Whichcote and the Intellectual Tradition

The thought of Glanvill and Norris was so colored by the writings of the Cambridge men that they are sometimes treated as members of the group, see Joseph Glanvill, The Vanity of Dogmatizing (London, 1661), and J. H. Muirhead, The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy (London, 1931), pp. 72-74. Cumberland also stood on the vague frontier between the Latitudinarians and the Cambridge Platonists, see W. C De Pauley, Candle of the Lord (London, 1937), pp. 149-150; D.N.B., V, 289-290. art. by Leslie Stephen; James Seth, English Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy (London, 1912), pp. 91-92; Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, pp. 39, 165, 189, cited by Seth, Ibid. Stillingfleet, Tillotson, Patrick, Fowler and Burnet — the so-called Latitudinarians in fact — might modify the teachings of the Cambridge Platonists, but the imprint of the older men was upon them to the end. For an account of Patrick’s and Fowler’s relation to them, see Tulloch, Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the Seventeenth Century (Edinburgh, 1872), II, 437-439. Edward Fowler, Free Discourses Between Two Intimate Friends, 2nd ed. (London, 1671). Stillingfleet, Origines Sacrae, 3rd ed. (London, 1666), and Irenicum (London, 1681); Cf. De Pauley, Ibid., pp. 187-189. Tillotson will be discussed later in this chapter to show the relationship between the Latitudinarians and Whichcote. G. Burnet as one of the Latitudinarians and a memoir writer makes this link between the Platonists and the Latitudinarians unquestioned when he testifies thus: “The most eminent of those, who were formed under those men the Cambridge Platonists were Tillotson, Stillingfleet and Patrick.” Cf. History of My Own Time ed. by Dean Swift, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1933), I, 343. See also G. R. Cragg, From Puritanism to the Age of Reason (Cambridge, 1950) pp. 59-60. In addition to the positive agreement between the Platonists and their successors, Hobbes appears as the negative influence or “common enemy” of them all, see Laird, Hobbes (London, 1934), pp. 258-285.Google Scholar

The Cambridge Platonists (London, 1926), p. 198. While agreeing in the main with Powicke’s excellent statement above, the present writer would contend that Whichcote’s individual influence is difficult to separate from the collective influence of the School by virtue of his being the leader. Whichcote is in a real sense the personal symbol of the movement not merely by his own contribution, but by the fact that he directly influenced all the members of the school as well as others outside it. Thus at times we shall speak of Whichcote individually, but where his views are reflected in the collective influence of the school, we shall feel justified to speak of Whichcote and his disciples or simply, the Cambridge Platonists. Cf. Howard’s introduction to Richard Ward, The Life of Henry More (London, 1911), pp. 6-8; E. T. Campagnac, The Cambridge Platonists (Oxford, 1901), pp. xxx-xxxi. Cf. E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley, Cal., 1956), pp. 185, 213.Google Scholar

Cragg, Ibid., p. 62. Cf. Burnet, Ibid., pp. 347-348. John Tillotson became Archbishop, see, H. G. Plum, Restoration Puritanism (Chapel Hill, N. C., 1943), p. 74.Google Scholar

Cf. M. Kaufmann, “Latitudinarianism and Pietism,” Cambridge Modern History, ed. by A. W. Ward (New York, 1908), V, 742–763; W. von Leyden, “Cambridge Platonists,” The New Cambridge Modern History, ed. by F. L. Carston (Cambridge, England, 1961), V, 90-91. See also, J. B. Mullinger, “Platonists and Latitudinarians,” Cambridge History of English Literature (Cambridge, England, 1917), VIII, 273-275.Google Scholar

Cf. Simon Patrick’s funeral sermon of Smith included in Smith, Select Discourses 4th ed., ed. by H. G. Williams (Cambridge, England, 1859), John Tillotson, Funeral Sermon of … Whichcote (London, 1683).Google Scholar

Burnet, Ibid.Google Scholar

Cragg, Ibid.,63.Google Scholar

Cf. Whichcote, The Malignity of Popery ed. by John Jeffery (London, 1717). Also in Works, I, 160-162.Google Scholar

Cragg, Ibid., pp. 63-65.Google Scholar

De Pauley, Ibid., p. 200.Google Scholar

Cragg, Ibid., pp. 66-70.Google Scholar

Ibid., pp. 72-73.Google Scholar

Cf. Tuckney’s criticism of Whichcote, Letters, No. 1. Cf. Supra, ch. III.Google Scholar

Cf. G. Burnet, A Sermon Preached at the Funeral of ….. Tillotson ….. cited by Cragg, Ibid., p. 78. Both Bishop J. A. T. Robinson in his Honest to God (London, 1963) and Bishop J. A. Pike in his A Time for Christian Candor (New York, 1964) have identified themselves with the latitudinarian tradition in Anglican theology.Google Scholar

Charles Smyth, The Art of Preaching, 1749–1939 (London, 1940), p. 102. For a further account of Tillotson’s relation with Whichcote and disciples, see Thomas Birch, Life of Tillotson, 2nd ed. (London, 1753), p. 101.Google Scholar

