Cooperation in Research & Development and European Competition Policy

  • Alexis Jacquemin
Chapter
Part of the Studies in Industrial Organization book series (SIOR, volume 14)

Abstract

During the last few years, the workings of national and international economies have been perceived as depending on strategic relationships, the main actors being firms which are endowed with varying powers and which position themselves, physically and psychologically, so as to discourage or dictate the actions and responses of their current and potential competitors. The name of the game is to co-operate with one’s competitors over common components, yet maintain keen competition at the final product stage; to erect credible barriers against players likely to enter the market; to control the range of products and services likely to act as substitutes for one’s own activity; to modify one’s bargaining power vis-à-vis suppliers or purchasers by means of long-term contracts or control of upstream operations; to influence the balance of forces by making strategic moves and anticipating change.

Keywords

American Economic Review Cooperative Agreement Competition Policy Consumer Welfare Cournot Competition 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1991

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  • Alexis Jacquemin

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