Why Norwegian Business Associations Have Generally Avoided Political Finance Roles

  • Arnold J. Heidenheimer
  • Frank C. Langdon
Chapter

Abstract

Although Norway did not achieve sovereignty until 1905, it is one of the European countries which has come closest to being “born free” in de Tocqueville’s sense. That is to say, it had only a very limited feudal experience, of which its contemporary society bears few after-effects. Most of the Norwegian nobility died out in the Middle Ages, and the overwhelming portion of the land has, in modern times, been held by peasant proprietors.1 Titles of nobility were completely abolished by the 1814 Constitution, and the civil servants, as the only distinctly superior class, lost most of their privileges in the course of the 19th century.2 The guild system was less developed in Norway than elsewhere in Scandinavia and was nearing complete dissolution by the mid-19th century.3 In 1900, an official yearbook noted “surprisingly small differences” between the incomes of the principal economic groups of the population with the annual income of the average “larger tradesman” said to be only a little more than twice as much as that of the average workman.4 This can be seen as a reflection of the fact that Norway long remained one of “Europe’s economic backwaters.” 5

Keywords

Political Party Business Association Party Leader National Union Labour Government 
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Notes

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    In 1927/28 the proportion of the state’s income derived from public properties and enterprises was about 20% in Sweden and Finland, 8% in Denmark and less than 5% in Norway. Kyoesti Jaervinen, “Die öffentlichen Unternehmungen in der Staatswirtschaft der nordischen Länder,” Weltwirtschaftsarchiv, XXIX (1929), p. 254. In the late 1950’s the percentage of the working age population employed by government and public enterprises was more than twice as high in Sweden than in Norway (5.88%). Bruce M. Russett, et al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 70–71.Google Scholar
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    Rival white collar and civil service unions claim a membership equal to only 8% of the LO total membership, compared to a similar ratio of 18% in Germany.Google Scholar
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    Statistik Arbok for Norge, 1961 (Oslo: Statistik Sentralbyra, 1961), p. 252.Google Scholar
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  66. 1.
    Carl J. Hambro in Akkurat, October, 1959.Google Scholar
  67. 2.
    Instilling Angaende Sporsmalet em a Gjennomfore Offentlighetsprinsippet nar det Gjelder Finansieringen av de Politiske Partier og den Politiske Presse (The Question of an Effective Disclosure Principle in the Financing of Political Parties and the Party press) (Oslo, 1952), p. 3. This report will be referred to as Government Party Finance Commission Report.Google Scholar
  68. 3.
  69. 1.
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  70. 2.
    The Government Party Finance Commission Report (pp. 4-5) summarized the parliamentary debate in this way: During the debate on this proposal which took place in the Parliament on November 26 and 27, 1948, the proposer made several changes in his original proposal: first, that the committee should be appointed by the Parliament; secondly, that the investigation should also include financing of political parties and the political press. During both the interpellation debate and the following debate concerning the above proposal, the and he therefore did not wish to accept Lothe’s proposal. Representatives from Hoire and Bondeparteit (Farmers’ Party) did not support the proposal either. A motion made by Vogt (Chr. P.), proposing that only Libertas and its supporting organizations should be investigated, was defeated by 17 votes. After this, Oksvik’s motion in its final form was accepted, 76 voting for it (Labour and Communists) and 52 voting against it. This was the resolution: “The Parliament has decided, by a special selection of representatives, to gather information concerning the financing of the political parties and the political press, assumed to be of interest to the public; this will also include the organizations mentioned in Oksvik’s interpellation. The nominating committee is asked to nominate committee members.” After this resolution, Lothe’s motion was defeated. The proposed committee was appointed by the Parliament on March 4, 1949, after nominations by the Nominating Committee. It consisted of 15 members, with M. P. Terje Wold as chairman, 8 members of the Labour Party, 2 each from Hoire (C) and Venstre (L), and one member from each of the following parties: Bondeparteit (Farmers’ Party), Kristelig Folkeparti (Chr. P.), and the Communist Party.Google Scholar