Cragg, Ibid., pp. 72-73. For a contemporary account of Tillotson’s homiletical method, see Burnet, Ibid. To compare his method with the Puritan preachers, see William Haller, The Rise of Puritanism (New York, 1938), pp. 19-23, 86-87. Among the Platonists, Whichcote was the most outstanding preacher. Henry More wrote sermons, but it is doubtful whether he delivered them. Cudworth and Smith apparently preached with effectiveness. Whichcote appears to have engaged in what R. E. Sleeth has called “life-situation” preaching, see his, Proclaiming The Word (New York, 1964), pp. 93-104.Google Scholar

Tillotson, Works (London, 1757), I, 315–316, 430; II, 12, 213-214; III, 20-21, 249 passim.Google Scholar

Ibid., II, 307-308; Cf. Ibid., III, 442-443.Google Scholar

Cf. Ibid., II, 405 with Supra, ch. VI.Google Scholar

Cf. James Moffatt, ed., The Golden Book of Tillotson (London, 1904), pp. 2–3, 12, 32-34. See also, Leslie Stephen, English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, (London, 1876), I, 79.Google Scholar

Moffatt, Ibid., pp. 35-38. The Latitudinarians resemble the Platonists in their charitable thought and work. Cf. Cragg, Ibid., pp. 79-80. Norman Sykes, The English Religious Tradition (London, 1953), pp. 53-54. For an account of Whichcote’s charitable work, see Supra, ch. I, and Tillotson, Funeral Sermon of.… Whichcote (London, 1683), p. 27. It would be difficult to overestimate the effect of Whichcote’s personal example upon Tillotson. For an account of the general relationship between the Cambridge Platonists and the Latitudinarians, see Kaufman, Ibid., pp. 742-753. Richard Baxter’s account of the “Latitudinarians” is valuable, see Autobiography, ed. by J. M. L. Thomas (London, 1931), p. 185.Google Scholar

Cf. Tallack, “Quakers and Cambridge Platonists,” F. Q. E., Vol. XXIII, (1889), p. 187.Google Scholar

Prov. 20:27. We need only recall the maxim of Cambridge Platonism: “the reason of man is the Candle of the Lord.”Google Scholar

Plato’s philosophy has for one of its characteristic features the prevalence of a similar doctrine. We need only to be reminded of Plato’s notions concerning “pre-existence” and “reminiscence.” Cf. Leif Egg-Olofsson, The Conception of the Inner Light in Robert Barclay’s Theology (Lund, 1954), pp. 20-22. Here the concept of the “inner light” has been traced from early Greek through the writings of the Cambridge Platonists and Quakers.Google Scholar

My reference to Whichcote here instead of the Cambridge Platonists is deliberate since he appears to be free of the excesses traceable in the writings of his disciples, i.e. Cudworth and More. More’s views on witchcraft in his own treatise on the subject and his co-operation with Glanvill in presenting the subject, deserves the same severe criticism that is due the fanaticism of the early Quakers, i.e. George Fox, Cf. Joseph Glanvill, Sadducismus Triumphatus, 4th ed. (London, 1724), including More’s “Supplementary Collection of. … Stories of Apparitions and Witchcraft,” pp. 403-404.Google Scholar

Tallack, Ibid., p. 190. Henry More among the Cambridge Platonists gives praise to the Quaker doctrine of “Divine immanence” and points out the inadequate notion of the Quakers concerning the historic Incarnation. Cf. Ibid., pp. 191-192. See also, More, Theological Works, ed. by J. Downing (London, 1708), pp. 533-534. Whichcote would appear to be in complete agreement with More in his worthy defense of the Incarnation.Google Scholar

This expression, “the Bearer of God’s Spirit,” is used often by C. K. Barrett in his The Holy Spirit and the Gospel Tradition (London, 1935), pp. 68, 92. He alternatively refers to Jesus, the Messiah as a “pneumatic” person. Cf. H. Daniel-Rops, The Church of Apostles and Martyrs, tr. by Audrey Butler (London, 1960), pp. 70-75 and J. Robert Nelson, The Realm of Redemption (Greenwich, 1951), pp. 37-66.Google Scholar

E. G. Selwyn points out that the root of practical religion for the New Testament writers lies in the indwelling of the Spirit of Christ in the spirit of man rather than a merely natural affinity between the divine and human spirit, for that natural affinity has been marred by sin. Thus for the bridging of the chasm so caused there is needed on God’s side redemption, and on man’s side repentance and for this reason the New Testament teaching about the Holy Spirit is “historically conditioned,” that is in relation to the Incarnation. This is precisely the note sounded by Whichcote and More. Yet in a footnote concerning his statement above Selwyn adds this unjustified assertion, “It is, I think, because the … Cambridge Platonists … tended to obscure this side of New Testament teaching that their influence has not been widespread.” See The First Epistle of St. Peter, (London, 1946), p. 285 Ibid., (n.). More challenges the Quakers and Familists alike for dwelling upon the Word of Logos revealed to man before the Incarnation and speaks of the “Logos, in conjunction with the Divine Soul of the Messiah” as the special object of Christian faith. Thus for the Cambridge Platonists the deepest spirituality is always in relation to Christ. See More, Ibid.Google Scholar

In keeping with his Christological argument, More wrote William Penn defending the Lord’s Supper, on the ground of its being designed as an “abiding, visible monument” of the Incarnation. See Tallack, Ibid., p. 192.Google Scholar

I John 4:2. Cf. Joseph Fletcher, William Temple: Twentieth-Century Christian (New York, 1963), pp. 29. 392-303 (n. 75) and Vincent Taylor, Forgiveness and Reconciliation (London, 1948), p. 225.Google Scholar

