.”, article 11.Google Scholar
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    See the note on this award from P. Fauchille in the Recueil des Arbitrages internationaux edited by A. de Lapradelle and N. Politis, vol.1 p. 532 et seq. It may be doubted, moreover, whether the failing of diplomatic notification engages the international responsibility of the blockading State. Cf., in the affirmative sense, Annuaire de l’Institut 1900 p. 254, and D. Anzilotti: Teoria generale delia responsabilità dello Stato nel diritto internazionale, Firenze, 1902 p. 114.Google Scholar
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    Cf. P. Fauchille: Traité de Droit international public, Paris 1925, I, 2–1021 note 1, and G. Gidel: Les eaux intérieures p. 46.Google Scholar
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    In a session of the Institut de Droit international in 1928, Mr. A. Alvarez said: “La véritable garantie contre un abus de droit de fermeture se trouve dans l’intérêt même de l’Etat. On est assuré que l’Etat ne prononcera la fermeture de ses ports que dans des circonstances tout à fait exceptionnelles.”, Annuaire 1928 p. 530. Cf. N. Politis: Le problème des limitations de la souveraineté et la théorie de l’abus des droits dans les rapports internationaux, Recueil des Cours 6 (1925) — 94/101.Google Scholar
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    “... Merchant vessels which enter and remain in the jurisdictional waters of a republic shall be subject to its regulations.” “Merchant vessels within the territorial waters of a nation shall be subject to the administrative and criminal laws and procedure of the said nation.”, articles 6 and 8 of Draft No. 12 elaborated by the American Institute of International Law, A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. Special Number October 1926 p. 323/4; “Les navires de commerce étrangers dans un port y sont placés sous la protection de l’autorité territoriale. Ils sont soumis en règle générale et sauf les dérogations consacrées par les articles suivants, aux lois de police et à toutes les dispositions réglementaires en vigueur dans le port où ils sont reçus...”, article 29 of the above-quoted Règlement 1928 of the Institut de Droit international, Annuaire 1928 p. 746/7. See also articles 33 and 42, p. 748 and 751. Cf. Hague Codification Conference 1930, Bases of Discussion on Territorial Waters, p. 97/102, and Actes de la Conférence p. 96/9.Google Scholar
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    “The State should have the right both to seize a vessel and everything on board and to arrest persons who are on board. This rule necessarily follows from the fact that a vessel, while staying in a port, is subject in every way to the dominion of the State in whose territory the port is situated. The question need not be regulated by a convention; this State would remain intact even if—as in the case of the Preliminary Draft—no mention of it were made in any convention.”, Hague Codification Conference 1930, Bases of Discussion on Territorial Waters, p. ), reply of the Government of the Netherlands.Google Scholar
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    “In the absence of special agreement to the contrary, a State may exercise jurisdiction over a vessel of another State which is in one of its ports, but in the absence of a request by the master or officer in charge for the aid of local authorities a State will not ordinarily exercise jurisdiction in matters relating solely to the internal economy of the vessel.”, Harvard Research on Territorial Waters 1929, article 18, A.J I.L. Off. Doc. Special Number April 1929 p. 307.Google Scholar
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    Department of State Press Release, February 16, 1927, p. 4. Cf. A. H. Charteris: The legal position of merchantmen in foreign ports and national waters, British Yearbook 1920/1 p. 45 et seq. He wrote inter alia: “As regards state practice in questions not covered by express treaty, the general principle that merchantmen have no legal right to immunity from the local jurisdiction of a foreign power into whose ports or harbours they enter is well established and recognized. The conventional limitations on the exercise of the local jurisdiction established by treaty depend on policy rather than on legal right, and cannot, of course, be pleaded against a State which is not a party to them.” (p. 84).Google Scholar
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    In a comment on the just quoted article 18 of the Harvard draft convention it was said: “Foreign merchant vessels enter ports with the consent of the local sovereign and thereby submit themselves to the will of the littoral State. ... In view of the firm position always taken by the American and British Governments, supported as it is by the practice of other States, it seems impossible to assert that a customary rule of international law has developed whereby vessels in port may claim immunities as of right. The fact that the exercise of jurisdiction has commonly been withheld when the affair concerned only the internal economy of vessel, is not to be considered evidence of the recognition of a legal principle.”, ibidem p. 307/8,Google Scholar
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    “Il y a vraiment une concurrence de souverainetés sur les citoyens à l’étranger comme sur les navires marchands dans les eaux territoriales étrangères, concurrence entre la souveraineté de l’Etat auquel appartiennent citoyens et navires, et celle de l’Etat dans le territoire duquel se trouvent les uns et les autres. Dans le conflit entre les deux souverainetés, la personnelle et la territoriale, cette dernière a la suprématie en principe, et, en principe également, on peut dire que la première ne peut s’exercer efficacement sans le consentement exprès ou tacite de la seconde.”, P. Fedozzi: La condition juridique des navires de commerce, Recueil des Cours 10 (1925) — 57.Google Scholar
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    In the Enterprise case between Great Britain and U.S.A. under Convention of February 8, 1853, the American Commissioner, N. G. Upham, said: “It is contended that a vessel impelled by stress of weather, or other unavoidable necessity, has a right to seek shelter in any harbor, as incident to her right to navigate the ocean, until the danger is past and she can proceed again in safety. This position I propose to sustain on three grounds: by authority; by the concession of the British Government in similar cases; and by its evident necessity as parcel of the free right to navigate the ocean, and therefore a necessary incident of such fight.”, Moore 4–4354, Survey No. 47. In the Creole case, under the same Convention, the Umpire, J. Bates, held: “The Creole was on a voyage, sanctioned and protected by the laws of the United States, and by the law of nations. Her right to navigate the ocean could not be questioned, and as growing out of that right, the right to seek shelter or enter the ports of a friendly power in case of distress or any unavoidable necessity.”, Moore 4–4377. Commenting this decision, Prof. L. Strisower wrote: Le droit de refuge “est un droit accessoire, nécessaire pour jouir du droit de libre navigation sur l’océan, et qui procède de ce même droit. ... Ce droit n’est pas une conséquence nécessaire du droit de libre navigation, mais... une conséquence naturelle, justifiée par l’intérêt de la navigation légitime.”, Lapradelle-P. vol I, p. 716, 717.Google Scholar
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    L. van Praag: Juridiction et droit international public, The Hague 1915, no. 270, p. 536/7, etc.Google Scholar

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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1946

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  • Alexander Marie Stuyt

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