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  72. 2.
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  73. 3.
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  74. 1.
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  75. 2.
    Stein Rokkan, “Readers, Viewers and Voters,” Guildhall Lectures 1964 (Manchester. Granada TV Network, 1964), p. 20.Google Scholar
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    Edvard Bull, Jr., op. cit., p. 111; Hubert Ferraton, Syndicalisme ouvrier et Social-Démocratie en Norvège (Paris; 1960), p. 155.Google Scholar
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    Valen and Katz, op. cit., p. 70. Labour party membership figures given here differ only slightly from those given by Torgersen. They correct earlier, inflated data on Labour party membership which had been utilized in some of Rokkan and Valen’s earlier publications, i.e. Rokkan, “Electoral Activity Party Membership and Organizational Influence,” Acta Sociologica, IV, (1959), pp. 25-37.Google Scholar
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  102. 2.
    Government Party Finance Commission Report, p. 18.Google Scholar
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  104. 1.
    Protokoll over… 38. ordinaere Lands mote, 9-11 April, 1962. (Oslo: DNA) p. 230.Google Scholar
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    Of the mass-directed campaign efforts utilized in the 1957 campaign, the ones which reached the largest percentage of voters were: 51% had listened to at least one of the radio debates; 29% had read at least one electoral pamphlet; 23% had received free newspaper subscriptions from some party. Rokkan (1959), op. cit., p. 29.Google Scholar
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    For the Labour movement’s adult education program see Edvard Bull, (Jr.), op. cit., p. 114-6.Google Scholar
  107. 1.
    In 1961 shipowners of some 82% of Norwegian tonnage were reported to be paying dues of 13 ore per ton to Libertas, for a total of about 1 million kroner annually. Total Libertas income from industry, calculated on turnover or number of workers, was estimated to be about as large as that from shipping. Dues from the metal working industry were said to be about 250,000 kroner a year. See Olav Brunvand, “Libertas i Dekning,” Tillittsmannen (DNA, 1961), No. 1.Google Scholar
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  114. 1.
    A study of interest organization journals in the 1957 election campaign, by Egil Fivelsdal and Knut Dahl Jacobsen, found that the organs of the business associations made no mention at all of participation in political activities and contained only “occasional negative comments concerning the policies of the Labour government.” Valen and Katz, op. cit., p. 307.Google Scholar
  115. 1.
    Morgenavisen, March 16, 1963.Google Scholar
  116. 2.
    Morgenbladet, March 20, 1963.Google Scholar
  117. 3.
    Labour’s complicated affiliation practices were characterized by the Government Party Finance Commission (pp. 4-5) in these terms: Only labor union locals, not national associations, may hold collective membership in the Norwegian Labour Party. The union locals have full rights of self-decision, and the national unions therefore cannot require the unions to join the party. Within the individual national unions, therefore, some unions are members of the Labour Party, others not. The National Union Federation has in all about 500,000 members. Of these, 80,000 hold collective membership in the Norwegian Labour Party, which has a total membership of 200,000. Exact information for the whole country on the number of union locals which have collective membership in the Labour Party does not exist, but the committee has been informed that in Oslo, which has the main portion of the collective membership (ca. 57,000), 121 of 210 labor union locals are collectively enrolled in the party. Collective affiliation generally occurs at the general meeting. The agenda is announced in advance, and decisions are reached by majority decision. Collectively-affiliated union locals are affiliated to the party with a definite membership figure, which is determined by the union local itself. This figure, as far as is known, always lies considerably below the union’s membership figure. As an example may be mentioned the Plumber’s Union in Oslo, which appears on the party list with only 600 of its 1200 members. The union locals do not pay dues to the Labour Party for members who state that they do not wish to be members of the party. During action upon party matters, a collectively-enrolled union local is considered as a general party branch. The union has the same rights as other party branches, and, in the same manner as these, has representatives in the local parties’ representative councils, according to the number of its members. It pays the same dues with