Introduction

  • Richard M. Zaner
Chapter
Part of the Phaenomenologica book series (PHAE, volume 17)

Abstract

In several respects, the problem of the body (or, as we shall have to say later, the metaproblem of the body) is the matrix of Gabriel Marcel’s philosophical work. In order to see this properly, it will be necessary to describe the general feautures of his work as a whole.

Keywords

Human Condition Philosophical Anthropology Personal Existence Authorized Translation Metaphysical Priority 
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References

  1. 1.
    Metaphysical Journal, H. Regnery (Chicago, 1952), p. 255, translation by Bernard Wall authorized and approved and with a “Preface to the English Edition,” by M. Marcel. (Hereafter cited in the text as MJ.) Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Du Refus à l’Invocation, Gallimard (Paris, 1940), p. 122. (Hereafter cited in the text as RI). Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Le Mystère de l’Etre: Vol. I, Réflexion et Mystère; Vol. II, Foi et Réalité, Aubier (Paris, 1951). (Hereafter cited in the text as, respectively, ME, I, and ME, II.) Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Cf. D. E. Roberts, Existentialism and Religious Belief, Galaxie Books, Oxford U. Press (New York, 1959), p. 278.Google Scholar
  5. 1.
    In the same place, he refers to several passages in his earlier writings which foreshadow the crucial role of this question: Cf. Etre et Avoir, Aubier, Editions Montaigne (Paris, 1935), pp. 72, 73, 158–59, 180–81, passim. (Cited textually as EA.); RI, pp. 188–89; etc.Google Scholar
  6. 2.
    Marcel, Position et Approches concrètes du Mystère ontologique, Introduction by Marcel de Corte, J. Vrin (Paris, 1949), pp. 46–51. (Cited textually as PA.) Google Scholar
  7. 2.
    Cf. below, pp. 16–18.Google Scholar
  8. 3.
    Cf. Homo Viator, H. Regnery (Chicago, 1951), p. 138, translated by Emma Craufurd. (Cited textually as HV.); and ME, I, p. 14; and MJ, p. 290.Google Scholar
  9. 1.
    Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays, Vintage Books (New York, 1959), pp. 14–15.Google Scholar
  10. 2.
    Pietro Prini, Gabriel Marcel et la méthodologie de l’invérifiable, Desclée de Brouwer (Paris, 1953).Google Scholar
  11. 3.
    Ibid., p. 31.Google Scholar
  12. 2.
    Miguel de Unamuno, Tragic Sense of Life, Dover Books, (New York, 1954), p. 8.Google Scholar
  13. 3.
    Cf. for this discussion, ME, I, pp. 103–05; RI, pp. 25–26; and MJ, E-O, pp. 320–25.Google Scholar
  14. 1.
    Hocking, op. cit., p. 444.Google Scholar
  15. 1.
    PA, “Introduction par Marcel de Corte,” p. 15.Google Scholar
  16. 1.
    Marcel’s relation to phenomenology has been excellently traced by H. Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, Volume Two Martinus Nijhoff (The Hague, 1960), pp. 421–443.Google Scholar
  17. 1.
    Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript, translated from the Danish by David F. Swenson, Princeton U. Press (Princeton, 1944), p. 106.Google Scholar
  18. 1.
    Cf. Hocking, op. cit., pp. 439–440.Google Scholar
  19. 2.
    Ibid., pp. 460–61. We would emphasize even more than Hocking that Marcel’s philosophy manifests a system, of a certain order.Google Scholar
  20. 3.
    Cf. Paul Ricoeur, Gabriel Marcel et Karl Jaspers, Editions du Temps Présent (Paris, 1947), pp. 111–14.Google Scholar
  21. 1.
    Cf. Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, Doubleday (New York, 1943), pp. 154–161.Google Scholar
  22. 2.
    Prini, op. cit., pp. 79–82.Google Scholar
  23. 1.
    Cf. Prini, op. cit., pp. 78–79.Google Scholar
  24. 1.
    Cf. Maurice Natanson, “Existential Categories in Contemporary Literature,” Carolina Quarterly (1959), p. 20: he points out that one must reflectively grasp and explicate his own style of being-in-reality, his concrete “style of being in the world at the level of ordinary, commonsense life, so that the philosophical character of that level of experience can be clarified.”Google Scholar
  25. 2.
    Cf. Schutz, “Multiple Realities,” PPR, Vol. v. No. 4 (June, 1945), pp. 550–51: man in the natural attitude makes constant and non-thematic use of a specific epoche — of doubt: he suspends the doubt that the world and its objects might be otherwise than they are believed to be.Google Scholar
  26. 3.
    Cf. Natanson, op. cit., p. 23.Google Scholar
  27. 4.
    Natanson, op. cit., p. 25.Google Scholar
  28. 1.
    Hocking, op. cit., p. 441.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands 1971

Authors and Affiliations

  • Richard M. Zaner

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