Tallack, Ibid., pp. 196-198.Google Scholar

Cf. H. M. Gwatkin, Church and State in England (London, 1917), pp. 340–341.Google Scholar

F. D. Maurice, Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, new ed. (London, 1873), II, 350–351.Google Scholar

Sykes, Ibid., p. 55. H. W. Richardson, of Harvard Divinity Faculty, in his “The Glory of God in the Theology of Jonathan Edwards,” unpub. Ph. D. diss., Harvard University (1962) has stated well the influence of Locke on Jonathan Edwards (pp. 50-97). In his discussion on “innate ideas,” he believes the position of Edwards to be closer to the Platonists than to Locke (pp. 81-82). I consider his association of the Cambridge Platonists with Ramist logic unfounded (pp. 50-52). I will return to this at the end of this chapter.Google Scholar

Salter, “Testimonies,” p. xxxiv, in Whichcote, Aphorisms, (1753). Salter here refers to Locke’s letter to the Rev. Richard King.Google Scholar

Powicke, Ibid., p. 20.Google Scholar

H. R. F. Bourne, Life of John Locke, (London, 1876), I, 77; Cf. G. F. von Hertling, John Locke und die Schule von Cambridge, (Strassburg, 1892), p. 160.Google Scholar

Bourne, Ibid., II, 228, 8, 212-214.Google Scholar

A. C. Fraser, Locke, (Edinburgh, 1890), p. 16. Cf. P. Lord King, The Life and Letters of John Locke, new ed. (London, 1858), I, 337, 344. For an account of the personal relation of Cudworth’s daughter, Demaris (later Lady Masham, Sir Francis’ second wife) and Cudworth’s widow to Locke, see Bourne, Ibid., I, 77, 170, 310; James Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, (Oxford, 1885), II, 403.Google Scholar

Martineau, Ibid., p. 404.Google Scholar

John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 31st ed. (London, 1853), I, iii, 25. Cf. James Gibson, Locke’s Theory of Knowledge and its Historical Relations (Cambridge, England, 1917), pp. 29-44.Google Scholar

For an account of Whichcote’s epistemology see Supra, Ch. IV. For a full discussion concerning “innate ideas” in Cambridge Platonism, see Lamprecht, “Innate Ideas,” P.R., Vol. XXV, (1926), pp. 553-73. It is the opinion of Seth, Ibid., p. 92-93, that Locke is reacting negatively to Descartes’ confidence in the “clearness and distinctness” of ideas as a criterion of truth. Even if we should accept this view, we would still need to consider his reaction to Cambridge Platonism. Ernest Cassirer points out in his The Platonic Renaissance in England, tr. by Pettegrove (New York, 1953), p. 59 (n. 1), that in their defense of the a priori, most of the thinkers of the Cambridge School do not distinguish between the “logical” and the “temporal” sense of the a priori concept. Hence they argue not only for the a priori validity of theoretical and ethical principles, but also for the “innateness” of these principles. In this respect they advocate essentially the position which Locke assails in the first book of his Essay. And it is quite probable that Locke, in formulating his arguments, was aiming largely at the philosophers of Cambridge as his real opponents. It is significant that Culverwel, closely associated with the Platonists, rejects the temporal and psychological interpretation of the a priori and to this extent anticipates Locke’s criticism. Cf. Of the Light of Nature, ed. by John Brown (Edinburgh, 1857), pp. 123-124. It seems reasonable to the present writer that Locke’s criticism of “innate ideas” may be a reaction, at once, against Descartes and the Platonists. For a comparison of “innate ideas” as conceived by Descartes and the Platonists, see Lamprecht, Ibid., pp. 571-73. Cf. Robert McRae, “‘Idea’ as a Philosophical Term in the Seventeenth Century,” J. H. I., vol. XXVI, no. 2 (April–June, 1965), pp. 175-190.Google Scholar

Seth, Ibid.; Apparently Locke by his concept of probable Knowledge anticipates this aspect of Butler’s thought. This position of Locke also explains why Shaftesbury, his pupil, reacted negatively against his Master’s epistemology and found a greater affinity with his own views in the sermons of Whichcote. Aesthetics appealed to Shaftesbury more than epistemology, see Richardson, Ibid., p. 292.Google Scholar

Francis Bacon, Advancement of Learning, ed. by G. W. Kitchin (London, [n.d.]), p. 209.Google Scholar

Cf. Cassirer, Ibid., pp. 59-60; Hertling, Ibid., pp. 100-157, 161-180, 293, 314-315; J. J. De Boer, The Theory of Knowledge of the Cambridge Platonists (Madras, 1931), pp. 4-6.Google Scholar

Gibson, Ibid., p. 237.Google Scholar

E. M. Austin, The Ethics of the Cambridge Platonists, (Philadelphia, 1935), pp. 78–80. Cf. Laird, Hobbes, pp. 280-281, 290.Google Scholar

Lowery, Ibid., pp. 236-237.Google Scholar

Cragg, Ibid., pp. 114-117. This writer conceives Locke’s treatise, The Reasonableness of Christianity, (London, 1695), as a standard work in Christian theology in England for the greater part of a century. See Ibid., pp. 117-118.Google Scholar

