Advertisement

The Ratification Debates

  • Donald Graham Valentine

Abstract

In seeking a method of analysing the ratification debates and the statements of the six Governments upon the Schuman Plan Treaty, it had to be decided whether it would be better to proceed country by country, or to set side by side the views of the different countries on the topics that were discussed. The latter procedure has been adopted because it is felt that in such a Community as has been set up, the variety of views of the member States concerning particular points is more important than the particular country expressing them.

Keywords

High Authority Official Report Arbitral Tribunal Full Compensation Patent Violation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Reference

  1. 1.
    A full list of these is contained in Appendix 1 B.Google Scholar
  2. 1.
    Eerste Kamer, Official Reports, 1951–1952, page 201, cols. 1 and 2.Google Scholar
  3. 2.
    R.D.F., page 31.Google Scholar
  4. 8.
    Relazione della Commissione permanente II eX, no. 2603—A, page 6.Google Scholar
  5. 4.
    R.D.F., page 30.Google Scholar
  6. 5.
    An assumption that principles other than those in the Treaty are to be binding, which may be questioned.Google Scholar
  7. 6.
    R.D.F., page 47.Google Scholar
  8. The attempt to solve this difficulty led the negotiators, as stated in the Luxembourg Exposés, to confine the Court to judgingGoogle Scholar
  9. 1.
    Compte Rendu des Séances de la Chambre des Députés, Session ordinaire, 1951–1952, page 127.Google Scholar
  10. 2.
    Rapport de la Commission spéciale par M. Bertrand, Rapporteur, Chambre des Représentants, Official Reports, 1951–1952, page 410.Google Scholar
  11. 3.
    Memorie van Toelichting, no. 2228, no. 3, 1950–1951, page 33, col. 2.Google Scholar
  12. 4.
    Compte Rendu, 1951–1952, page 127.Google Scholar
  13. 5.
    Memorie van Toelichting, no. 2228, no. 3, 1951–1952, page 33. 8 Compte Rendu, 1951–1952, page 127.Google Scholar
  14. 1.
    Memorie van Toelichting, no. 2228, no. 3, 1950–1951, page 33, col. 2.Google Scholar
  15. 2.
    Assemblée Nationale, Official Reports, 1951, page 8855, col. 1.Google Scholar
  16. 3.
    M. Coste—Floret also declared: “It is upon the principles of our public law that this Court will develop its precedents” — page 8855, col. 1. This, however, is perhaps claiming too much.Google Scholar
  17. 4.
    E.g. M. Carcasonne, Official Reports, 1952, page 715, col. 1.Google Scholar
  18. 5.
    R.D.F., page 32.Google Scholar
  19. 6.
    M. Biever, Compte Rendu, 1951–1952, col. 1611.Google Scholar
  20. 1.
    Sénat de Belgique, Session ordinaire, 1950–1951, no. 369, page 14.Google Scholar
  21. 2.
    By a law dated 25 May, 1928, these Tribunals were empowered to deter¬mine certain private Belgian interests. Their decisions were executory in Belgium provided that they were stamped by the agent général of the Belgian Government appointed to the Mixed Tribunal.Google Scholar
  22. 3.
    Voorlopig Verslag, no. 2228, no. 7, 1951–1952, par. 8, page 69, col. 1. 8 Eerste Kamer, Official Reports, 1952, page 211, col. 1.Google Scholar
  23. 4.
    Sénat, Official Reports, Session ordinaire, 1951–1952, page 128, col. 2.Google Scholar
  24. 5.
    By Mr. Delwaide, Annales Parlementaires, N. 72, page 19.Google Scholar
  25. 6.
    Session ordinaire, 1951–1952, no. 107.Google Scholar
  26. 1.
    Tweede Kamer, Official Reports, 1951–1952, page 209, col. 1.Google Scholar
  27. 2.
    Compte Rendu, 1951–1952, page 155.Google Scholar
  28. 3.
    Senato della Repubblica, Projet de loi, no. 1822A, 1952.Google Scholar
  29. 4.
    As has been stated, this was contained in the Netherlands’ and Luxem¬bourg’s Exposés and it was discussed in the Report of the French Delegation.Google Scholar
  30. 5.
    Senato della Repubblica, Official Reports, page 31624.Google Scholar
  31. 6.
    loc. cit., page 31645.Google Scholar
  32. 7.
