Negation, Conjunction, and Events
I am now confronted with another problem. If it is granted that “there are events (whatever their ontological status)” is indubitable, I think it will also be conceded that we never find unrelated events. So although the ultimate metaphysical unit is symbolized by the expression ‘fx’, we never do find ‘fx’ alone and we should be tempted to conclude that we never accost a simple event. From the point of view of experience of whatever kind, we must, I believe, admit that we never experience a simple, isolated event but always interrelated or connected ones and hence any language should mirror (or symbolize) this. Something else is beginning to be evident. The metaphysical language seems to be an interpretation of logic; or conversely, logic, as a language, seems so far to be the symbolization of a non-symbolic informal metaphysical language. If what I am doing is correct so far, the discussion over the question “does logic involve ontology in any way?” would seem at long last to give promise of being terminated by demonstrating not only that it does but how it does it. But let us not involve ourselves here in this dispute.
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 1.Cf. P. F. Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1935 ), pp 79–82.Google Scholar
- 1.Cf. A. J. Ayer, “Negation,” Journal of Philosophy. XLIX, 26, 1952.Google Scholar
- 3.For example by Richard Taylor, “Negative Things,” Journal of Philosophy, XLIX, 13, 433 ff., June 19, 1952.Google Scholar
- 4.G. Frege, “Negation” in Translations from the Writings of Gottlob Frege ed. P. Geach and M. Black (New York: Philosophical Library, 1952 ), pp. 117 ff.Google Scholar