Locke, Essay, IV. 19. 4. Locke appears to be in an essential agreement with Whichcote on several points: (1) Opposition to enthusiasm, Ibid., IV. 19. 3. (2) The role of revelation, Ibid., IV. 16. 14; 18. 3, 5, 7, 8, 10. Cf. Reasonableness of Christianity, p. 14. (3) Scripture, its authority and interpretation, Reasonableness, pp. 1, 4., 43, 292-293 and (4) The relation of morality and religion, Ibid., pp. 15,19, 24-25, 260-261, 243-244. Cf. Essay, IV. 3. 18; 12. 11Google Scholar

One can hardly read Whichcote’s Sermons and Aphorisms and compare them with Locke’s Letters of Toleration without admitting the probability of Whichcote as a direct influence towards Locke’s tolerant spirit. See Supra, ch. VIII, Cf. Locke, Four Letters on Toleration, (London, 1876), esp. the Ist Letter, (1689), Ibid., pp. 2-4. Cf. W. K. Jordan, The Development of Religious Toleration in England (London, 1939), IV, 111-116; Cragg, Ibid., pp. 230, 190, 213-17. Locke’s minimum faith, viz., the confession that Jesus is the Messiah is well known, see Reasonableness of Christianity, pp. 1, 4-5, 43 passim. Locke in spite of his affinity with the Cambridge Platonists and the Latitudinarians in simplifying the faith, goes beyond both in his doctrinal vagueness and indicates the suppositions which tend to overthrow the accepted systems of theology. Cf. Plum, Ibid., pp. 80-93; Otto Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society ed. by Ernest Barker (Boston, 1957), II, i, 16 and see my “A Theological Conception of the State” J. C. S. vol. IV, no. I (May, 1962), pp. 66-75.Google Scholar

Cragg, Ibid., pp. 124-125. Cf. Bourne, Ibid., II, 87; John Omam, The Problem of Faith and Freedom in the Last Two Centuries (London, 1906), p. 105. Locke’s intention and dedication to truth is remarkably similar to Whichcote’s. Cf. Lady Masham’s tribute to Locke in a letter of Jean Le Clerc cited by Cragg, Ibid., p. 135, with Tillotson’s tribute to Whichcote in his Funeral Sermon of. … Whichcote.Google Scholar

Stephen, Ibid., I, 85.Google Scholar

Ibid., pp. 77-81.Google Scholar

Pascal, Pensées, ed. by Stewart (New York, 1947) “Apology,” Pen. 12. Lord Herbert of Cherbury is considered the true father of Deism, see Oman, Ibid., pp. 81-82. Stephen, Ibid., 83-84; F. L. Nussbaum, The Triumph of Science and Reason, (New York, 1953), pp. 186-187; C. C. J. Webb, Studies in the History of Natural Theology, (Oxford, 1915), pp. 89-90; Seth, Ibid., pp. 89-90; Cf. Cragg, Ibid., pp. 137-139. Locke, Essay, I, ii, 3. For an account of the manner in which John Toland builds his deistic theory upon Locke’s general position, see Toland, Christianity Not Mysterious (London, 1696), pp. 6, 37, 42, 127-134, 139-155 passim. Cf. Cragg, Ibid., Oman, Ibid., pp. 107-110; Stephan, Ibid., pp. 93-94. For an account of Stillingfleet’s protest against Locke and Toland alike, see Stephen, Ibid., pp. 112-113. For Locke’s defense, see Locke, Works, 12th ed. (London, 1824), III, 108, 42. Stillingfleet may be said to represent the Cambridge Platonists and Latitudinarians in this controversy. Unfortunately, however, he blamed Locke for the inferences which Toland had derived from Locke’s epistemology and this most assuredly against Locke’s consent.Google Scholar

Toland, Ibid., p. 6.Google Scholar

Stephen, Ibid., pp. 110-112. Cf. Cragg, Ibid., pp. 139-155.Google Scholar

Ibid., p. 85.Google Scholar

Whichcote, Aphorisms (1753), see Salter’s preface, pp. xviii-xix.Google Scholar

D.N.B., IV, 443-445. Martineau in the second volume of his Types of Ethical Theory treats Cudworth and Clarke as Dianoetic ethicists. Martineau’s term was used by Aristotle in describing intellectual virtues. We have seen Supra, chs. II, V, that Whichcote leans heavily upon Aristotle’s Ethics. Furthermore, the essential “intellectual” element in Whichcote’s ethics is more marked than in Cudworth. We have seen Supra, ch. IX, that Cudworth’s moral psychology is in part a reaction against the intense intellectualism of Whichcote’s ethics. Clarke in his mathematical deduction of moral law from logical necessity appears to be closer to Whichcote than to Cudworth.Google Scholar

Stephen, Ibid., I, 119-121. Cassirer finds a remarkable affinity between the rationalism of Whichcote and Leibnitz. If this observation is correct, there is little wonder that Clarke, an admirer of Leibnitz, should prize similar notions in Whichcote, a British predecessor of his, see Cassirer, Ibid., p. 39.Google Scholar

Samuel Clarke, Being and Attributes of God, 6th ed. (London, 1725), pp. 256–257; Cf. Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion, (1705), p. 86, (cited by Willey, The Eighteenth Century Background, (London, 1940), p. 60.).Google Scholar

Clarke, Unchangeable Obligations, pp. 147-148, (cited by Willey, Ibid.).Google Scholar

Ibid., p. 141, (cited by Willey, Ibid.). Allowing for the scientific and philosophical advancement between the Cambridge Platonists and Clarke, most of his ethical theory is anticipated in the writings of Whichcote and Cudworth and to a lesser degree in More’s work on ethics. See Martineau, Ibid., pp. 425-38.Google Scholar