    Camera dei Deputati, no. 2603 A, page 56, col. 2.Google Scholar
  33. 8.
    This statement would carry greater weight if it did not ignore the many cases of pleine juridiction.Google Scholar
  34. 9.
    M. Dehousse, Sénat, Session ordinaire, 1951–1952, page 128.Google Scholar
  35. 1.
    Compte Rendu, 1951–1952, page 127.Google Scholar
  36. 2.
    Compte Rendu, 1951–1952, page 155.Google Scholar
  37. 3.
    However, this statement continues: “It must be admitted that professional conscience and the personal independence of the judges as well as the liberal view of the Governments will in practice guarantee the full and entire independence of this high judicial body”.Google Scholar
  38. 4.
    Belgian Sénat, Session ordinaire, 1951–1952, page 128.Google Scholar
  39. 5.
    Professor of International Law, University of Brussels.Google Scholar
  40. 6.
    Compte Rendu, 1951–1952, page 155.Google Scholar
  41. Bundestag, Official Reports, 1951–1952, page 7712 (C).Google Scholar
  42. 1.
    This evoked the interruption from the Right : “The lawyers know all about this too”. It may be noted that Mr. Serrarens, one of the two Dutch judges of the Court, is a trade unionist, long associated with the international Catholic Labour Movement.Google Scholar
  43. 2.
    Eerste Kamer, Official Reports, 1952, page 201, col. 1.Google Scholar
  44. 3.
    Made by Dr. van Essen in Economisch-Statistische Berichten, 29th Aug., 1951.Google Scholar
  45. 4.
    Assemblée Nationale, Official Reports, 1951, page 8855, col. 1.Google Scholar
  46. 5.
    R.D.F., page 46.Google Scholar
  47. 6.
    Sénat, Session ordinaire, 1951–1952, page 128.Google Scholar
  48. Senato della Repubblica, Official Reports, page 31624.Google Scholar
  49. Sénat, Session ordinaire, 1951–1952, page 132.Google Scholar
  50. In assessing this statement, it is perhaps useful to record that Prof. RohnGoogle Scholar
  51. continued by saying that the High Authority was illogical, and that the Assembly would be created of financiers who only knew shareholders’ meetings and had no idea at all of parliamentary bodies.Google Scholar
  52. 8.
    Conseil de la République, Official Reports, 1952, page 750, col. 1. 4 Eerste Kamer, Official Reports, 1952, page 211, col. 1.Google Scholar
  53. 1.
    Camera dei Deputati, no. 2603 A, page 56, col. 2.Google Scholar
  54. 2.
    This however is not accurate; France and Germany together have two judges out of seven.Google Scholar
  55. 3.
    Senato della Repubblica, Official Reports, 1952, page 31733.Google Scholar
  56. 4.
    loc. cit., page 31731.Google Scholar
  57. 5.
    Compte rendu, 1951–1952, col. 1619.Google Scholar
  58. 6.
    Annales parlementaires, N. 72, 1952, page 7.Google Scholar
  59. 1.
    Réalités allemandes, page 2451.Google Scholar
  60. 2.
    Toujours possibles.Google Scholar
  61. 3.
    loc. cit., page 2451.Google Scholar
  62. 4.
    Annex no. 727 in Documents parlementaires, Assemblée Nationale, page 1926, col. 2.Google Scholar
  63. 5.
    R.D.F., page 35.Google Scholar
  64. 1.
    Compte Rendu, 1951–1952, page 128.Google Scholar
  65. 2.
    Memorie van Toelichting, no. 2228, no. 3, 1950–1951, page 34, col. 2.Google Scholar
  66. 3.
    R.D.F., page 35.Google Scholar
  67. 4.
    See page 74.Google Scholar
  68. 5.
    Bundestag, Official Reports, 1951–1952, page 7732 D.Google Scholar
  69. 6.
    loc. cit., page 7749 D.Google Scholar
  70. Memorie van Toelichting, no. 2228, no. 3, 1950–1951, page 39, col. 1. 2 R.D.F., page 38.Google Scholar
  71. 1.
    On this see further page 107.Google Scholar
  72. 2.
    Voorlopig Verslag, zitting 1951–1952, 2228, no. 7, page 72, col. 1.Google Scholar
  73. 3.
    Memorie van Antzvoord, no. 2228, no. 8, 1951–1952, page 86, col. 2.Google Scholar
  74. 4.
    Bundestag, Official Reports, 1951–1952, page 7730 A.Google Scholar
  75. 5.
    Memorie van Toelichting, no. 2228, no. 3, 1950–1951, page 34, col. 2.Google Scholar
  76. 6.
