Epistemology I pp 61-81 | Cite as
The Difference Between the Psychology and the Epistemology of Perception
Abstract
Consider a statement of the form “y perceives a Phi-x” — say “I see a tree” or “He hears a bell”. An analysis of such a statement that would, I think, elicit widespread agreement is that it asserts one thing essentially subjective and implies another more or less objective. The subjective proposition is that the subject is in a certain state (condition or activity) describable as a state of “perceiving a Phi-x”. The objective proposition is that there is something describable as “being a Phi-x” that he is perceiving. Thus, the statement “I see a tree” is false if I am not in a tree-seeing condition, and also false if there is no tree where I claim to see it. Similarly, “He hears a bell” is not true unless he is in a particular sort of hearing condition and there is a bell.
Keywords
Subjective State Standard Analysis Large Mammal Perceptual Statement Logical TruthPreview
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References
- See Richard Jeffrey, Formal Logic: Its Scope and Limits, McGraw-Hill, 1967, P-5.Google Scholar
- P. F. Strawson, “On Referring”, Mind, Vol. 59, 1950.Google Scholar
- See Roderick Chisholm, “Sentences About Believing”, Vol. II, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Minnesota, 1958.Google Scholar