Time as viewed by Husserl and Heidegger

It is interesting to know the interaction between Husserl’s and Heidegger’s philosophical opinions on time. It is known that in April 1926 Husserl, in proposing that Heidegger prepare his lectures for publication, referred to the question of time. It is also known that just then Heidegger worked on his own treatise about being and time. As K. Święcicka suggests, Heidegger’s concept of time was influenced by Husserl’s opinions, and that decided its final shape (K. Święcicka, Husserl [Warsaw, 1993]).Google Scholar

See E. Husserl, Die Idee der Phänomenologie, Fünf Vorlesungen, Husserliana, Bd II (The Hague, 1950, 1958).Google Scholar

According to Paul Ricoeur for instance, phenomenology is first of all the general outline of intentionality, where the consciousness is the unshaken foundation, but the Ricoeur’s opinion this is still to be done. Ricoeur discusses Husserl’s phenomenological method and his specific hermeneutic program arises from it (See P. Ricoeur,“Phenomenology and Hermeneutics”, in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences (Cambridge, Mass., 1981). However, to Lévinas, besides the phenomenological method, Husserl’s discovery of the sensible object’s being such because of an essential meaning of the way it reaches consciousness (intentionality) is important. In Lévinas’ opinion it is important that Husserl’s philosophy reveals the new area of concrete — absolute consciousness, which to Lévinas is semantics according to the best sources (See E. Lévinas, Théorie de l’Intuition dans la Phénoménologie de Husserl (Paris: Alcan, 1930); and En Découvrant l’Existence avec Husserl et Heidegger (Paris: Vrin, 1949). It is a relevant point to pay attention to the fact that in Husserl’s opinion his philosophy had not been understood by his followers in the proper way. When he talked to A. Jaegerschmid, he complained of being isolated in his philosophical work and above his followers’ understanding. This situation mostly follows from the fat that while Logische Untersuchungen was always taken up by his disciples, this work Husserl himself treated as only his philosophical début (See A. Jaegerschmid,“Rozmowy z Edmundem Husserlem (1931–1938)”, Znak, no. 212 (1972), p. 2.Google Scholar

See E. Husserl,“Vorlesungen zur Phanomenologie des inners Zeitbewusstseins”, Jarbuch für Philosophic und phänomenologische Forschung, IX (1928), and E. Husserl, Texte zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1883–1917) (Hamburg, 1982).Google Scholar

When Husserl talks about philosophy and philosophers he pays attention to the strict connection with the historical past. From his considerations about time, when he lays particular stress on the retentional past, we can educe a view that the philosopher“draws from a history”, that there is“a deposit” of the past that is brought to life by him in order to better understand himself (See E. Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, Eine Einleitung in die Phänomenologische Philosophie (Hamburg, 1982).Google Scholar

See M. Heidegger, Being and Time (Oxford: Blackwell, 1964), §65, §68.Google Scholar

Consideration of the anxiety we can also find in Paul Ricoeur’s works, especially when he tries to grasp it as something that is set in motion the impetus of existence (See P. Ricoeur,“Vraie et fausse angoisse”, in Histoire et Vérité Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1964). He studies anxiety on different levels of human existence, namely, from the biological level connected with the will to live, through the psychological level connected with history, to the stage of anxiety caused by authority. However, in his opinion, the sphere of absolute threat implied by anxiety follows from a feeling of guilty when moral codes have previously been transgressed. Heidegger is instead concerned with a sort of metaphistical anxiety not connected with God.Google Scholar

See E. Husserl,“Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie”, Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung I (1913).Google Scholar

See M. Heidegger, Being and Time (Oxford: Blackwell, 1964.Google Scholar