    Drucksache no. 2950, published in Bundestag Official Reports, 1951–1952, page 7635.Google Scholar
  77. 1.
    By this must be meant “in all cases where the implicit decision of the High Authority refusing to take the necessary action is annulled”.Google Scholar
  78. 2.
    For a discussion of this interpretation, see pages 97–98.Google Scholar
  79. 3.
    Voorlopig Verstag, no. 2228, no. 7, 1951–1952, page 71, col. 2.Google Scholar
  80. 4.
    It is presumably held to be in contradiction to Art. 33 because it appears to allow an appeal for an annulment of a decision of the High Authority on grounds other than the four set out in that article.Google Scholar
  81. 5.
    Memorie van Antwoord, no. 2228, no. 8, 1951–1952, page 86, col. 2.Google Scholar
  82. 1.
    On this see further, page 95.Google Scholar
  83. 2.
    R.D.F., page 41.Google Scholar
  84. 3.
    Compte Rendu, Session ordinaire, 1951–1952, page 128.Google Scholar
  85. 4.
    Memorie van Toelichting, no. 2228, no. 3, 1950–1951, page 34, col. 2.Google Scholar
  86. 1.
    R.D.F., page 41.Google Scholar
  87. 2.
    Memorie van Toelichting, no. 2228, no. 3, 1950–1951, page 34, col. 2.Google Scholar
  88. 3.
    This statement need not have been limited to general decisions - it applies also to individual ones.Google Scholar
  89. R.D.F., page 42.Google Scholar
  90. 5.
    Session ordinaire, 1951–1952, page 128, col. 2.Google Scholar
  91. 1.
    Sénat, Session ordinaire, 1951–1952, no. 107.Google Scholar
  92. 2.
    Session ordinaire, 1951–1952, page 160, col. 1.Google Scholar
  93. 3.
    L’épuisement inconsidéré. “The American Journal of International Law”, vol. 46, supplement page 108, translates this “inconsiderate exhaustion”, but the adjective does not appear satisfactory.Google Scholar
  94. 4.
    By this, of course, they can only mean the Schuman Plan Court, and not the International Court of Justice.Google Scholar
  95. 5.
    Session ordinaire, 1951–1952, page 160, col. 1.Google Scholar
  96. 6.
    celui où existent des éléments sérieux faisant présager des troubles fondamentaux. ’ Sénat, Session ordinaire, 1951–1952, page 160, col. 1.Google Scholar
  97. 1.
    Rapport fait au nom de la Commission spéciale par M. Bertrand, rapporteur, Chambre des Représentants, 1951–1952, page 410.Google Scholar
  98. 2.
    Compte Rendu, 1951–1952, page 188.Google Scholar
  99. 3.
    Referred to as “cette soupape de sûreté”.Google Scholar
  100. 4.
    Compte Rendu, 1951–1952, col. 1629. b On this see further page 102.Google Scholar
  101. 6.
    Bundestag, Official Reports, 1951–1952, page 7730 A.Google Scholar
  102. 7.
    For reasons for doubting this view, see page 107.Google Scholar
  103. 8.
    Memorie van Toelichting, no. 2228, no. 3, 1950–1951, page 34, col. 2.Google Scholar
  104. 9.
    Voorlopig Verslag, no. 2228, no. 7, 1951–1952, page 72, col. 1.Google Scholar
  105. 1.
    Memorie van Antwoord, no. 2228, no. 9, 1951–1952, page 86, col. 2.Google Scholar
  106. 2.
    This governs the right of interested parties to intervene in cases before the Court.Google Scholar
  107. 3.
    Sénat, Session ordinaire, 1951–1952, page 140.Google Scholar
  108. 4.
    The relevence of these two articles is not apparent.Google Scholar
  109. 5.
    Compte Rendu, Session ordinaire, 1951–1952, page 129.Google Scholar
  110. 6.
    However, it is submitted that decisions creating fundamental and per¬sistent disturbances are assailable in law as a violation of Art. 2, par. 2 of the Treaty.Google Scholar
  111. 1.
    Voorlopig Verslag, no. 2228, no. 7, 1951–1952, page 72, col. 1.Google Scholar
  112. 2.
    For the assumed grounds of this contention see page 20, footnote 4.Google Scholar
  113. 3.
    Memorie van Antwoord, zitting 1951–1952, 2228 nol 8, page 86, col. 2.Google Scholar
  114. 4.
    See page 21 above.Google Scholar
  115. 5.
    Voorlopig Verslag, no. 2228, no. 7, 1951–1952, page 72, col. 1.Google Scholar
  116. 6.