collective as with individual membership. Dues to the national party are 80 ore per quarter per member for full payment, and 40 ore for half payment. As appears from … the party by-laws, that these union members who, … do not wish to be considered as party members must expressly state their reservations against being counted as members. This arrangement is, in general, the same as in Sweden and Great Britain A labor union member always has the opportunity to make this reservation, and no grounds for the reservation need to be given. No special form is required for use in cases of reservation. Union members who belong to other parties are obliged to exclude themselves from membership in the Labour Party. The LO has supported the Norwegian Labour Party ever since it was founded. Before elections, the LO has encouraged its members to support the party at the election. The National Union and the national unions donate money to the national party, and the local unions to the local parties. The National Union Federations and the national unions do not give donations to local parties and district organizations. LO cannot require the national unions to make donations to the party’s election campaigns, and neither can the national unions require the local unions to make donations. In the parliamentary election of 1949 there were several national unions which did not make grants to the election campaign. It may be mentioned that some national unions and union locals grant donations to the Communist Party.Google Scholar
  118. 1.
    “Pengemakt og Organisationemakt,” Kontakt, April, 1958.Google Scholar
  119. 2.
    Valen and Katz, p. 325. According to Fivelsdal only some five percent of the white-collar membership of the LO belong to union locals which are collectively affiliated to the Labour Party, but a much larger proportion of the membership believes that such ties exist. This may be the result of an aggressive campaign against “political unionism” on the part of non-LO unions. Among members of LO white-collar unions 45 percent disapproved of collective membership, whereas only 35 percent approved. Egil Fivelsdal, “White-Collar Unions and the Norwegian Labor Movement”, Industrial Relations, V, (October, 1965), pp. 83, 88-89.Google Scholar
  120. 3.
    Venstre-politikk 1951-53, pp. 45-6.Google Scholar
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    Pengemakt og Organisationemakt, op. cit. Google Scholar
  122. 2.
    Shannon, op. cit., p. 78.Google Scholar
  123. 3.
    Government Party Finance Commission Report, pp. 52 ff.Google Scholar
  124. 1.
    Government Party Finance Commission Report, pp. 29 ff.Google Scholar
  125. 2.
    Cf. Eckstein’s evaluation: “The fact is that Norway’s political system is drab and untheatrical in the extreme. It lacks pageantry, aesthetic formalism, and titles, except for one inconsequential knightly order. It cultivates self-effacing, matter-of-fact speaking in which Gradrindish facts, preferably statistical, are at a premium. And it is headed by a monarchy without a court, chosen in 1905 because it seemed “more respectable” than a pure republic, not out of real monarchial convictions; nor is there yet any deep emotional involvement in it; nor does the monarchy try to cultivate such an involvement.” (p. 29).Google Scholar
  126. 1.
    Government Party Finance Commission Report, p. 16.Google Scholar
  127. 2.
    D.N.A. 38 Ordinaere Landsmoete, op. cit., p. 230.Google Scholar
  128. 3.
    Rokkan (1966), op. cit., p. 111.Google Scholar
  129. 1.
    1961 and 1965 Election OutcomesGoogle Scholar
  130. 1.
    Arbeiderbladet, September 6, 1965.Google Scholar
  131. 2.
    Thus the two important portfolios Finance and Labor went to two Liberals, Helge Seip and Ole Myrvoll, who had locked horns with Libertas, while the Minister of Commerce, Kaare Willoch, had also not been very close to the organization.Google Scholar
  132. 3.
    Arbeiderbladet, October 23, 1965.Google Scholar
  133. 4.
    Valen and Katz, op. cit., p. 37.Google Scholar
  134. 5.
    Jan Henryk Nyheim, “The Cooperation of Four Parties,” Scandinavian Political Studies, II, 1967, p. 258.Google Scholar
  135. 1.
    Sven Groennings will soon be publishing an analysis of the formation of the 1965 coalition in Groennings, Kelley and Leiserson, eds, The Study of Coalition Behavior, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968) and in Scandinavian Political Studies, III, 1968.Google Scholar
  136. 1.
    Tale av formannen i styret i Libertas, h.r. advokat Johan Hjort, (Libertas pamphlet, 1965), p. 6.Google Scholar
  137. 2.
    Ibid., p. 8.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands 1968

Authors and Affiliations

  • Arnold J. Heidenheimer
    • 2
  • Frank C. Langdon
    • 1
  1. 1.University of British ColumbiaCanada
  2. 2.Washington UniversityUSA

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