The Plausibility of Justification

Abstract

One standard objection made against all versions of utilitarianism—an objection we have not yet explicitly considered—is that utilitarianism does not give adequate consideration to claims of justice.¹ Utilitarianism, it is said, would sanction such obviously unjust practices as racial descrimination simply if these practices resulted in the best overall consequences. Thus, it is concluded, justification of utilitarianism is impossible since use of the utilitarian principle as fundamental cannot be shown to be consistent with such claims of justice. In order to put our consideration of the above objection to utilitarianism in its proper context, it will be helpful to begin by presenting a few tentative suggestions as to what it means to say something is just. But these suggestions can only be understood in light of Chapters I and II. Without being taken in conjunction with these chapters they will perhaps be more misleading than helpful.