The Concept of Purpose in a Naturalistic Humanist Perspective

Abstract

Purposive behavior, irregardless of how it is conceived or defined, may be quite extensive in the animal kingdom. But, though it may not be confined to the human animal, it still characterizes human existence, or at least some of the manifestations of human existence, to an exceptional extent (indeed to such an extent that purpose as manifested in the human domain is generally conceived as constituting a difference in kind from its manifestations in the rest of the organic world). It is, therefore, not surprising that concepts of human purpose have come to occupy positions of fundamental importance in a large number of the conceptual-aspirational frameworks¹ men have developed. Indeed, these conceptual-aspirational frameworks themselves are often simply (or at least in large measure) manifestations of the human search for purpose. That is to say, many, perhaps all, of the conceptual-aspirational systems men have developed have been developed in order to create or elucidate structures which satisfy the human desire for a sense of purpose (in some sense of that term).