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Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Wealth and Resources

  • Obed Y. Asamoah

Abstract

The Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and Resources was adopted by the Assembly at its seventeenth session.1 It proclaims the right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources including their “inalienable” right freely to dispose of them, suggests ways of furthering the free and beneficial exercise of the right, and proclaims the policies which should guide its exercise. It acknowledges, logically, the right of peoples and nations to determine the conditions for the exploitation, development and disposition of resources including the importation of capital for such purposes.

Keywords

Supra Note International Tribunal Agendum Item Investment Agreement Natural Wealth 
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References

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Copyright information

© Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands 1966

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  • Obed Y. Asamoah

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