Abstract
This paper explores a heuristic — representativeness — according to which the subjective probability of an event, or a sample, is determined by the degree to which it: (i) is similar in essential characteristics to its parent population; and (ii) reflects the salient features of the process by which it is generated. This heuristic is explicated in a series of empirical examples demonstrating predictable and systematic errors in the evaluation of uncertain events. In particular, since sample size does not represent any property of the population, it is expected to have little or no effect on judgment of likelihood. This prediction is confirmed in studies showing that subjective sampling distributions and posterior probability judgments are determined by the most salient characteristic of the sample (e.g., proportion, mean) without regard to the size of the sample. The present heuristic approach is contrasted with the normative (Bayesian) approach to the analysis of the judgment of uncertainty.
This study was supported by a grant from the Research and Development Authority of the Hebrew University, by NSF Grant GM 6782 to the second author, and by the U.S. Public Health Service through Grant MH-04439 to Oregon Research Institute. We thank Maya Bar-Hillel for her contributions in all phases of the project, and Ruth Beyth for her help in the collection and analysis of data. We also thank Robert P. Abelson, Ward Edwards, David H. Krantz, William Kruskal, Sarah Lichtenstein, and Paul Slovic for their many helpful comments on an earlier draft of the paper.
A more detailed version of this paper appeared in Cognitive Psychology 3 (1972). 430–454.
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Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1972). Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness. In: Staël Von Holstein, CA.S. (eds) The Concept of Probability in Psychological Experiments. Theory and Decision Library, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2288-0_3
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