The Coming of the Northern Europeans to the Malay-Indonesian Area

Keuning, Tweede schipvaart I, p. XXIV.Google Scholar

See also J. G. van Dillen, Het oudste aandeelhoudersregister van de Kamer Amsterdam der Oost-Indische Compagnie, p. 11–20.Google Scholar

For the conflicts of the Portuguese and the Dutch in the overseas territories see: C. R. Boxer, “Portuguese and Dutch Colonial Rivalry 1641–1661” in Studia II (1958),13–7–42. Later on the Portuguese tried to avail themselves of the superior shipbuilding skill of the northern Europeans by having ships built in English ports (Documentos remettidos I, p. XXIII, p. 237, 26 /3 1608 ).Google Scholar

Outside Europe, the Dutch offensive was directed mainly against the Portuguese. In “Portuguese and Dutch Colonial Rivalry,” p. 8, Boxer points out that the Dutch were usually defeated when they fought against the Spanish (for example, in the Philippines).Google Scholar

Barbour, “Dutch and English Merchant Shipping in the 17th century,” p. 227.Google Scholar

Tiele, “Europeërs” V, p. 202.Google Scholar

Boxer, Far Eastern Quarterly, Review X (1950), p. 219.Google Scholar

Historia da expansdo II, P. 94. For the superiority of Dutch ships and naval tactics see Botelho de Sousa, Subsidios para a Historia militar maritime da IndiaI, P. 433, 434, 437. In the 27th century boarding parties and man-to-man fighting gave way to gun battles between ships, which meant that the ships had to carry much heavier armament. While Barbour (“Dutch and English Merchant Shipping,” p. 227) also attaches significance to these changes in the tactics of naval warfare, Professor Boxer does not consider that the contrast between Dutch and Portuguese tactics was so great. According to him, the Dutch still tried to board as soon as they could but the Portuguese, who were aware of Dutch superiority, tried to avoid battles, although of course, exceptions did occur (statement by Prof. Boxer).Google Scholar

Coen, Bescheiden VI, P. 456 (Discours x624).Google Scholar

Quotation: “was so veel gezeyt als dat men in Noorwegen om vijgen en rozynen zou varen,” V.O.C. arch., O.B. 2626 II, fol. 300, 10/3 1616; also Ibid., O.B. 1617 I, fol. 122vs, x0/3 1616; Coen, Bescheiden VI, P. 456 (Discours 1614 ).Google Scholar

Boxer considers that the Portuguese made a serious mistake in basing their defence upon lightly-armed but very easily manoeuvrable ships such as lateen-rigged lighters and frigates which fell easy prey to the heavily-armed vessels of the Dutch and English (Boxer, “Portuguese in the East,” p. 232).Google Scholar

em tempo em que a guerra se faz aos hollandezes que e gente bem disciplinade“ (Documentos remettidos IV, p. 168, 22/3 1617).Google Scholar

Lopes, Expansdo da lingua portuguesa, p. 12, gives some figures showing the ratio between the numbers of Dutch and Portuguese ships that were sent to the East Indies. According to Lopes, between 1595 and 260x the Netherlands dispatched 65 ships (This figure is incorrect. According to the data provided by the Bijlsma inventory on the precursors of the United Company, the number was 48). During the same period 33 ships reputedly embarked from Lisbon. The cubic capacity of the Portuguese ships must have been considerably more than that of the Dutch vessels, however.Google Scholar

Boxer, “Portuguese in the East,” p. 23; Ballard, Rulers of the Indian Ocean, p. 21x. Boxer (“Rivalry,” p. 27, 28) considers that the quality of the human material was a factor of very considerable importance in the conflicts between the nations.Google Scholar

Dunlop, Bronnen Persii, p. LVII; Pieter van Dam, Beschrijvinge II, 3, p. 26; Boxer, “Military influence,” p. 7.Google Scholar

See, for instance, Van Dam II, 3, p. LVII, p. 26.Google Scholar

Calendar of State Papers, East Indies, 1617–1622, p. 21 (7/3 1617 ).Google Scholar

See p. 129.Google Scholar

Boxer attaches less importance to these technical factors and points out that the larger northern European ships destined for the East Indies trade were usually the same size as the smaller caracks and galleons of the Portuguese (Boxer, “Admiral Joao Pereira Corte Real and the construction of Portuguese East Indiamen in the Early 17th Century,” Mariner’s Mirror XXVI (2940), P. 388–390, 396–398, 404–406 ).Google Scholar

Boxer, Tragic History of the Sea, 1589–1622, p. 1–30.Google Scholar

De Lannoy, Histoire de l’expansion I, p. 143.Google Scholar

Historia de Portugal V, P. 340, 351; Boxer, Fidalgos in the Far East, p. 13; Ibid., “Rival¬ry,” p. 23.Google Scholar

Quotation: “het soo lange op zee conden herden, ja hielden het voor onmogelijck, so lange sonder rust op zee to wesen,” B&V II, “Matelieff,” p. 52.Google Scholar

Coen, Bescheiden I, p. 635; Boxer, Fidalgos in the Far East, p. 27, 68.Google Scholar

W. M. F. Mansvelt, Rechtsvorm en geldelijk beheer, p. 70 et seq.Google Scholar

C. de Heer, in Bijdrage tot de financieele geschiedenis der Oost-Indische Compagnie, p. 2¬17, contests the view that the United Company was a cartel, and he demonstrates that in spite of the autonomy of the various Chambers the Company was actually an entity in itself (p. 27).Google Scholar

