What Are the Limitations of the Situation Calculus?

  • M. Gelfond
  • V. Lifschitz
  • A. Rabinov
Chapter
Part of the Automated Reasoning Series book series (ARSE, volume 1)

Abstract

The situation calculus [8] is a methodology for expressing facts about action and change in formal languages of mathematical logic. It involves expressions for situations and actions (events), and the function Result that relates them to each other. The possibilities and limitations of this methodology have never been systematically investigated, and some of the commonly accepted views on this subject seem to be inaccurate.

Keywords

Frame Problem Concurrent Action Temporal Reasoning Nonmonotonic Reasoning Dine Room 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1991

Authors and Affiliations

  • M. Gelfond
    • 1
  • V. Lifschitz
    • 2
  • A. Rabinov
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of Texas at El PasoEl PasoUSA
  2. 2.Department of Computer Sciences and Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Texas at AustinAustinUSA
  3. 3.Apple Computer, Inc.CupertinoUSA

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