Edgework

Jurgen Ruesch and Gregory Bateson, Communication: The Social Matrix of Psychiatry (New York: W.W. Norton, 1968) p. 209.Google Scholar

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, tr. G.E..M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1953), pp.198, 202, and elsewhere on seeing-as.Google Scholar

Ruesch and Bateson, p. 209.Google Scholar

Gerald Prince, “Narrative Guides”, Chapter III in manuscript of forthcoming book, Narratology (The Hague: Mouton, 1982).Google Scholar

William Labov and Joshua Waletzky, “Narrative Analysis: Oral Versions of Personal Experience”, Essays on the Verbal and Visual Arts, ed. June Helm (Seattle and London: university of Washington Press, 1967) p. 37.Google Scholar

Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis (New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London: Harper and Row, 1974) p. 3.Google Scholar

Gregory Batesonf unpublished Lecture at the university of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia: 1973).Google Scholar

Maurice Natanson, Literature, Philosophy and the Social Sciences (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962) p. 81: “The act of framing, of literally surrounding a canvas with sides of wood or metal, is the astonishing sorcery of the art apprentice. To frame a picture is to separate a part of experience from its context… To create, then, is to separate, to exclude, to deny a whole by attending a fraction of that whole.”Google Scholar

Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind (New York: Ballantine Books, 1972) p. 188.Google Scholar

Goffman, p. 249.Google Scholar

Goffman, p. 82.Google Scholar

Labov and Waletzky, p. 13, “…. narrative will be considered as one verbal technique for recapitulating experience, in particular, a technique of constructing narrative units which natch the temporal sequence of that experience.:”Google Scholar

Roland Barthes, “An Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative”, New Literary History Volume VI (1974–75), pp. 237–272, p. 252.Google Scholar

Barbara Herrnstein Smith, Poetic Closure (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1968) p. 4.Google Scholar

Paul Ricoeur, “Narrative Time”, Critical Inquiry VII, 1 (Autumn 1980) p. 180. See also p. 174: “Following a story, correlatively, is understanding the successive actions, thoughts, and feelings in question insofar as they present a certain directedness. By this I mean that we are pushed ahead by this development and that we reply to its impetus with expectations concerning the outcome and completion of the entire process. In this sense, the story’s conclusion is the pole of attraction of the entire development. But a narrative conclusion can be neither deduced nor predicted. There is no story if our attention is not moved along by a thousand contingencies. This is why a story has to be followed to its conclusion. So rather than being predictable, a conclusion must be acceptable. Looking back from the conclusion to the episodes leading up to it, we have to be able to say that this ending required these sorts of events and this chain of actions. But this backward look is made possible by the teleological movement directed by our expectations when we follow the story.”Google Scholar

Goffman, p. 527.Google Scholar

Smith, p. 42. Consider also the structuralist view that redundancy draws out pattern, Bateson, Steps, p. 130.Google Scholar

Emmanuel Schegloff and Harvey Sacks, “Opening up Closings” in Ethnomethodology, ed. Roy Turner (Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1974) p. 256: “Having initially formulated the closing problem for conversation in terms of the suspension of the transition property of utterance completions, a technique was described to come to terms with that problem --- the terminal exchange.”Google Scholar

Labov, “The Transformation of Experience in Narrative Syntax” in Language in the Inner City (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1972) pp. 365–366.Google Scholar

Schegloff and Sacks, p. 236.Google Scholar

Sacks, “On the Analyzability of Stories by Children” in John Gumperz and Dell Hymes, eds., Directions in Socioligistics: The Ethnography of Speaking (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972) pp. 325–345, pp. 344–345.Google Scholar

Harvey Sacks, Unpublished Lecture Notes (University of California, Irvine: 9 April, 1970) Lecture II, p. 10.Google Scholar

Goffman, P. 505.Google Scholar

Labov, p. 365–366.Google Scholar

Sacks, (9 April 1970) Lecture II, pp. 13–14.Google Scholar

Labov, p. 363.Google Scholar

Compare Labov, p. 364, and Labov and David Fanshel, Therapeutic Discourse (New York, San Francisco, London: Academic Press, 1977) p. 106.Google Scholar

Labov and Waletzky, p. 40.Google Scholar

Labov, p. 366.Google Scholar

Labov and Waletzky, p. 32.Google Scholar

Sacks, (1970) Lecture VII, p. 10.Google Scholar

Maurice Natanson notes that Alfred Schutz used to refer to birth, death, and aging as “metaphysical constants,” The Journying Self (Massachusetts: Addison Wesley Pub. Co., 1970) p. 198.Google Scholar

Harold Garfinkel, “Background Expectancies,” Rules and Meanings ed. Mary Douglas (Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1977) p. 21.Google Scholar

Sacks, (1970) Lecture VII, p. 11.Google Scholar

Sacks, (1970) Lecture VII, p. 10.Google Scholar

Jane Spencer Edwards describes the way orientations relate Taleworlds to the social realms of storytellers and hearers in “Orientation to the Contexts of Oral Narrative,” presented at the American Folklore Society Meetings (Los Angeles: October, 1979).Google Scholar

Labov, p. 366.Google Scholar

Labov, p. 370.Google Scholar

See Goffman, pp. 543, 544, and 545, on prospective and retrospective framing.Google Scholar

Labov and Waletzky, p. 37.Google Scholar

See Charles Goodwin, “The Interactive Construction of the Sentence Within the Turn at Talk in Natural Conversation”, presented at the American Anthropological Society Meetings (San Francisco, 1975) on the mutual construction of turns at talk.Google Scholar

Labov, p. 372.Google Scholar

Sacks, (28 May 1970) Lecture VII, p. 2, and (4 June 1970) Lecture VIII, p. 4.Google Scholar

Schutz, footnote, p. 256.Google Scholar

I am indebted to Erving Goff man not just for the phrase “frame analysis” but for the ontological concerns it implies.Google Scholar