Mansvelt, Rechtsvorm en geldelijk beheer, p. 93, 94.Google Scholar

In his Dutch-Asiatic Trade, 1620–1740, K. Glamann takes a more favourable view of the Company’s bookkeeping than Mansvelt. He uses a trade journal and ledger which have been preserved from the Company’s office in Persia to demonstrate that the directors knew more about whether the factories were proving remunerative than Mansvelt supposed (Glamann, p. 250–252). Nevertheless, he does not dispose satisfactorily of one of Mansvelt’s greatest objections, namely the United Company’s totally inadequate system of calculating expenses. The directors were well aware of the imperfections of their bookkeeping system, witness their repeated attempts to appoint an Accountant-General, whose task it would be to combine Dutch and Asian data into one general bookkeeping system (Van Dam I, r, p. 372–376).Google Scholar

Lane, “Oceanic expansion,” p. 22, 23.Google Scholar

For the inadequate costing system, see Mansvelt, Rechtsvorm, p. 107.Google Scholar

As far as the United Company is concerned, at least, the publication of Glamann’s Dutch Asiatic Trade means that a solid foundation has already been laid. It is question¬able, however, whether research of this nature, which depends primarily on statistical material, is possible in respect of the Portuguese enterprises.Google Scholar

For the significance to Dutch economy of the carrying trade, see J. E. Elias, Het voorspel van den eersten Engelschen oorlog (The Prelude to the First English War), I, chapter r.Google Scholar

Historia de Portugal V, p. 336.Google Scholar

MacGregor, “Portuguese in Malaya,” p. 23.Google Scholar

De Lannoy, Histoire de l’expansion I, p. 22.Google Scholar

Pires, Suma Oriental I, p. 220.Google Scholar

Quoted in Whiteway, Rise of Portuguese Power in India, p. 174. Bartholomew the Florentine was a certain Bartolomeo Marchione, an Italian merchant from Florence, who played an important role in Portuguese trade, owned a business-house in Portugal, and participated in Portuguese enterprises overseas (thus Giovanni da Empoli went to the Indies in Marchione’s service in 2503 ). For Bartolomeo Marchione see Charles Ver-linden, “La colonie italienne de Lisbonne et le développement de l’économie métro¬politaine et coloniale portugaise” in: Studi in Onore di Armando Sapori, p. 621.Google Scholar

In mentioning Pires we must not forget Duarte Barbosa who was equally interested in economic affairs.Google Scholar

Unlike the Dutch United Company, the Portuguese government permitted private merchants in Portugal to send money in commends with ships leaving for Asia. More than 40% profit was sometimes made on the reals-of-eight which were used for trading in Asia (Itinerario I, p. 9).Google Scholar

See p. 126, 128.Google Scholar

In 1609 rumours were current in Lisbon that the Spanish king would allow absolutely unrestricted trade with the East Indies against payment of an import and export duty of 50% (Letters received by the East India Company from its servants to the East I, p. XXXVIII).Google Scholar

Fitzler, “Überblick Portugiesischen Uebersee Handelsgesellschaften,” p. 289, 290; Boktim IV, p. 689.Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch. 453, Gentlemen Seventeen to Gov. Gen. & Council, 2/2 1629; Ibid., 24/3 2630; Coen, Bescheiden, VII b, p. 1813, 22/9 2629; Ibid., V, p. 830, 2/2 2629. e4. V.O.C. arch. 453, Gentlemen Seventeen to Gov. Gen. & Council, 28/8 2629.Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch. 453. Gentlemen Seventeen to Gov. Gen. & Council, 24 /3 1630.Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch. 453. Gentlemen Seventeen to Gov. Gen. & Council, 24 /3 1630.Google Scholar

See Pissurlencar, Assentos I, P. 572 (dissolution, by the king, of the Company for Trade with the East Indies, 12 /4 2633 ).Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1630 I, fol. 245.Google Scholar

Letters received by the East India Company from its servants in the East I, p. X X X VIII.Google Scholar

Hist. de Portugal V, p. 352, 377; Pyrard, Voyage I, p. XII. The capture of the Portuguese carack “Madre de Deus” was very important in this respect.Google Scholar

Documentos remettidos I, p. XIV, p. 206; Ibid., III, p. XXVI, p. 328, 18/3 1625; J. Lucio d’Azevedo, Historia dos Christlos novos Portugueses, makes no mention of converted Jews in Malacca.Google Scholar

Documentos remettidos IV, p. XXIII, p. 266, 21 /3 1627.Google Scholar

Boktim II, p. 236 n.d. Carta do secretario de Estado para o vice-rei; Ibid., III, P. 543. Carta regia, 2g/2 2603; Ibid., IV, p. 62o (codex Brit. Mus. No. 1231 fol. 209 ).Google Scholar

Rouffaer-IJzerman, Eerste schipvaart I, p. 99.Google Scholar

Ballard, Rulers of the Indian Ocean, p. 254, 279; Villiers, Indian Ocean, p. 148; “a fleet lying in the zone of the perpetual south east trade winds is to windward of the whole Indian ocean throughout the year, on any part of which it can make a descent.”Google Scholar

In 2606 a strong Spanish fleet under the command of Don Pedro de Cunha came to the Moluccas; in 1625 the Portuguese and Spanish made a combined attack aimed at conquering the Moluccas. Stapel, Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indic, III, P. 54, 98.Google Scholar