See Supra, ch. VI.Google Scholar

Stephen, Ibid., pp. 127-29.Google Scholar

Ibid., pp. 129-130. Austin, Ibid., p. 70, observes that the Cambridge Platonists have been considered the founders of an “intellectual” school in English ethics which extends from them through Clarke, Wollaston, Balguy and Price, to Reid and Stewart of the Scottish School and, finally, to Martineau and others.Google Scholar

Whichcote’s influence upon the “common sense” school of English ethicists may be traced through Shaftesbury, who was under a more direct influence of the Cambridge Platonists. Butler is an outstanding representative of the same ethical school. Cf. Stephen, Ibid., II, 15.Google Scholar

See Supra, Appendix I.Google Scholar

Select Sermons (London, 1698), preface. Cf. Characteristics (London, 1723), II, 80, no, 311-313 passim. In these passages Shaftesbury attacks Hobbes. Cf. P. R. Anderson, “Science in Defense of Liberal Religion: A Study of Henry More’s Attempt to Link Seventeenth Century Religion with Science” (New York, 1933), pp. 200-202. Two research works are invaluable for a general knowledge of Shaftesbury’s moral and religious outlook. They are: Alfred Sternbeck, Shaftesbury Über Natur, Gott und Religion (Berlin, 1904) and V. G. Stanley, “Shaftesbury’s Philosophy of Religion and Morals: A Study in Enthusiasm,” unpub. diss. Columbia University, 1961.Google Scholar

Maurice, Ibid., II, 449-451.Google Scholar

Characteristics, (London, 1732), vol. II, bk. I, pt. II, sect. I; bk. II, pt. I, sect. I; pt. II, sect. I passim. Cf. L. A. Selby-Bigge, British Moralists, (Oxford, 1897), I, pp. 4-85; De Pauley, Ibid., pp. 18-20.Google Scholar

Cudworth’s moral psychology is closer to Shaftesbury’s than Whichcote’s, see Supra, ch. IX. Cf. De Pauley, Ibid., pp. 20-22; Whichcote, Works, II, 395, for Whichcote’s view of the beauty of the good life.Google Scholar

“An Inquiry Concerning Virtue,” Characteristics (1723), vol. II, bk. I, pt. I, sect. I, p. 6; Cf. De Pauley, Ibid., pp. 22-24. For an account of Shaftesbury’s notion of the value of religious belief to the good life, see Shaftesbury, Ibid., pt. III, sect. III, pp. 52-76 passim. For a comparison of Whichcote and Shaftesbury’s view concerning the nature of happiness here and hereafter, see De Pauley, Ibid., pp. 23-26; Cf. Shaftesbury, “The Moralists,” Ibid., pt. II, sect. I, pp. 221-245.Google Scholar

Stephen, Ibid., II, 24; Cf. Oman, Ibid., pp. 99-100.Google Scholar

Maurice, Ibid., II, 449. Cf. Austin, Ibid., pp. 81-82; Laird, Hobbes, p. 283; Willey, Ibid., pp. 61-75; Martineau, Ibid., II, 448-473; Whichcote, Select Aphorisms, (1822), p. 22. Cassirer who stresses the influence of the Cambridge Platonists not only upon German rationalism and aesthetics, conceives this influence as being transmitted mainly by Shaftesbury, see Ibid., pp. 160-162.Google Scholar

For an account of their agreements and differences, see Stephen, Ibid., II, pp. 16, 28, 46-47.Google Scholar

According to W. R. Scott, there is a close connection between Cudworth, Clarke and Butler, see An Introduction to Cudworth’s Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, (London, 1891), pp. 59-61. Whichcote certainly belongs to the same moral and religious tradition and is in many ways the founder of it.Google Scholar

Cf. Willey, Ibid., pp. 76-77.Google Scholar

Quoted by Butler, Analogy 6th ed. (Glasgow, 1764), p.v.Google Scholar

Supra, ch. VI.Google Scholar

Willey, Ibid., Cf. Butler, Analogy, pt. I, ch. VII, Con.Google Scholar

Ibid., pp. 76-94.Google Scholar

Butler, Sermons 4th ed. (London, 1749), Ser. i-iii, See esp. Ser. i, p. 13.Google Scholar

Butler, Works (Oxford, 1836), II, Preface, p. xiv; Ser. vi, p. 80; Ser. ii, pp. 33, 34 passim.Google Scholar

Butler, Sermons, Ser. i, pp. 6-7.Google Scholar

Ibid., pp. 9-11.Google Scholar

Ibid., p. 10. Cf. Whichcote’s reflections on the same subject, Supra, chs. V, VII. However, Butler’s views concerning “self-love” have no parallel in Whichcote’s writings, see Butler, Ibid., pp. 12-13; Cf. Ser. xi, p. 203. The closest Whichcote approaches Butler on this subject is when he asserts that immortality is unnatural and self-destructive. The positive corollary to this would be very close to Butler’s appeal to self-interest or “self-love.”Google Scholar

