Metaphysics and Belief pp 3-9 | Cite as
The Ethics of Belief
Abstract
- (1)
briefly state Chisholm’s proposal to formulate expressions, featuring epistemic terms, in what is usually called “normative” language;
- (2)
consider Firth’ reservations with regard to Chisholm’s enterprise;
- (3)
propose a less emasculated acceptance of the “Ethics of Belief”-thesis by drawing on an illustration of belief- and value-language,3 and formalizing the different types of “belief-worthiness” into which that illustration may be analyzed;
- (4)
derive from all this a case for the plausibility of Chisholm’s original thesis, and conclude with several suggestions concerning the distinctness of cognitively-normative-, from other types of normative, beliefs.
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
- Roderick M. Chisholm, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study (Ithaca, New York; Cornell University Press, 1957 ).Google Scholar
- Roderick Firth “Crisholm and the Ethics of Belief,” Philosophical Review, Vol. 68, 1959, pp. 493–506.Google Scholar
- Gouldner and Peterson, Technology and the Moral Order ( Bobbs-Merrill; New York, 1962 ).Google Scholar