Cf. De Lannoy, Histoire de l’expansion coloniale I, p. 72, 117, 219, with Hist. de Portugal V, p. 320, 342, 343, 386. According to Cortesâo the decline of the Portuguese empire began before 1580 and the Spanish kings had tried more than once to counteract it. Cortesäo cites Oliveira Martins (Portugal nos Mares I) as a Portuguese historian who in a spirit of resistance to chauvinism denies that Spain had any influence on the Portuguese decline. Boxer, “Portuguese in the East,” p. 236, draws attention to the fact that the decline continued even after Portugal had regained its independence from Spain.Google Scholar

Hist. de Portugal V, p. 350.Google Scholar

Letters East India Company III, p. XXIX (1615); Ibid., IV, p. XIV (1616). V.O.C. arch. 452, 17/io ‚624; Boletim IV, p. 8x9 (1616). Noteworthy in this connection is the plan of Francisco de Saude the Spanish governor of the Philippines, to conquer Achin (MacGregor, “Johore Lama,” p. 94 note 190 ).Google Scholar

Hist. de Portugal V, p. 320, 386.Google Scholar

De Lannoy, Histoire de l’expansion I, p. 128.Google Scholar

Boletim III, p. 573 (1601–1602), Carta régia n.d.; Ibid., p. 544, Carta régia, 19/2 1603 Ibid., p. 603, Carta regia, 25/2 1609; Ibid., IV, p. 762, Carta do vice-rei, 19/11615; Ibid., p. 779 n.d. (Dec. 16x5); Ibid., p. 819, 1616; Documentos remettidos IV, p. XXXIX, P. 346, 20 /2 1618.Google Scholar

Documentos remettidos I, p. XXII, p. 210, 4 /3 1608.Google Scholar

Coen, Bescheiden I, p. 690, 700. Up till now, unfortunately, there has been no publication of Portuguese or Spanish records with which Coen’s estimate could be compared. Quite possibly, in view of the poor state of Portuguese-Spanish financial administration, no such records exist. (De Lannoy I, p. 209 ).Google Scholar

Quotation: “niet meer dan een boon in een brouketel,” Coen, Bescheiden I, p. 690.Google Scholar

I bid., p. 689.Google Scholar

According to the Dagregister Batavia of 1637 (13/I, p. 2,), a short time previously the Portuguese had brought silver to the value of 60 or 70 tons of gold from Japan to Macao in 4 navettes. Profits of Ioo%, were made on this Macao-Japan trade, while 40 to 50% could be gained by giving money or goods in commenda (Dagregister 1637, p. 20).Google Scholar

Boxer, Fidelgos in the Far East, p. 144.Google Scholar

Ibid., p. 134, 135.Google Scholar

Boletim II, p. 158. Alvare réglo, 9/3 1594; Ibid., p. 207. Carta régla, 1/3 1594; Ibid., p. 326. Carta regia, 28/2 1595; Ibid., p. 241. Carta regia, 2,/II 1598; Ibid., III, p. 597. Carta régla, 19/3 1609; Ibid., IV, p. 713 n.d. Ibid., 4, P. 840, March 16x7.Google Scholar

According to the Dagregister Batavia of 1637 (13/I, p. 2,), a short time previously the Portuguese had brought silver to the value of 60 or 70 tons of gold from Japan to Macao in 4 navettes. Profits of Ioo%, were made on this Macao-Japan trade, while 40 to 50% could be gained by giving money or goods in commenda (Dagregister 1637, p. 20).Google Scholar

Dagregister Batavia, 1633, p. 163. By 1637 communications between Macao and the coast of India had become very difficult because so many ships were being seized (Dagregister Batavia 1637, 3 /3, p. 64 ).Google Scholar

In 1605 the Dutch captured Tidore from the Portuguese (Cornelis Bastiaensz.) but in,606 it was recaptured by a combined Spanish-Portuguese fleet. Part of Ternate also fell into Spanish hands ( De Jonge, Opkomst III, p. 53 ).Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1632 I, fol. 5vs (6/1 1632); fol. 135 (26/II 1631 ); Ibid., O.B$11633 I, fol$1190 (7/3 1632); fol. 396vs (r/rr 1632 ).Google Scholar

B & V II, “ Paulus van Solt,” p. 55 (March- 1606 ).Google Scholar

B & VII, “Van der Hagen,” p. 50, 51. Cf. also B & VII, “Matelieff,” p. 148.Google Scholar

Coen, Bescheiden VIIb, p. 988; Dagregister Batavia 1625, p. 205 (29/9 1625); V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1633 II, fol. 26, (7/11 ‚632); Dagregister Batavia 1636, p. 166, 167 (15/7 1636); Ibid., p. 3, (8/1 1636); V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1637 I, fol. Io9 (28/, 2 1636 ).Google Scholar

e.g. Boletim IV, p. 826, March 1617.Google Scholar

In 1613 the Dutch captured the Portuguese fort on Solor, but did not settle there permanently so that the Portuguese were able to continue trading.Google Scholar

A Portuguese squadron near Aden could control the Red Sea (Stripling, The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs, p. 33, 93).Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 III, fol. 2I2vS (22/Io 1615).Google Scholar

Moreland, Peter Floris, p. 120. 121.Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch., 1617 III, fol. 216vs (22/to 1615).Google Scholar

For the Portuguese seizure of a Moslem ship coming from Mecca, see Pissurlencar, Assentos I, p. 291 et seq. (4/Io 1630 ).Google Scholar