    This grants an appeal for indemnity if the High Authority fails to take the measures required as the result of a decision of annulment.Google Scholar
  117. 7.
    Memorie van Antwoord, no. 2228, no. 8, 1951–1952, page 86, col. 2.Google Scholar
  118. 8.
    What meaning the Netherlands’ Government attaches to the term “negative decision” is not clear, as by Art. 37, par. 3 the Court may annul decisions of the High Authority attempting to end the disturbance as well as explicit or implicit refusals to recognise the existence of the situation. It is suggested that these cannot all be classed as negative decisions.Google Scholar
  119. 9.
    R.D.F., page 43.Google Scholar
  120. 10.
    en apprécier le bien—fondé.Google Scholar
  121. Tweede Kamer, Official Reports, 1951–1952, page 164, cols. 1 and 2. 2 Compte Rendu, 1951–1952, col. 1623.Google Scholar
  122. 1.
    Almost the same words are found in the Luxembourg Exposé des Motifs: “Art. 37 is of major importance for the Luxembourg economy, which is particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in the steel industry. It can be regarded as a special guarantee in favour of our economy”—Compte Rendu, Session ordinaire, 1951–1952, page 129.Google Scholar
  123. 2.
    Tweede Kamer, Official Reports, 1951–1952, page 163, col. 2.Google Scholar
  124. 3.
    Realités allemandes, page 2451.Google Scholar
  125. 4.
    Drucksache no. 2950 in the Bundestag Official Reports, 1951–1952, rage 7644 A.Google Scholar
  126. 1.
    R.D.F., page 36.Google Scholar
  127. 2.
    Memorie van Toelichting, no. 2228, no. 3, 1950–1951, page 34, col. 2.Google Scholar
  128. 3.
    Sénat, Session ordinaire, 1950–1951, no. 369, page 12.Google Scholar
  129. 4.
    Actions brought under Art. 66, par. 5. 2 are automatically suspensive. 6 Relazione della Commissione Permanente II, Giolitti and Bottai for the Minority, no. 2603—A, page 56, col. 2.Google Scholar
  130. 6.
    R.D.F., page 45.Google Scholar
  131. 1.
    Memorie van Antwoord, no. 2228, no. 8, 1951–1952, page 83, col. 1.Google Scholar
  132. 2.
    On this see further page 118.Google Scholar
  133. 3.
    R.D.F., page 37.Google Scholar
  134. I R.D.F., page 40.Google Scholar
  135. 2.
  136. 3.
    Tweede Kamer, Official Reports, 1951–1952, page 164, col. 2. 4 For a discussion of the meaning of these terms, see page 113.Google Scholar
  137. 4.
    Voorlopig Verslag, no. 2228, no. 7, 1951–1952, par. 8, page 69, col. 2 6 Memorie van Antwoord, no. 2228, no. 8, par. 8, 1951–1952, page 83, col. 1.Google Scholar
  138. 1.
    Voorlopig Verslag, no. 2228, no. 7, 1951–1952, page 72, col. 1.Google Scholar
  139. 2.
    Memorie van Antz000rd, no. 2228, no. 8, 1951–1952, page 86, col. 2.Google Scholar
  140. 3.
    Memorie van Toelichting, no. 2228, no. 3, 1950–1951, page 34, col. 2 and page 35, col. 1.Google Scholar
  141. 4.
    Voorlopig Verslag, no. 2228, no. 7, 1951–1952, page 72, col. 1.Google Scholar
  142. 5.
    Memorie van Antwoord, no. 2228, no. 8, 1951–1952, page 83, col. 1.Google Scholar
  143. 1.
    No legislation has, however, been introduced to give this express compe¬tence, so that it may be inferred that none was required.Google Scholar
  144. 2.
    R.D.F., page 44.Google Scholar
  145. 3.
    By this article, member States undertake not to submit disputes on the interpretation or application of the Treaty to a mode of decision other than that provided by the Treaty.Google Scholar
  146. 4.
    Senato della Repubblica, 1951, no. 1822, page 6, col. 2.Google Scholar
  147. 5.
    The term “interpretation of the Treaty” is obviously wider than “the objects of the Treaty” (Art. 89, par. 2). Power to act under Art. 89, par 2 is dependent upon a compromis between States, and not on the absence of special procedures in the Treaty.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 1954

Authors and Affiliations

  • Donald Graham Valentine
    • 1
  1. 1.Saltwood, KentEngland

Personalised recommendations