The Moral Crisis of Explanation in the Social Sciences

  • Ilja Maso
Chapter
Part of the Analecta Husserliana book series (ANHU, volume 15)

Abstract

“The knowledge of the objective-scientific world is ‘grounded’ in the selfevidence of the life-world. The latter is pregiven to the scientific worker, or the working community, as ground; yet, as they build upon this, what is built is something new, something different.”1 Taking this statement by Husserl seriously, one may ask how new, how different, scientific knowledge can be compared with its everyday counterpart.

Keywords

Causal Explanation Scientific Explanation American Sociological Review Tentative Explanation Verifiable Truth 
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References

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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company 1983

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  • Ilja Maso

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