Threatened by its northern European enemies on the coast of India, the Portuguese government tried to remain on friendly terms with the Mogul empire (Documentos remettidos III, p. XXXI, p. 389 (1x/2 x616); Ibid., p. XLIII, 499 (18/3 16x6); Ibid., IV, p. XX (21/3 1617), p. 130; Letters East India Company II, p. 150 (2/12 16x5); Ibid., IV, P. 342 (2/x1 x616).Google Scholar

Quotation: “haer nogh meerder genegentheyt toonden als voor andere Europische natien,” Van Dam, Beschrijvinge II, 3, p. 12.Google Scholar

Moreland, Peter Florin, p. 68.Google Scholar

Verhaal van eenige oorlogen in Indie.“ Krosiek Historisch Genootschap 1871. p. 576.Google Scholar

Terpstra, Westerkwartieren, p. 3.Google Scholar

Documentos remettidos I, p. XIX, p. x65 (2/x 1608); Ibid., III, p. 71 (4/2 1613 ); Letters East India Company III, P. 44 (8/3 1614/1615).Google Scholar

Ibid., I, p. 176 (2/4 1612); Ibid., II, p. 229 (16/12 1614 ); V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 III, fol. 211 (22/10 1615).Google Scholar

Terpstra, Westerkwartieren, p. 37.Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 III, fol. 216vs. (22/10 1616).Google Scholar

Letters East India Company IV, p. XXX, p. xox (1/5 1616 ).Google Scholar

Ibid., III, P. 38 (3/3 1614 [1615]); Ibid., VI, p. X XV.Google Scholar

Ibid., I, p. XX XVIII.Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch., O.B. 16,7 III, fol. 214 (22/10 1615 ).Google Scholar

Yet some of these Indian ships do seem to have carried a certain amount of armament. In 16x3 the English made a report about a large ship of 30o tons belonging to the Gujarati and coming from Mocha, which was armed with 12 pieces of artillery (Best, Voyage to the East Indies, p. 234, 14/I 1613 ). In his description of the Indian merchantmen, Van den Broecke states that they carried guns but that these guns were of little use because they were mounted in the wrong place and so were completely without shelter. Moreover, according to Van den Broecke, the Indians did not know how to handle them (B & V II, “Van den Broecke,” p. 66 ).Google Scholar

Jourdain, Journal, p. 223.Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1627 II, fol. 125 (5/8 1626).Google Scholar

Terpstra, Westerkwartieren, p. 41.Google Scholar

Coen, Bescheiden VIIb, p. 1209, 1213, 1501; Ibid. V, p. 297, 589, 590, 598; Ibid., IV, P. 315; Ibid., III, p. 23; V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1628 II, fol. 154.Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1636 I, fol. 24, 25 (4/1 1636 ); V.O.C. arch. 454, Brieven XVII (Gentlemen Seventeen), fol. 124vs, 127 (24/9 1636).Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 128 (24/9 1636); V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1636 I, fol. 4 (4/1 1636).Google Scholar

Letters East India Company IV, p. 314 (26/5 1616).Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1635 I, fol. 63 (15/8 1634).Google Scholar

Documentos remettidos II, p. i89, 192 (6/2 1615).Google Scholar

Documentos remettidos III, p. i89, 190 (6/2 1615).Google Scholar

Ibid., p. 373 (6/2 1616).Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch. 453 (Brieven XVII) 3/4 1628.Google Scholar

Documentos remettidos IV, p. XX, 125 (21/3 16x7); Ibid., p. XXXIX, 346 (2o/2 1618 ).Google Scholar

Quotation: “zich geen moeyten, noch arbeyt laten verdrieten omme tot haar voorne¬men in negotie te comen,” V.O.C. arch. 454 (XVII), p. 165 (6/12 1637 ).Google Scholar

Coen, Bescheiden VIIb, p. 1209, 1213, 1501; Ibid. V, p. 297, 589, 590, 598; Ibid., IV, P. 315; Ibid., III, p. 23; V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1628 II, fol. 154.Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1634 I very., fol, 924 vs. (memorandum Philip Lucasz.).Google Scholar

Ibid., fol. 935 (Philip Lucasz.).Google Scholar

Ibid., fol. 930, 935 (memorandum Philip Lucasz.).Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 188 (12/4 1638).Google Scholar

Ibid., fol. 188vs. (12/4 1638).Google Scholar

Ibid., fol. 39vs. (2/9 1634).Google Scholar

From 1638–164x the number of references to the hoplessness of the Portuguese situation is almost overwhelming.Google Scholar

Letters East India Company IV, p. 236.Google Scholar

Van Dam, Beschrijvinge II, 3, p. 277.Google Scholar

Letters East India Company V, p. XIV (16x7).Google Scholar

Van Dam, Beschrijvinge II, 3, p. 277.Google Scholar

Dunlop, Bronnen Persii, p. LIV, LV, LVI.Google Scholar

Ibid., p. LVII.Google Scholar

In 1616 the Portuguese had some 40 or 50 men living here for the purpose of conducting trade (Letters East India Company, IV, p. 315, 26/5 1616). An agent was authorized to take half of the import and export duties paid by Portuguese traders as well as those of other nationality in the name of the viceroy in Goa, for the Spanish crown (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1634 I very., fol. 935vs., memorandum Philip Lucasz.).Google Scholar

Van Dam, Beschrijvinge II, 3, p. 11.Google Scholar

Dagregister Batavia 1636, p. 111 (2/6 1636).Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1634 I very., fol. 935vs., 936, memorandum Philip Lucasz.). 130. Van Dam, Beschrijvinge II, 3, p. 11.Google Scholar