Stephen, Ibid., II, 54-56.Google Scholar

Willey, Ibid., pp. 93-94. Cf. Butler’s epitaph (in Bristol Cathedral), cited by Willey, Ibid., p. 76; Cf. Stephen, Ibid., I, 281-307; II, 47-56; Oman, Ibid., pp. 118-127; Butler, “Of the Nature of Virtue,” Dissertation, II in Analogy, (1764), pp. 344-356. Butler, together with the Cambridge Platonists, conceived Hobbes as his opponent, see Laird, Ibid., pp. 283-284.Google Scholar

Whichcote, Aph. 981; Cf. Ibid. 1161. For a fuller discussion of the Cambridge Platonists upon Scripturalism in the eighteenth century see Powicke, Ibid., pp. 206-208. Powicke is no doubt correct when he asserts that Whichcote and his school would have been driven to similar conclusions to those of the Scripturalists if they had tried to work out their reading of the New Testament into a system.Google Scholar

Norris’ basic agreement with the Cambridge Platonists was as follows: (1) Platonic love; (2) Reverence for reason; (3) The use of reason in the service of religion; (4) His dislike of Calvinism; (5) His insistence upon the ethical side of religion; (6) His view that orthodoxy of judgment is necessary only in fundamentals; (7)His attachment to the Church of England; and (8) His general indifference to politics. Powicke, Ibid., pp. 126-32. Concerning the work of John Sergeant of Cambridge and Arthur Collier of Oxford, see Muirhead, Ibid., pp. 72-73. Although there appears to be no direct relation between Berkeley and the Cambridge Platonists, his work entitled Siris, places him in the Christian Platonic tradition with them. All we can say is that Berkeley like the Cambridge Platonists is a great foe of scepticism, atheism and materialism, and in so far as he goes to Plato for his inspiration, he uses a common source with the Cambridge man. Cf. Seth, Ibid., pp. 123-128 and John Wild, George Berkeley (New York, 1962), pp. 71-77.Google Scholar

Ibid., pp. 131-132.Google Scholar

Quoted by Powicke, Ibid.Google Scholar

Ibid., pp. 126-127. Lovejoy’s essay in which he compares the thought of Cudworth, Norris and Collier with the so-called Neo-Kantians, i.e., T. H. Green, J. Royce, F. H. Bradley and others, is interesting. He dares to suggest that Cudworth anticipated Kant and much of the material which they claim to have received from Kant might well have been derived from the English idealists of the seventeenth century. See O. Lovejoy, “Kant and the English Platonists,” Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James (London, 1908), pp. 265-302. A similar position is taken by James Mackintosh, Discourse on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy (Edinburgh, 1872), p. 142. The same position is implied in Muirhead, Ibid. The work begins with the Cambridge Platonists and ends with American idealism, i.e. Royce. Muirhead dares to refer to Cudworth as the founder of British Idealism, see Ibid., p. 35. This tendency to imply the influence of the Cambridge Platonists upon Neo-Kantianism and even upon Kant himself has been convincingly criticized by Austin, Ibid., pp. 83-84; Scott, Ibid., pp. 62-64; Martineau, Ibid., II, pp. 396-399. The evidence is practically balanced on both sides. However, since Whichcote was not a systematic philosopher, the problem does not deserve further consideration. Whichcote is involved only indirectly in so far as he contributes to the idealism of Cudworth.Google Scholar

Muirhead, Coleridge as Philosopher (London, 1930) pp. 38–39, 97. See Coleridge’s lecture on “Plato and Platonism” in Kathleen Coburn, ed., The Philosophical lectures of Samuel Taylor Coleridge (London, 1949), pp. 144-169.Google Scholar

Ibid., pp. 65-67, 83, 95, 97, 113-115, 116-118, 234.Google Scholar

Seth, Ibid., pp. 320-27. Cf. Coleridge, Aids to Reflection ed. by Thomas Fenby, revised London, n.d.), Aphorisms, X, II, VII. Though Coleridge’s two main doctrines, viz. the distinction between Imagination and Fancy in Biographia Literaria and between Reason and Understanding in Aids to Reflection are interrelated, we are only concerned with the latter distinction here. Cf. J. D. Boulger, Coleridge As Religious Thinker (New Haven, 1961), pp. 3, 65-93. In his discussion on Coleridge’s concept of “higher reason,” Boulger is correct, I believe, in recognizing the influence of Kant as well as the Cambridge Platonists. In addition to Kant’s critical philosophy, Coleridge had also passed through the enlightenment. He had witnessed the breakdown of the unity between reason and revelation. It can readily be understood, therefore, why his circumstance called forth a more profound and critical concept than that provided by the Cambridge Platonists.Google Scholar

Basil Willey, Nineteenth Century Studies (London, 1949), pp. 28–29. Cf. Seth, Ibid., pp. 320-321. William Whewell, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, new ed. (Cambridge, England, 1862), p. 122. According to Whewell, Coleridge’s distinction in kind between Reason and Understanding is untenable. He asserts that the verb to reason is always employed to designate the discursive or ratiocinative operations of the mind while the verb to understand implies a fixed contemplation. Thus Coleridge’s view is neither good English nor good philosophy, for Coleridge describes the understanding as the faculty which judges according to sense obtaining truth by generalizing from experience, while he conceives Reason as observing Truth by intuition. Cf. Whewell, Ibid., pp. 119-130; Coleridge, Ibid., Aphorism VIII. It seems fair to conclude that however confusing Coleridge’s language may be, his intention is clear. He desires to purify the term Reason as applied to the supreme spiritual and moral faculty of man. Thus in intention he is perhaps closer to Whichcote than to any other member of the Cambridge Platonists school.Google Scholar

