The Philosophy of Time

  • Wolfe Mays
Chapter

Abstract

Whitehead was acutely aware of the problems which arise if one does not want to dismiss the time of our direct human experience as a merely illusory reaction on the part of our minds to the physical world. Although interested in time as a human phenomenon, Whitehead was also concerned to show its relation to the time of scientific thought, which he regarded as only dealing with certain formal relational aspects of our changing human experience.1

Keywords

Scientific Concept Physical Time Ordinary Language Congruence Relation Psychological Time 
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References

  1. 1.
    The following books discuss aspects of Whitehead’s philosophy of time: William W. Hammerschmidt, Whitehead’s Philosophy of Time, New York, King’s Crown Press, 1947;Google Scholar
  2. 1a.
    Robert M. Palter, Whitehead’s Philosophy of Science, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, Press, 1960.Google Scholar
  3. 2.
    M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, translated by Colin Smith, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962, p. 421.Google Scholar
  4. 3.
    Ibid., p. 421.Google Scholar
  5. 4.
    Ibid., p. 422.Google Scholar
  6. 5.
    Ibid., p. 432.Google Scholar
  7. 6.
  8. 7.
  9. 8.
  10. 9.
    A.N. Whitehead, An Enquiry Concerning Natural Knowledge, cf. Chap. 1, “Meaning.”Google Scholar
  11. 10.
    Phenomenology of Perception, cf. p. 415.Google Scholar
  12. 11.
    Ibid., pp. 419–420.Google Scholar
  13. 12.
    Percy W. Bridgman, The Nature of Physical Theory, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1936, cf. pp. 29–32.Google Scholar
  14. 13.
    A.N. whitehead, The Concept of Nature, p. 29.Google Scholar
  15. 14.
    E. Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, translated by James S. Churchill, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1964, cf. p. 26.Google Scholar
  16. 15.
    Ibid., p. 29.Google Scholar
  17. 16.
    A.N. Whitehead, “Time, Space and Material,” Proceedings, Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume II, 1919, p. 44.Google Scholar
  18. 17.
    A.N. Whitehead, The Concept of Nature, cf. p. 69.Google Scholar
  19. 18.
    A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, cf. p. 234.Google Scholar
  20. 19.
    Filmer S.C. Northrop, “Whitehead’s Philosophy of Science,” in The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, edited by P. A. Schilpp, Evanston and Chicago, Northwestern University Press, 1941.Google Scholar
  21. 20.
    A. Einstein, “Physik und Realität,” Journal of the Franklin Institute, CCXXI (1936), p. 317. Quoted from Robert M. Palter, Whitehead’s Philosophy of Science, p. 4.Google Scholar
  22. 21.
    Ibid., p. 4n.Google Scholar
  23. 22.
    The Concept of Nature, cf. pp. 121–124. PNK, Chap. Congruence, pp. 49–50.Google Scholar
  24. 23.
    The Principle of Relativity, pp. 49–50.Google Scholar
  25. 24.
    Filmer S.C. Northrop: “Whitehead’s Philosophy of Science,” cf. pp. 200–201.Google Scholar
  26. 25.
    A. Grünbaum, “Whitehead’s Philosophy of Science,” The Philosophical Review, LXXI (1962), pp. 222–223.Google Scholar
  27. 26.
    A. Grünbaum, Philosophical Problems of Space and Time, New York, Knopf, 1963, p. 53.Google Scholar
  28. 27.
    Ibid., p. 62.Google Scholar
  29. 28.
    Ibid., cf. p. 60.Google Scholar
  30. 29.
    A. Grünbaum, “Whitehead’s Philosophy of Science,” p. 229.Google Scholar
  31. 30.
    A. Grünbaum, Modern Science and Zeno’s Paradoxes, London, Allen and Unwin, 1968.Google Scholar
  32. 31.
    Ibid., pp. 45–46.Google Scholar
  33. 32.
    Ibid., cf. p. 52.Google Scholar
  34. 33.
    Ibid., cf. p. 55.Google Scholar
  35. 34.
    Ibid., p. 56.Google Scholar
  36. 35.
    Essays in Science and Philosophy, p. 281. Another thinker who denied the existence of physical passage and who is quoted approvingly by Grünbaum was Hermann Weyl. Weyl stated, “The objective world simply is, it does not happen. Only to the gaze of my consciousness, crawling upward along the life-line of my body, does a section of the world come to life as a fleeting image in space which continuously changes in time” (Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science, Princeton, 1949, p. 116). Weyl’s position would seem to be an updated version of Plato’s conception of time as a moving image of Eternity.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands 1977

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  • Wolfe Mays

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