C. van de Haar, De diplomatieke betrekkingen tussen de Republiek en Portugal, 1640–1661 (The diplomatic relations between the [Dutch] Republic and Portugal.Google Scholar

Tiele, “Europeers” V, p. 163–166.Google Scholar

Clark and Van Eysinga, The Colonial Conferences between England and the Netherlands in 1613 and 1615, II, p. 27.Google Scholar

Letters East India Company III, p. XXVI.Google Scholar

Van Rees, Geschiedenis Koloniale politiek II, p. 19; Van der Chijs, Stichting Oost Indische Compagnie, p. 149.Google Scholar

Mansvelt, Rechtsvorm en geldelijk beheer, p. 53.Google Scholar

Letters East India Company I, p. XXIII.Google Scholar

Moreland, Peter Floris, p. 84 note 2.Google Scholar

Letters East India Company, p. XXIII.Google Scholar

Court Minutes I, p. XXV.Google Scholar

Terpstra, Nederlanders in Voor-Indië, p. 37.Google Scholar

In a comparative study of the ways in which the two companies were organized (“Oceanic Expansion, Government Influence on Company Organization in Holland and England, 1550–1650”) Riemersma makes some valuable suggestions which certainly merit elaboration. He sees the English company as an association of individuals retaining the character of a guild, and the Dutch United Company more as an organi¬zation for the joint use of capital in which the personal element was of much less importance. The difference in the size of the shares in the United Company meant that there was quite a contrast between the big shareholders, who were chosen to fulfil the leading functions and the majority of the shareholders, who shared in the dividends but could exert no influence in the Company itself. According to Riemersma, there was far less difference in the size of the shares in the English company and so there was more equality among its members. But was the difference between the two companies in respect of the relationships among the shareholders themselves as great as Riemersma posits (p. 37)? After all, in the English company, just as in the Dutch United Company, there was friction between the big and smaller shareholders. (Court Minutes I, p. VIII).Google Scholar

Letters East India Company VI, p. XXIX; Court Minutes I, p. VI, XIV, XVIII, X XI.Google Scholar

Court Minutes I, p. XIV, XXI.Google Scholar

Quotation: “de particuliere handel van de Engelsen hebbe U Ed. to gelooven soo de Compagnie van Engelandt in voegen als UE. gedient wert, lange voor desen de Neder¬landsche Compagnie to boven soude geraect wesen,” V.O.C. arch; O.B. 1634 I very., fol. 922vs. (memorandum Philip Lucasz.).Google Scholar

Letters East India Company V, p. XXXVI.Google Scholar

Ibid., p. XXXVIII; Court Minutes I, p. V. Private trade to the value of fi. 31.00o was reputed to have been done in one year.Google Scholar

The United Company’s initial capital (fl. 6,50o,000) was eight times as much as that of the English company (£ 68,000). (Hall, South East Asia, p. 233).Google Scholar

Van Dillen, “Amsterdam als wereldmarkt der edele metalen in de 17e en 18e eeuw,” P. 544, 583, 584.Google Scholar

It was laid down in 1609 that the quantity of coins which might be exported was not to exceed £ 30,000. It turned out however that there was no market for English goods in Asia and so the maximum for money exports was raised to £ 60,000. In 1616 £ 52,087 was exported in money as opposed to £ 16,506 in goods (Letters East India Company VI, p. XXXIX). The money the English exported usually had to be procured before¬hand from the Netherlands (Coen, Bescheiden I, p. 668, 26/12 x621). For the years 1603–1617 Dutch money exports were as follows: 1603: fl. 650.000 16x1: 50o.000reals 1604: no returns x612: no shipment 1605: 345.600 reals 1613: 216.000 reals 1606: 340.000 reals 1614: 128.000 reals 1607: 500.000 reals 1615: 400.000 reals 1608: no returns 1616: 528.000 reals 1609: 300.000 reals 1617: 400.00o reals 1610: 600.000 reals (Van Dam I, x, p. 632). The value of goods exported is only known for certain years. For example, in 1603 the value of the cargo amounted to fl. 131.000. In 16x5, the value of goods exported only amounted to fl. 70.000, as against 432.00o reals = fi. 1.o80.00o in money (V.O.C. arch. 248, fol. 314, 1/xo 1615, resolution Gentlemen Seventeen). It may be assumed that the ratio in other years did not differ greatly from the figures quoted above. In 1607 it was expressly stated that no merchandise was exported except for some iron and lead, the value of which was not considered worth mentioning (V.O.C. arch. 248, 3/10 1607, resolution Gentlemen Seventeen). For this reason the United Company tried from the beginning to stimulate goods exchange between the Asian countries themselves, so as to be able to reduce the ship¬ments of money. The idea behind this was that trade in Asia would nourish itself and enough profit be made to cover the expenses of return freights to the Netherlands, which could then be used in the mother-country not only to provide for a distribution of profits but also as a basis for the formation of new capital. Apart from the fact that the English company used to return their deposited capital to its shareholders, the mercantilistic financial policy of the English government must have been one of the reasons why the Dutch United Company had the upper hand of the English at first. Moreover, at a somewhat later period the United Company in Asia also tried to obtain precious metals in exchange for goods. In the Indonesian Archipelago, for example, this was the case on Sumatra and Borneo, and outside Indonesia in Mocha, and particularly in China and Japan. According to Moreland the fact that the United Company controlled the Spice Islands and also had a monopoly of trade to Japan was one of the most important factors in the Company’s success (Moreland, From Akbar to Aurangzeb, p. 64). For the connection between eastern trade and the influx of American silver and the consequent rise of modern capitalism see E. J. Hamilton, “Prices as a Factor in Business Growth,” The Journal of Economic History XII (x952), p. 333.Google Scholar