Muirhead, Ibid., pp. 254-255; Cf. J. H. Rigg, Modem Anglican Theology 2nd and revised ed. (London, 1859), pp. 8-32.Google Scholar

Willey, Ibid., pp. 33-34. It is of interest that Coleridge chose to call his insights in Aids to Reflection “aphorisms,” the very term made famous by Whichcote in the seventeenth century. This implies literary as well as thought affinity between them. One wonders if in fact Coleridge conceived this term by a study of Whichcote’s writings.Google Scholar

Cf. Muirhead, Ibid., p. 125. Muirhead calls Coleridge the reviver of the Platonic tradition and the founder of nineteenth century Idealism in England. Earlier in the same work (p. 35) he claims for Cudworth the position of the real founder of British Idealism. If this observation is correct, the relation between Cudworth and Coleridge is obvious. This would mean also that the relation between Whichcote and Coleridge is unquestioned since that which, idealistically speaking, is explicit in Cudworth’s writings is implicit in Whichcote’s. On the question of Justification by faith, Coleridge takes his stand against both Arminians and Catholics in defence of the Lutheran view. Thus on his view of saving faith, he differs somewhat with Whichcote who holds out for considerable Arminian influence, see, Boulger, Ibid., pp. 58-64.Google Scholar

The Kingdom of Christ 3rd ed. (London, 1883), I, xxv.Google Scholar

Leslie Stephen’s art. in D.N.B., Vol. XIII, pp. 104-105.Google Scholar

Bigg, Ibid., pp. 115-214. Cf. Candlish, “Professor Maurice and His Writings,” L.Q.R., Vol. III, No. VI, (1855) pp. 393-436; C. R. Sanders, Coleridge and the Broad Church Movement (Durham, N. C., 1942), pp. 14-15.Google Scholar

Cf. C. E. Raven, Natural Religion and Christian Theology (Cambridge, England, 1953), II, 214. See also A. M. Ramsey, F. D. Maurice and the Conflicts of Modern Theology (Cambridge, England, 1951), pp. 58-71.Google Scholar

Ibid., p. 213. This tribute to Maurice might almost be applied to Whichcote as it stands.Google Scholar

Ibid., p. 2.Google Scholar

Ibid., pp. 187-188. Cf. Jn. 3:19, 17. Cf. W. M. Davies, An Introduction to F. D. Maurice’s Theology (London, 1964), pp. 16, 118, 153 and R. N. Flew, The Idea of Perfection in Christian Theology (London, 1934), p. 116.Google Scholar

Smith, “Of Divine Knowledge,” Ibid., p. I. Cf. Maurice, Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy new ed. (London, 1873), II, 350; The Kingdom of Christ, II, 6-8, 193-195; Raven, Christian Socialism, 1848–1854 (London, 1920), pp. 78-82.Google Scholar

W. R. Inge, The Platonic Tradition in English Religious Thought (London, 1926), pp. 96–97. It is obvious I believe, that even the social consciousness and action of Maurice is present in Whichcote’s life and thought though not in the same degree. Inge numbers Wordsworth, Shelley, Coleridge and Ruskin among what he calls the “personal Platonists.” Willey, Ibid., pp. 53-54, considers Thomas Arnold as a successor of Whichcote and one who echoed in his whole life the exclamation of Whichcote: “Give me a religion that doth attain real effects.” Arnold stands in a succession which descends from Hooker, through the Cambridge Platonists to Coleridge, and leads through Maurice to William Temple. Cf. Stanley’s Life of Arnold, (1835) II, 13, cited by Willey, Ibid., p. 53. In Arnold’s concept of the “end” of the Church as that of “putting down of moral evil” and its “nature,” a loving society of all Christians, he reflected in his life and thought the spirit of Whichcote. Matthew Arnold, according to Willey, is akin in spirit to the same succession as his father, Thomas Arnold. Matthew Arnold, in fact, was trying to do for the nineteenth century what Whichcote attempted to do in the seventeenth, viz. “to preserve a spirit of piety and rational religion” in opposition to the “fanatic enthusiasm and senseless canting then in vogue.” Cf. Willey, Ibid., pp. 266-267. It is understandable that Matthew Arnold should have written an introduction to a work edited by W. M. Metcalfe, entitled The Cambridge Platonists, (1885).Google Scholar

Inge, Ibid., pp. 97-98.Google Scholar

B. F. Westcott, Essays in the History of Religious Thought in the West (London, 1891), p. 357.Google Scholar

Cited by Inge, Ibid., pp. 103-104. Inge comments that this language about eternal life, as a higher plane of existence into which we may pass here and now, is so much the hallmark of Platonism that it is needless to expatiate upon it. Ibid., p. 109. Cf. Henry Chadwick, The Vindication of Christianity in Westcott’s Thought (Cambridge, England, 1960), pp. 8, 10.Google Scholar

Cf. Temple, Nature, Man and God (London, 1943), pp. 304–305, 314. See Supra, ch. VI.Google Scholar