Much information to the shortage of money experienced by the English in Asia is to be found in English sources as well as in the records of the Dutch United Company. Only a few suggestions are given here: Letters East India Company I, p. XXXIX; Ibid., V, p. XXV; Coen, Bescheiden I, p. 668; Ibid., III, p. 113, 246; Ibid., V p. 534, 596; V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1628 I, fol. 40vs.Google Scholar

Letters East India Company VI, p. XLI.Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch. 4389 (departures register for Company ships).Google Scholar

Coen, Bescheiden II, p. 493 (30/12 1628); Ibid., p. 439 (19/9 1618); Ibid., I, p. 554 (12/5 2620 ). In his letter of 30/12 16x8 Coen contrasts the 28 ships then in Asia with the ideal figure of 58. In 2620 he actually considered that English ships were in the majority, but his figures for the Dutch ships did not include small ships nor those which had just left for Holland. As opposed to the 42 ships on the official list in January 1619 we have Coen’s figure of 19 (plus x x worn-out ships). In 1617 there were x x English ships as against 39 Dutch ones ( I Jzerman, Cornelis Buysero in Bantam, p. xi ).Google Scholar

Letters East India Company V, p. 154; Ibid., I, p. XXXIX; Jourdain, Journal, p. 326.Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch., O.B. ‚622 I, fol. 119–121.Google Scholar

For example, in x626 there were 62 Dutch ships and 21 English ones. 37 of the 62 Dutch ships had a capacity of more than 300 tons. No tonnage is mentioned in respect of the English craft, only the various categories, that is to say 22 or 13 ships, 6 yachts and 3 frigates (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 2626 II, fol. 248). The figures for 1627 were 58 Dutch ships and x8 English ones (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1627 I, fol. 1o6).Google Scholar

Letters East India Company V, p. 154; Ibid., I, p. XXXIX; Jourdain, Journal, p. 326.Google Scholar

Letters East India Company IV, p. XXVII.Google Scholar

Ibid., p. XXVII.Google Scholar

For the English and Dutch standpoints in their colonial negotiations, see Clark and Van Eysinga, Colonial Conferences II, p. 28, 30, 65, 77, xox-113, 144–146.Google Scholar

Letters East India Company III, p. 146.Google Scholar

Villiers, Indian Ocean, p. 158.Google Scholar

For the more ethical stand taken by the English in the colonial conference see Clark, p. x46. Crawfurd’s remark that the English would have been just as monopolistic as the Dutch if they had had the chance is a mere assumption and refers, moreover, to the English attitude towards the Dutch not towards the natives. Kiers (p. 83) treats Craw¬furd’s assumption as an established fact. He neglects, however, to produce contempo¬rary evidence in support of the assumption.Google Scholar

Clark, Colonial Conferences II, p. 144, 145.Google Scholar

Ibid., p. 102.Google Scholar

In criticising English claims to priority in the Spice Islands on the grounds that they were the first, Kiers fails to distinguish between territorial authority and the right to trade freely (p. 87).Google Scholar

Clark, Colonial Conferences, II, p. 28, 68–70, 145, 146.Google Scholar

Quotation: “een pernicieuse, hooveerdiche en incumpatible natie, die overal hun voor¬deel soecken,” V.O.C. arch., O.B. 16,5, fol. xovs (ix/ix 1614 ).Google Scholar

Ibid., fol. 8vs (II/Ix x614).Google Scholar

Ibid., O.B. 1617 I, fol. 1x1 (10/3 x6, 6 ).Google Scholar

Ibid., O.B. 1616 II, fol. 297 (2o/3 2616); Ibid., O.B. 1617 I, fol. IIovs (10/3 1616 ).Google Scholar

Ibid., O.B. 1616 I, fol. 70vs (23/ro 1615).Google Scholar

Ibid., O.B. 1617 I, fol. 1x1 (10/3 x6, 6 ).Google Scholar

Ibid., fol. 1x2 (10/3 x616).Google Scholar

Ibid., O.B. 1619 II, fol. 253vs (2o/8 1628).Google Scholar

De Jonge, Opkomst IV, p. XXX, XXXI, LXII, LXIII.Google Scholar

Tide, Bouwstoffen I, p. XXVI, XXVII.Google Scholar

Quotation: “de goede kudde der historische herkauwers,” Kiers, Coen op Banda, p. 2–3. 279. Ibid., p. 76, 77.Google Scholar

Ibid., p. 110.Google Scholar

In writing his thesis Coen op Banda for the University of Utrecht Kiers was strongly influenced by Professor C. Gerretson, who held the Chair of Colonial History at this University.Google Scholar

Ibid., p. 44.Google Scholar

Ibid., p. 53.Google Scholar

TG., LVIII, (1943), p. x50–152 (H. Terpstra); Tijdschr. Kon. Ned. Aardrijkshundig Genootschap. LX (1943), P. 503 (C. Wessels).Google Scholar

Quotation: “sonder nochtans eenige handtdadigheyt tegens haer te plegen,” Coen, Bescheiden VI, p. 7x.Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch. 450, fol. 152–153.Google Scholar

Ibid., O.B.,6x7 I, fol.,o (11/7 x6,6).Google Scholar

The Dutch actually accredited the English with the evil plan of getting the Bandanese to hand over their islands to the king of England in the presence of the king of Bantam (Petition from Reynst to the States General 26/10 16x5, arch. St. Gen. 5746A Letters East Indies 1599–1622).Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch. 450, fol. 257 (30/xx 16x5), fol. 289 (xo/,2 16x5, to Reael). The Seventeen’s criticism of Read fails to hold water, since they upbraid him (in their letter of April 16,7) for taking forcible action on Banda and Ceram while displaying so many scruples in respect of the English and the Spanish (V.O.C. arch. 450, fol. 573, 12/4 1617). After all, the military situation was not the same in both cases.Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch. 451, fol. 179, x80 (Memorandum from the delegates sent by the Seventeen to the States General 31/5,617); V.O.C. arch. 451, fol. 196, see also resolutions States General 31/5,6,7 (arch. St.-Gen. 564); letters East Indies x599–1622 (arch. St.-Gen. 5746A).Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch. 452, fol. 179 (31/5 16,7).Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 I, fol. 40vs (16/5 1616); Ibid., fol. 45, 45vs (25/6 16x6); Ibid., fol. 48, 48vs (7/7 1616 ).Google Scholar

The resolution of 16th May x6r6 is not signed by Van der Hagen, who was absent at the time. The resolution of 15th June 1616, however, which is an expression of approval of the action taken against Castleton, does carry Van der Hagen’s signature.Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 I, fol. 35 (5/5 1616 ); Ibid., fol. 37 (9/5 x6r6).Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 I, fol. 39vs. Protest by Reael about the English admiral’s vessels lying off Tidore.Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 I, fol. 40vs (16/5 1616).Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1618 I, fol. 3vs (10/5 16x7); Ibid., O.B. 1616 III, fol. 3 (25/7 2625 ). In the last-mentioned letter there are two conflicting remarks. On the one hand Reael displays vexation at the English “who carry supplies to the other’s enemy [the Banda¬nese]. For this reason they must be more rigorously prevented from trading and these people must be dealt with more hardly” (“die Bens anders viant [de Bandanezen] toe¬voer doen. Daarom moet hun de handel wat rigoureuzer worden belet” [en moet men] “met dit volck wat harder toegaen”). But on the other hand Read praises the Seven¬teen’s intention to make a pact with the English, “which is considered by all the world to be the only means of destroying the Spanish and the Portuguese in Asia.”Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 I, fol. ro (1x/7 1616).Google Scholar

Kiers devotes several pages (p. 93–99) to discussing whether Read had already received the Seventeen’s order of 30th April 1615 when he left the English undisturbed. But the question is irrelevant since the order was not sufficiently explicit about the course that was to be followed, a fact admitted by Coen himself. It was not until the order of 30th November 1615 that all doubt about the Seventeen’s intentions was dispelled. Kiers holds that Reael should have abided by an order issued by Governor General Reynst on 11th October 1615 when the existence of the order dated 2rst November 1614 (no force to be used) was still unknown in the East Indies. This order by Governor General Reynst did prescribe the use of force. Was Reael, who had himself been appointed Governor General, obliged to carry out an order issued by his predecessor when he was perhaps already aware of the existence of the order issued by the higher authority, that is to say, the Gentlemen Seventeen, on 21st November 1614? At any rate he and his council did know about the negotiations being conducted in Europe.Google Scholar

Thei, attitude towards the natives, in a certain sense more humane than that of their colleagues, must be carefully adjuged in the light of contemporary feeling on the subject. Otherwise Van der Hagen’s attitude towards slavery, for example, is totally inexpli¬cable. As an argument in favour of keeping slaves he puts forward the idea that those owned by the United Company could become Christians (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1618 I, fol. 201vs, 26/5 1617). In the same way, Read has no hesitation about forcibly dis¬placing the entire population of the island of Siau in order to use these people as labourers in the Banda Islands (Tide, Bouwstoffen I, p. XVIII, XIX). When United Company ships brought the Siau islanders to Amboina for transportation to the Banda Islands, a revolt broke out among the Amboinese, who were afraid that they would suffer the same fate, and only the confidence which they placed in Van der Hagen was able to avert worse trouble (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 III, fol. 50, 18 /7 1616 ).Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch., O.B. r617 I, fol. 45 (25/6 1616); Ibid., O.B. 1617 I, fol. ro, joys. (11/7 16x6); Ibid., O.B. 1616 III, fol. 3 (25/7 1615).Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 I, fol. 1x1, III (10/3 x616); Ibid., O.B. 1619 II, fol. 253vs (2o/8 1618 ); Ibid., O.B$11616 I, fol. 70vs (23/10 1615 ).Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1619 II, fol. 255 (2o/8 1618).Google Scholar

Kiers criticizes these negotiations by Read (p. Ito) but disapproves even more of Reael’s negotiations with the Bandanese, although the latter were no more than a confirmation of the pact concluded the previous year with the Bandanese byAdmiral Lam.Google Scholar

Letters East India Company V, p. XXXIV (16x7).Google Scholar

Tiele, Bouwstoffen I, p. XXX.Google Scholar

Op een lege romp en hope van een ydele buit, [terwijl hij (Coen) heel goed wist, dat de Engelsen op weg naar Banda waren] “nu alhyer een vyer ontsteken is, dat sonder twijffel een grooten brant met sich sal trecken.” V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1618 I, fol. 4 (10/6 16,7).Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1616 III, fol. 5 (25/7 1615); Ibid., O.B. 1617 I, fol. 6vs (1x/7 16x6); Ibid., O.B. 1618 I, fol. 8vs (ro/5 1617); Ibid., O.B. 16x8 II, fol. 5 (xo/Ir 1617). In making recommendations about his successor, Read also put Coen’s name forward although he knew that Coen, whom he held to be “a person of great discernment, diligent and bold” (V.O.C. arch., O.B. 1617 III, fol. 28, 22/9 1616), advocated a policy diametrically opposed to his own. His personal preference, however, must have been for Cornelis Dedel.Google Scholar