Ibid., p. 306.Google Scholar

Ibid., p. 305; Cf. Supra, chs. IV-VI.Google Scholar

Ibid., pp. 321-322. Temple places himself in the Christian Platonic tradition by his work Plato and Christianity (London, 1916). It appears obvious that he stands in the same tradition with the Cambridge Platonists and receives his inspiration from a common source. See, W. D. Geoghegan, Platonism in Recent Religious Thought (New York, 1938), pp. 82-109. Cf. Joseph Fletcher, Ibid., pp. 295-296 (n. 51). This relation between nature and grace in Raven led him to write a book on Father Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, the noted scientist-theologian, see His Teilhard de Chardin Scientist and Seer (New York, 1962), pp. 17-29. It is interesting that John MacQuarrie relates the theologies of William Temple and Teilhard de Chardin in his Twentieth-Century Religious Thought (New York, 1963), pp. 269-273.Google Scholar

Inge says, Ibid., p. 104, that Bigg belongs to the Christian Platonic tradition and in his Bampton Lectures on the Alexandrian Fathers he did much to awake the public interest in this type of theology. His sermons and addresses show that his personal religion belonged to the same type as that of Bishop Westcott.Google Scholar

Inge, Ibid.Google Scholar

Ibid., pp. 113-114.Google Scholar

Ibid., pp. 115-116. This seems to be the main point at which Dr. C. E. Raven aligns himself with the Christian Platonic tradition, i.e. early Logos-theology, the Cambridge Platonists and others. His volume “Science and Religion,” Natural Religion and Christian Theology, Vol. I, is a noteworthy attempt to prove that there is no conflict between nature and grace. Here he devotes a chapter to Cudworth and kindred minds who had a constructive influence upon modern scientific advance. Cf. Supra, ch. IV. For Raven as for Whichcote the God of Nature is the Giver of Grace.Google Scholar

Ibid., pp. 116-117. Cf. W. D. Geoghegan, Ibid., pp. 5-33 and George Santayana, Platonism and the Spiritual Life (New York, 1927), pp. 83-91.Google Scholar

Christian Mysticism 3rd ed. (London, 1913), p. 287.Google Scholar

Whichcote, Aphorisms (1930), Intro, by Inge, pp. ix-x.Google Scholar

Ibid., p. x. Cf. Christian Mysticism, Ibid., The Philosophy of Plotinus, II, 227-228. By comparison Inge appears more mystical than Whichcote though they have much in common. Inge’s mysticism like Whichcote’s is a “practical” mysticism. Raven considers W. R. Inge as a representative of British “modernism.” Raven, Ibid., II, 6. It would appear, then, that the roots of this modernism might reach back to Whichcote and his disciples. Willey, Ibid., pp. 226-267, calls Matthew Arnold the “founder” of English modernism but insists that Arnold gets his inspiration from the Cambridge Platonists.Google Scholar

Raven, Ibid., p. 6. The scope of this book does not take us into New England religious thought. There has been, however, a number of hints that the influence of the Cambridge Platonists passed to Jonathan Edwards. But the theory that the Cambridge Platonists were greatly influenced by Ramus and that it was through this common source that Edwards and the Platonists are linked, appears unfounded. There is also a real question as to whether Edwards read even Cudworth’s Intellectual System, see J. H. McCracken, “The Sources of Jonathan Edward’s Idealism,” P. R. vol. XI, no. 1 (January, 1902), p. 35. Most authors rely on two sources: Perry Miller, The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century (New York 1939) and H. W. Schneider, History of American Philosophy (New York, 1947). Both authors appear to be very knowledgeable concerning both Edwards and Ramus, but reveal slight insight into Cambridge Platonism. Thus I would question the conclusions of D. J. Elwood, The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards (New York, 1960), see pp. 168 (n. 47), 183 (n. 46). His assumption that Ramus influenced the Cambridge Platonists more than Renaissance Platonism cannot be supported. It may be true that Ramus’ influence was more important on Congregational Puritanism than Renaissance Platonism, but this is not true of the Cambridge school. There is, however, evidence that Ramus made a greater impact at Cambridge than at Oxford, but there is no way of establishing such a strong tie to Whichcote and his school. Their writings indicate no excitement over Ramus. There are two key factors to remember: (1) The Cambridge men were Puritans who did not leave the Church of England to become Congregational Puritans; therefore their theology was a reaction against the Calvinism of the Westminster Assembly; and (2) They were against the claims of papacy, but they were not Aristotelian in the Ramistic sense; they were rather pro-Platonic. For example, Whichcote used much of Aristotle and referred to him as the Philosopher indicating his admiration for him. There may be a tie between some Puritans in England with others in New England through Ramus, but this does not seem true regarding the Cambridge Platonists. What can be established, I think, is that Edwards was influenced by John Locke and Locke in turn was influenced directly by Whichcote and his school. This point we have already discussed earlier in this chapter. Cf. Richardson, Ibid.; H. G. Townsend ed., The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards (Eugene, Oregon, 1955), p. vi-vii; Paul Ransey’s introduction The Works of Jonathan Edwards (New Haven, 1957), pp. 47-65. Concerning Ramus see the following: W. J. Ong, Ramus and Talon Inventory (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), Pierre De La Ramée, Dialectique (1555) (Edition critique avec introduction, notes et commentaires de Michel Dassonville) (Geneva, 1964), pp. 7-46; F. P. Graves, Peter Ramus (New York, 1912), pp. 212-213; Charles Waddington, Ramus, Sa Vie, Ses Écrits Et Ses Opinions (Paris, 1855), pp. 364-380, 396-397. For an account of the continuing influence of Platonism on religious thought in England and America, see, W. D. Geoghegan, Ibid., the entire work.Google Scholar