Coen, Bescheiden II, p. 145 (21/9 1616); Ibid., p. 163 (ro/10 1616); Ibid., p. 173-x75, 180, 191, 193 (7/I1 1616 ); Ibid., I, p. 199 (so/so 1616).Google Scholar

Coen, Bescheiden II, p. 163 (so/10 1816 ); Ibid., P. 174 (74 r 1616).Google Scholar

Coen, VI, p. 460 (Discours 1614 ); Coen, Bescheiden I, p$188 (10/1r 1614); Ibid., p. 141 (22/Io 1615 ).Google Scholar

Quotation: “absurde saecke,” Coen, Bescheiden II, p. 183 (7/,, 1616 ).Google Scholar

Ibid., p. 721 (4/6 162o); Ibid., P. 746 (26/6 1620 ); Ibid., p. 764 (9/7 1620).Google Scholar

Kiers, Coen op Banda, p. 142.Google Scholar

Clark, Colonial Conferences II, p. 136. Clark considers this a realistic policy and a “pru¬dentand practical plan.”Google Scholar

In 1629 Gentlemen Seventeen complained that two English ships had brought 115.000 pounds of cloves, which would be damaging to United Company sales (V.O.C. arch. 453, 3/12 1629). In 1630 the directors estimated that the entire quantity of cloves brought to England in 1629 amounted to 300 quartets (r quartel varied between 360 a 400 pounds) (V.O.C. arch. 453, 14/3 1630). These complaints continued in subsequent years (V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 46 [2/9 1634], arrival of 255 bahar of cloves for the English in Bantam). In 1636 about 300.000 pounds of cloves were brought to England (V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 139vs, 26/11 2636). In 1638; 118.000 pounds (V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 216vs, 16/9 1638). In 1640 47,000 pounds (V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 296vs, 11/9 1640) in spite of the destructive expeditions undertaken by the Dutch in the Spice Islands. In 1641, 46.000 pounds (V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 357vs, 5/9,641). In 1641 the English cargo actually included 3470 pounds of mace and 3340 pounds of nutmegs, although the Banda Islands were closed entirely to foreign traders (V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 351vs, 5/9 1641). These nutmegs and mace must have reached the English through smuggling and private trading on the part of United Company officials and nutmeg-planters.Google Scholar

De Jonge, Opkomst VI, p. LXXVIII.Google Scholar

In 1624 four large ships went to Surat, while only one left for Bantam (V.O.C. arch. 452, Dec. 1624, see also Letters East India Company IV, p. X I (1616).Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch. 454 fol. 303 (11/9 1640).Google Scholar

Terpstra, Nederlanders in Voor-Indic, p. 27.Google Scholar

Coen, Bescheiden IV, p. 584, 585 (2x/9 1623 )Google Scholar

Because they feared that the the one third share of the spices to which the English were entitled by the terms of the treaty might at some time in the future amount to so much that the English would be able to supply all Europe with spices, and that then the United Company would no longer be able to dispose of its cloves, the directors of the United Company wanted to specify once and for all the maximum quantity of cloves that might be shipped to Europe (Coen, Bescheiden IV, p. 491, 4/3 162,).Google Scholar

Letters East India Company III, p. 146 (16/7 1615)Google Scholar

If the shareholders of the English company wished, their deposited capital could be paid back to them. This was not the case in the United Company, in spite of the pro¬tests of its shareholders. In this way the United Company succeeded in establishing a capital reserve. Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade, p. 8. See also p. 194, note 149.Google Scholar

V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 23 (25/11 1633)Google Scholar

Ibid., fol. 227 (16/9 1638).Google Scholar

Quotation: “een grote sake voor de vrunden [!], dat zij onder de wapenen en groote oncosten van dese Compagnie (the United Company) paisibel varen en haren handel doorgaans mogen drijven,” V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 326vs (15/3 1641 ).Google Scholar

Van Dam, Beschrijvinge II, 3, p. 14; Coen, Bescheiden III, p. 573 (28/12 /629); V.O.C. arch. 453 (28/8 1629); V. O.C. arch., O.B. 1631 I, fol. 21vs, 33vs, (7/3 1631); Ibid., O.B. 1634, I, fol. 37 (15/8 1632); Ibid., O.B. 1633 I, 34 (1/12 (2632); Ibid., O.B. 1634 I very. fol. 956vs (memorandum Philip Lucasz.); Ibid., O.B. 1634 I, fol. 43 (15/12 1633) Dagregister Batavia 1636, p. 1,0 (2/6 1636); V.O.C. arch. 454, fol. 146vs, 148 (3/Io 1637); Ibid., foi. 256 (12/9 1639); Ibid., fol. 299vs (1r/9 1640 ).Google Scholar

Van Dam Beschrijvinge II, 3, p. 14.Google Scholar

Heeres, Encyclopaedic Ned. Indie I, p. 723–725.Google Scholar

Ibid., I, p. 583–584.Google Scholar

Quotation: “publycke liedekens op haer wijse gemaeckt,” Coen, Bescheiden I, p. Sri 22 /2 2620 ).Google Scholar